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Missouri Law Review
Volume XVI NOVEMBER, 1951 Number 4
THE WORK OF THE SUPREME COURT
FOR THE YEAR 1950
STATISTICAL SURVEY
WILLIAM W. "SHINN*
The statistical survey for 1950 is derived from the 265 majority opinions
written by the judges and commissioners of the Missouri Supreme Court
during that year. This sum represents an increase of 21 opinions over the
preceding year and is the largest since 1943, when 306 opinions were writ-
ten." Five of the opinions were originally written in division and later
accepted by the court en bane. There were four dissents with opinion and
ten without opinion. Six concurring opinions were handed down and there
were ten concurrences without opinion. The personnel of the court was
changed in the following manner: Judge Douglas resigned December 31,
1949; Judge, formerly Commissioner, Dalton was selected January 3, 1950;
Judge Clark died June 9, 1950; and Judge Hollingsworth was selected August
4, 1950. Commissioner Bradley resigned January 23, 1950; and Commis-
sioners Aschemeyer and Lozier were selected January 3, 1950, and January
23, 1950, respectively. To enable the court to keep abreast of its work, a
special division (Division Three), composed of Judge Tipton of the court
and Judges Vandeventer and McDowell of the Springfield Court of Appeals,
was formed and ordered to hear cases on November 14, 1950.
Table I indicates the distribution of the 265 opinions among the divi-
sions of the court.
TABLE I
NUMBER OF OPINIONS WRITTEN BY EACH DIvIsIoN
E Banc ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 48
Division Number One ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 119
Division Number Two ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 96
Special Division Number Three ------------------------------------------------------ 2
Total ............................................................................................ 265
*Chairman, Board of Student Editors.
1. Total majority opinions for the preceding six years are as follows- 1944,
251; 1945, 197; 1946, 181; 1947, 244; 1948, 254; 1949, 244.
(341)
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Table II indicates the classification of the opinions according to their
dominant issue. Since many of the cases contained several issues, the selec-
tion of the most important one was necessarily somewhat arbitrary.
TABLE II
TOPICAL ANALYSIS OF DECIsIoNs
A dm inistrative Law ......................................................................... 4
A ppeal and Error ......................................................................... 17
A ttorney and C lient ....................................................................... 2
A utom obiles ....................................................................................... 6
B anks and B anking ...................................................................... 2
C onstitutional L aw .............................................................. . ...... 8
Contracts ......................................................................................... 3
C orporations ..................................................................................... 4
Courts .................................................................................................. 1
Crim inal L aw ................................................................................. 44
D am ages ............................................................................................. 6
D eath .................................................................................................. 1
District and Prosecuting Attorneys ................................................ I
D ivorce ............................................................................................... 3
E quity ............................................................................................... 5
Evidence ............................................................................................ 3
Fraud .................................................................................................. 6
G ifts ...................................................................................................... 1
H usband and W ife ......................................................................... 2
Insane Persons ................................................................................. 3
Insurance ......................................................................................... 4
Judgm ents .......................................................................................... 4
Levees and Flood C ontrol ............................................................. 2
Lim itation of A ctions ....................................................................... 2
M andam us ....................................................................................... 3
M arriage ............................................................................................ 1
M aster and Servant .......................................................................... 1
M ortgages .......................................................................................... 3
M unicipal C orporations ................................................................. 4
N egligence ........................................................................................ 34
N egotiable Instrum ents ................................................................. 1
Partnerships ........................................................................................ 1
Pleading ........................................................................................... 2
Practice and Procedure ............................................................... 11
Principal and A gent ......................................................................... 2
Prohibition ........... . ..... ...................... 1
Q uo W arranto .................................................................................... 1
2
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Railroads ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 5
Real Property ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 20
Schools and School Districts ------------------------------------------------------------ 5
Statutes ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 2
T axation .............................................................................................. 2
Torts (other than negligence) --------------------------------------------------- 3
Trusts ................................................--------------------------------------------- 5
Vendor and Purchaser ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 2
Wills and Administration -------------------------------------------------------------- 15
Workmen's Compensation --------------------- .......................------------------- 7
Total -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 265
Table III indicates the disposition of the cases before the court during




Alternative Writ of Mandamus Modified .................................... 1
Alternative Writ of Mandamus Quashed -------------------------------------- 1
Appeal Dismissed ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 3
Cause Remanded with Directions -------------------------------------------------- 2
Cause Transferred to Court of Appeals ---------------------------------------- 3
Decree Affirmed ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2
Decree Affirmed in Part and Reversed in Part and Cause
Remanded with Directions ------------------------------------------------------ 1
Decree Affirmed and Cause Remanded for Further Proceedings 1
Decree Modified and Affirmed as Modified ------------------------------------ I
Decree Reversed and Cause Remanded with Directions -------- 3
Judgment Affirmed ......................................--. ... ----------------------------- 129
Judgment Affirmed and Cause Remanded ------------------------------------ 1
Judgment Affirmed in Part and Reversed and Modified in Part 1
Judgment Affirmed in Part and Reversed in Part and Cause
Remanded with Directions ---------------------------------------------........ 3
Judgment Affirmed on Condition of Remittitur; Otherwise
Reversed and Remanded ....................----- ------ --- --------------------- 6
Judgment and Decree Affirmed -------------------------------------------------------- 4
Judgment and Decree Modified and Affirmed as Modified ........ 1
Judgment and Order Reversed and Cause Remanded --------------- 2
Judgment and Sentence Affirmed -------------------------------------------------- 2
Judgment Modified and Affirmed as Modified ------------ -- -- -- -- -- 6
Judgment Reversed .......................................................................... 7
Judgment Reversed and Cause Remanded .................................... 16
3
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Judgment Reversed and Cause Remanded for a New Trial .... 12
Judgment Reversed and Cause Remanded for Further
Proceedings ................................................................................ 5
Judgment Reversed and Cause Remanded with Directions ........ 15
Judgment Reversed and Cause Remanded with Directions on
Condition of Remittitur ............................................................ 1
Judgment Reversed and Declaratory Judgment Entered .......... 1
Judgment Reversed in Part and Affirmed in Part ........................ 1
Order Affirmed ................................................................................ 5
Order Granting New Trial Affirmed and Cause Remanded ........ 7
Order Reversed and Causes Remanded with Directions ............ 9
Order Suspending License to Practice Law ................................ 1
Petitioner Remanded to Custody .................................................... 1
Preemptory Writ of Mandamus Issued ...................................... 2
Preliminary Rule in Prohibition Discharged ........................... 2
Provisional Rule in Prohibition Discharged .............................. 2
Provisional Rule in Prohibition Made Absolute ....................... 3
Rule Made Absolute in Part and Discharged in Part ................ 1
W rit of Ouster Ordered .................................................................. 1
T otal ............................................................................................ 265
The final table (Table IV) indicates the disposition of the motions
subsequent to decision to the extent that such disposition can be determined
from present records. Cases wherein rehearings were granted or which
were transferred to the court en banc are necessarily not included in this
survey.
TABLE IV
MOTIONS SUBSEQUENT TO DECISION
Motion for Rehearing Denied .................................................... 43
Motion for Rehearing or an Order Limiting Retrial Overruled 1
,Motion for Rehearing or Modification of Opinion Denied ........ 2
Motion for Rehearing or to Modify Opinion Denied and
Opinion Modified on Court's Own Motion ............................ 1
Motion for Rehearing or to Transfer to Court En Banc Denied 58
M otion to M odify Denied ................................................................ 1
Motion to Modify Opinion Denied and Opinion Modified on
Court's Own Motion ..................................... 1
Motion to Modify Opinion or to Clarify Opinion Denied and
Motion for Rehearing or to Transfer to Banc Denied ........ 1
Motion to Transfer to Court En Banc Denied .......................... 3
Motion to Transfer to Court En Banc or for Modification of
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APPELATE PRACTICE
CHARLES V. GARmrr*
THE JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT
During the year under review the court found it necessary to transfer
only three cases to the appropriate court of appeals on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction in the supreme court. At least one of them involves questions of
some importance.
In Lemonds v. Holmes,' an action for damages for personal injuries
sustained in an automobile accident, the jury returned a verdict in favor of
plaintiff and against two of four defendants, assessing damages at $5000,
and also returned a verdict against plaintiff and in favor of the other two
defendants. Plaintiff appealed from the judgment in favor of the two de-
fendants against whom the judgment in favor of plaintiff was rendered
also appealed. Plaintiff had sued for $20,000 damages, but did not seek
to have the judgment which he did obtain reviewed upon any ground of
inadequacy or damages. The court held that the amount in dispute was
only $5000, and transferred the cause. The holding is based upon the rule
announced in Hoelzel v. Railroad,2 which in effect overruled prior decisions
as to procedure to be followed where a judgment for plaintiff is reversed as
to only one of two or more defendants who are jointly liable. It had for-
merly been the rule that, since there can be but one judgment in the case,
error as to one defendant necessitated a new trial of all issues as to all de-
fendants. That rule was later modified in cases providing that, under those
circumstances, the case would be remanded to the trial court with directions
to hold in abeyance the verdict of liability as to the defendants against
which no error was committed and to grant a new trial as to the liability
of the other defendant against whom error was committed. This resulted
in a new trial as to both defendants on the question of damages.3 In the
Hoelzel case that rule was further modified to provide that the new trial
be confined to the issue of liability only of the defendant against whom error
had been committed, to be followed by a judgment for the amount of the
verdict originally rendered to be entered against all defendants finally held
liable. It was pointed out in the Hoelzel case that there is no set rule which
should govern the question but that the court in the light of the facts in each
*Attorney, Kansas City. LL.B., Kansas City School of Law, 1912.
1. 229 S.W. 2d 691 (Mo. 1950).
2. 337 Mo. 61, 85 S.W. 2d 126 (1935).
3. Compare Neal v. Curtis & Co., 328 Mo. 389, 41 S.W. 2d 543 (1931).
5
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particular case should determine the character of the error and the issues
affected thereby and rule the question accordingly. Applying that rule to
the jurisdictional question involved in the Lemonds case, the court held
that, because the plaintiff did not question the amount of the verdict as
to the two defendants held liable by the jury, the other two defendants
could have satisfied plaintiff's claim by confessing judgment in favor of
plaintiff for $5000, and that, for that reason, the amount involved on the
appeal was only $5000. The court did not consider the question of whether
or not, if plaintiff should be successful in the appellate court against the
two defendants who were discharged by the jury, those two defendants, in
the second trial, could raise a question as to the excessiveness of a $5000
verdict. It does appear that those two defendants are necessarily deprived
of the right to question the excessiveness of a $5000 award under the situa-
tion created by the decision in the Lemonds case.
A slightly different situation was before the court in Reaves v. Rieger,'
which was also transferred because of the fact that the amount involved
on the appeal was only $5000 although plaintiff had sued for $20,000. In
that case the jury returned a verdict for $5000.00. The trial court sus-
tained defendant's motion to set aside the verdict and enter judgment for
defendant and, in the alternative, ordered a new trial. The court states
that if both the order granting a new trial and the order entering judgment
were reversed, plaintiff would gain and defendant would lose only $5000
by the reinstatement of the jury's verdict. On the other hand, if the judg-
ment for defendant were affirmed, plaintiff would lose only that for which
he contends, on the appeal, he is entitled to, that is, the $5000 awarded
by the verdict which he seeks to have reinstated. The court holds that
plaintiff's claim for the original amount prayed for is not now before the
appellate court but that on the appeal the amount of the verdict which the
trial court set aside is determinative of appellate jurisdiction. It does not
appear that, in the event the case is returned for a new trial, the plaintiff
would be limited to a $5000 recovery.
The third case transferred is Julden v. Houck.; That was a suit by
life tenants for authority to execute certain leases and make certain im-
provements and to bind the remaindermen to the terms of the leases.
Appellate jurisdiction was sought to be sustained in the supreme court be-
4. 232 S.W. 2d 500 (Mo. 1950).
5. 228 S.W. 2d 668 (Mo. 1950).
(Vol. 16
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cause of the fact that the estimated cost of the improvement was $140,000.
In transferring the cause on its own motion, the court points to the fact
that the cost or value of the improvement is not an issue on the appeal
and that there is no evidence from which the value of the relief granted
to the plaintiff from the decree can be determined. It is again emphasized
that the amount involved must affirmatively appear from the record in order
to vest jurisdiction in the supreme court. On the other hand, the court
held, in Chlemical Bank & Trust Co. v. Ankeuser-Busctz, that where the
suit was to compel the issuance of a newstock certificate to replace a lost
certificate and the ownership of the stock would be lost without the new
certificate, and the market value of the stock was in excess of $5000, the
court did have appellate jurisdiction on the ground of "amount in dispute."
In Missouri State Oil Co. v. Fuse,7 the action was one to establish a
permanent easement against defendant's land. The court held that it had
jurisdiction on appeal on the ground that title to real estate was involved,
pointing to the fact that, although title to the fee was not directly in issue,
the relief sought is an easement which would interfere with the exclusive
and unrestricted possession and use of the land in question, and would
operate upon defendant's title "in some measure or decree." The court
points to the fact that the question there considered differs from the ques-
tion presented in an appeal in a condemnation proceeding, where the issue
is not "title" but is on the "right to take all or a part of the landowner's
conceded title."
THE RIGHT OF APPEAL
In Kattering v. Fraz,8 the court considered the requirement of the
1943 Code of Civil Procedure and the rules of court with reference to the
time for deposit of the docket fee. Under the former practice the trial
court habitually permitted the taking of appeals without payment of the
docket fee, and, as a result, numerous delays in the final disposition of liti-
gation frequently resulted. When the code was adopted it was specifically
provided that the docket fee shall be deposited with the clerk of the trial
court at the time of filing notice of appeal,9 and that statutory rule is imple-
mented by Supreme Court Rule 1.29 prohibiting the appellate clerk from
filing a notice of appeal received from the clerk of the trial court not
6. 231 S.W. 2d 165 (Mo. 1950).
7. 232 S.W. 2d 501 (Mo. 1950).
8. 231 S.W. 2d 148 (Mo. 1950).
9. Mo. REv. STAT. § 512.050 (1949).
7
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accompanied by the docket fee, and Rule 3.28 providing that no notice of
appeal shall be accepted and fled by the clerk of the trial court unless the
docket fee is paid. In the Kattering case the court dismissed the appeal be-
cause the statute and rules had not been complied with, notwithstanding
the affidavit of counsel showing the absence of inexcusable neglect upon
appellant's part in failing to comply with the rules. The court calls atten-
tion to the fact that if the rules are not followed the result would be to
create again the same conditions which the new code sought to remedy.
The decision, in affect, amounts so a holding that the actual payment of
the docket fee is jurisdictional-a very proper holding within both the
intention and the spirit of the new code.
In Coy-ne v. Soutlhwestern, Bell Telephone Co.,10 the trial court sus-
tained defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiff's amended petition and dis-
missed the case with prejudice. From that order of dismissal plaintiff
appealed. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the appeal in the appellate
court for lack of jurisdiction. The record shows that plaintiff's first petition
was dismissed on defendant's motion for failure to state a cause of action.
Ten days later the court entered an order enlarging the period for pleading.
Within the enlarged time for pleading plaintiff filed the amended petition.
The court held that the first order of dismissal, that is, dismissal of the
first petition, was a final judgment, from which plaintiff took no appeal.
Consequently the trial court did not have authority to extend the time or
to enter any further orders after the 10-day period of time within which
to file a notice of appeal had expired. While the trial court could have
granted plaintiff relief by setting aside the first order of dismissal, or by
sustaining a motion for a new trial if one had been filed within 10 days
after the dismissal had been ordered, neither of those steps were taken, and
the opinion holds that under those facts there was no appellate jurisdiction
and that the appeal should be dismissed. This opinion again discloses the
fact that in every case where a motion to dismiss plaintiff's petition is
sustained, the plaintiff must see to it that affirmative action is taken within
10 days, either by filing a notice of appeal, filing a motion for a new trial,
or obtaining an order of the trial court setting the order of dismissal aside.
If none of those steps are taken the right of appeal is lost and the order
sustaining the motion to dismiss becomes a final determination of the case
from which no appeal will lie.
10. 232 S.W. 2d 377 (Mo. 1950).
[Vol, 16
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The court also dismissed the appeal in State ex rel St. Louis County
v. Public Service Commission."- In that case proceedings before the Public
Service Commission were brought to the circuit court for review. The
circuit court reversed the report and order of the commission and remanded
the cause to the commission for further proceedings. Thereupon the relator
filed its motion to reconsider the judgment of the circuit court, in the nature
of a motion for a new trial and, upon the overruling of that motion, filed
its notice of appeal. The court held that the order of the circuit court
remanding the cause to the commission for further proceedings was not a
final order and that the case could not be brought to the appellate court
on appeal until the commission had acted pursuant to the order of the
circuit court and the matter had again been brought before the circuit
court for review. In so ordering the court rejected the theory that the
Public Service Commission law provides a complete method for appeal and
that the provisions of the Civil Code with respect to appeal are inapplicable.
QUESTIONS FOR REVIEW
In Nelson v. Kansas City,12 plaintiff sued for judgment in the sum of
$10,000 for personal injuries. At the close of all the evidence defendant
moved for a directed verdict on the ground that no submissible case was
made. That motion was overruled and plaintiff secured a verdict for $1100.
Plaintiff filed a motion for a new trial on the ground, among others, that
the verdict was grossly inadequate. The trial court sustained the motion on
that ground and ordered a new trial on the question of damages only.
Defendant appealed from that order without filing any after-trial motion.
On the appeal respondent contended that, as defendant had not filed any
after-trial motion, the only question for appellate review was whether or
not the trial court abused its discretion in granting a new trial on the
ground of the inadequacy of the verdict. Appellant contended that the
court has the right and the duty to review the evidence as to liability. That
contention was sustained, the court stating that if plaintiff made no sub-
missible case he was not entitled to any damages and could not be granted
a new trial solely on the ground that the verdict in his favor was inadequate.
The court then considered the evidence as to liability and held that the
defendant's motion for a directed verdict should have been sustained. Point-
11. 228 S.W. 2d 1 (Mo. 1950).
12. 227 S.W. 2d 672 (Mo. 1950).
9
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ing to the fact that under proper procedure defendant should have re-
newed his request for a directed verdict by an appropriate after-trial mo-
tion, the court held that this failure on the part of defendant to follow the
proper procedure did not deprive the court of jurisdiction to remand the
cause with direction to enter judgment in favor of defendant. In so doing,
the court relied not only upon the reasoning that a verdict in any amount
would be excessive where defendant is not liable in any event, but also
pointed to its Rule 3.27 respecting plain errors, and its Rule 1.28 provid-
ing for liberal construction of the rules to promote justice. Thus, while not
approving defendant's failure to file a proper after-trial motion, the court
refused to put the parties to the expense of a new trial where the final
result could only be a judgment for defendant. Similarly in Wood v. St.
Louis Public Service Co.,13 the plaintiff appealed from an order of the trial
court overruling plaintiff's motion for a new trial on the issue of damages
only. The court again held that the question of whether or not plaintiff
made a submissible case was before the court for consideration, even though
defendant had not appealed; but, in considering that question on its merit,
reached the conclusion that a submissible case was made. The opinion then
reviewed the evidence as to the adequacy of the verdict, held that it was
not adequate, and affirmed the judgment.
RECORDS AND BRIEFS
During the year under review the court was not called upon to con-
sider any substantial question with respect to the requirements of the sta-
tutes or of its own rules as to the sufficiency of records and briefs.
CRIMINAL LAW
CHARLES H. REIM*
In the field of criminal law there were forty-two appeals decided by
the Supreme Court of Missouri, during the year 1950. Despite the fact
there is rarely a matter of first impression before the court in this field, the
supreme court reversed approximately one case in three. Thirteen appeals
resulted in reversals, while twenty-nine were affirmed, including one by a
divided court.
13. 228 S.W. 2d 665 (Mo. 1950).
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I. PROCEDURE BEFORE TRIAL
A. Searek and seizure
No case involving the question of lawful search and seizure was decided
on its merits by the supreme court during the year 1950. In the companion
cases of State v. Medley and State v. Fithenl and in State v. Lee,2 the court
found the question had not been sufficiently preserved or presented for
review.
B. Indictment and Information
The court continued the tendency to sustain informations and indict-
ments which generally follow language of the statute and apprise defendant
of the offense with which he is charged.3
Failure of the information to state the day of the month upon which
the offense occurred is not fatal; 4 nor is failure to allege with particularity
the ownership or description of property allegedly stolen, when property or
ownership is merely incidental and not an essential element of the crime
charged. 5
1. 232 S.W. 2d S19 (Mo. 1950).
2. 233 S.W. 2d 666 (Mo. 1950).
3. State v. Hardy, 225 S.W. 2d 693 (Mo. 1950) (defendant was charged with
assault with malice aforethought, the statute used the word, "maim", and the court
found the words, "to do great personal injury or bodily harm", used in the informa-
tion to be the same and within the terms of the statute>; State v. Anderson, 232
S.W. 2d 909 (Mo. 1950) (charge was embezzlement by bailee, and objection was
made to the indictment on the ground that it failed to show by whom the embezzled
property was delivered to bailee. Court said where charge is basically predicated
upon the existence of a fiduciary relationship and that relationship is expressed in
the statute by the use of the word, "bailee", it may likewise be so compressed in
the indictment It is not necessary for all particulars of the fiduciary relationship
to be explicitly pleaded if the term used in the statute is employed and is sufficient
to indicate that relationship); State v. Jones, 227 S.W. 2d 713 (Mo. 1950) (charge
was burglary of a dwelling; court found information which contained, "breaking the
knob to a rear kitchen door", sufficiently followed language of statute which read,
"by forcible bursting or breaking the wall or outer door of such house or the lock
or bolt of such door"); State v. Dowling, 230 S.W. 2d 691 (Mo. 1950) (where
charge was grand larceny; description in information of property alleged to have
been stolen consisted of a listing of the specific articles together with their reason-
able value); State v. Birkner, 229 S.W. 2d 674 (Mo. 1950); State v. Black, 227
S.W. 2d 1006 (Mo. 1950).
4. State v. Feeney, 226 S.W. 2d 688 (Mo. 1950). Also see State v. Shipley,
232 S.W. 2d 515 (Mo. 1950) where the information charged the crime on the 27th
of March and the instruction referred to March 26th as the date.
5. State v. Lundry, 233 S.W. 2d 734 (Mo. 1950), where affidavit filled in
magistrate court referred to "divers red oak and white oak trees" and amended in-
formation stated, "fifty Black Oak trees." In affirming conviction the court said
the amendment could not have prejudiced the substantial rights of the defendant.
See also State v. Dowling, supra, note 3.
11
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Where defendant entered into a conspiracy with others to rob and pur-
suant to the conspiracy, and in the perpetration of the robbery, a victim
was killed by a conspirator, other than defendant, it was not necessary for
the information to aver the conspiracy.'
II. CONTINUANCES
In the two cases where a denial of defendant's motion for a continuance
was presented for review, the appellate court found no abuse of trial court's
discretion, where in one the evidence of the absent witness would have been
merely cumulative-and application allegedly due to sickness of witness failed
to contain either a doctor's certificate or supporting medical opinion,7 and
in the other generally there was no abuse of discretion.8
III. TRIAL
A. Voir Dire
A prospective juror who at one stage of questioning indicates he has
formed an opinion based on "general newspaper reports" which is not a
fixed opinion, but one that would influence his judgment and take evidence
to remove and that it would be impossible for him to be fair and impartial
in the case, then later states he could go into the trial with an open mind
and not be guided by anything but the evidence and instruction, is a quali-
fied juror, and where record did not disclose any objection to court's method
of questioning juror, the appellate court held that there was no showing of
abuse of trial court's discretion. Nor was there an abuse of discretion in
overruling a challenge for cause in a murder case where a venireman qualified
as a competent juror, but for personal reasons stated he would rather not
serve.20
B. Opening statement
While the reading of the information to the jury during the opening
statement is not favored, it does not constitute reversible error; but reading
6. State v. Bradley, 234 S.W. 2d 556 (Mo. 1950). It was not necessary for
the information to allege the homicide was committed by another, who with de-
fendant and others had entered into a conspiracy to rob. Defendant was not
prosecuted for robbery nor for entering into a conspiracy, but for murder and evi-
dence of the conspiracy was but an incident to the crime charged, and proof that the
homicide was committed in the perpetration of robbery was tantamount to proof
of the necessary elements of the crime of murder in the first degree.
7. State v. Britton, 228 S.W. 2d 662 (Mo. 1950).
8. State v. Garner, 360 Mo. 50, 226 S.W. 2d 604 (1950).
9. State v. Tiedt, 360 Mo. 594, 229 S.W. 2d 582 (1950).
10. State v. Brown, 360 Mo. 104, 227 S.W. 2d 646 (1950).
[Vol. 16
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the prosecutor's affidavit vouching for the facts underlying and constituting
the charge, according to prosecutor's best information and belief, is rever-
sible error.11
C. Evidence
1. Confessions and admissions
Failure of the record to affirmatively show that before making a con-
fession the defendent had been advised of his right to counsel, does not
render the confession involuntary, even though defendant was under arrest
at the time.'2
Holding defendant in jail without a criminal charge being placed against
him, for a period of more than twenty hours, which is a violation of Section
544.170, of Missouri Revised Statutes (1949), does not render defendant's
confession, given while under arrest, involuntary as a matter of law."3
2. Conduct of Defendant
Proof of flight, resisting or attempting to escape and possession and
threatened use of a weapon at the time of arrest are competent as bearing
on the question of defendant's guilt.'- However, in another case, defendant's
witness' testimony, that some five or six weeks prior to the killing defendant
had related to him that defendant had had a discussion with victim and
witness received the impression defendant was disturbed, worried, excited
and alarmed because of victim's threats, was excluded as heresay, purely
self-serving and not part of the res gesta, in the absence of other evidence
that the defendant had prior difficulty with the victim or that his condition
was due to his relationship with the victim.1
In a murder prosecution the court approved admission of evidence that
the defendant believed the grand jury was investigating his conduct and
that of his son in certain transactions with the deceased and that the defend-
ant exhibited an active interest in what the grand jury was doing, on the
11. State v. Bohannon, 234 S.W. 2d 793 (Mo. 19$0).
12. State v. Tillett, 233 S.W. 2d 690 (Mo. 1950).
13. State v. Lee, supra note 2; In State v. Tillett, supra note 12, defendant
was also held in custody beyond the statutory period and urged that as a ground for
acquittal without avail.
14. State v. Garner, supra note 8; In State v. Missey, 234 S.W. 2d 777 (Mo.
1950), the court approved admission of testimony of a police officer relating con-
versation of co-defendants, overheard through the use of a microphone placed in thejail.
15. State v. Tillett, supra note 12.
13
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issue of motive, and held it did not violate the statute with respect to secrecy
of grand jury proceedings. 6
3. Proof of other crimes
Where intent is an essential element of the crime charged, evidence
tending to show intent is admissible, although showing other offenses; and
evidence of other crimes, where admissible on the issue of intent, can be
shown independent of any conviction therefor.17
In a prosecution for statutory rape, evidence of two state's witnesses'
convictions in juvenile court for petit larceny was inadmissible to affect
witnesses' credibility."
In a murder prosecution, where the state charged that defendant hired
another to help defendant and his son kill the deceased, evidence of the
acquittal of the son in a prior trial was properly excluded.19
4. Privilege, competency and credibility
During the year reviewed the court interpreted Section 546.260, Mis-
souri Revised Statutes (1949), and found under this section that a wife,
while a competent witness against her husband, cannot be forced to testify
for the State, contrary to her wishes.
2 0
A witness, who some six years prior to the trial was adjudged by the
probate court to be an habitual drunkard and incapable of managing his
affairs and committed to a state hospital, was prima facie a competent wit-
16. State v. Brown, supra note 10.
17. State v. Medley, supra note 1. The court further held in this case that a
general objection to the admission of evidence concerning prior convictions was
insufficient unless the evidence was wholly inadmissible for any purpose. Objection
must be specific and call court's attention directly to the group upon which the
objection is being made. It was suggested that had an objection to the evidence
been made upon the ground that it tended to prove a separate crime for which de-
fendant was not on trial, a more serious question would have confronted the court.
18. State v. Coffman, 360 Mo. 782, 230 S.W. 2d 761 (1950).
19. State v. Brown, supra note 10.
20. State v. Dunbar, 230 S.W. 2d 845 (Mo. 1950). Wife filled an affidavit
against her husband for felonious assault with a gun, her arm being amputated due
to the injury she received. At the trial she refused to testify and the court required
her to do so. This was reversible error, court saying while she was a competent
witness she was not a compellable witness. The statute expressly applies to crimi-
nal cases and the option to testify or not to do so is with the spouse and not with the
defendant. This is true despite wording of the statute which reads, "but any such
person may, at the option of the defendant, testify in his behalf", the court holding
this was an unnecessary provision and having no relation to the first part of the
section making the spouse a competent witness. In State v. Black, supra note 3, the
question of wife and children testifying against 'defendant was also discussed but
here no question was preserved for review.
[Vol. 16
14
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 16, Iss. 4 [1951], Art. 1
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol16/iss4/1
1951] WORK OF MISSOURI SUPREME COURT FOR 1950 355
ness and, in absence of request for hearing on the issue of mental compe-
tency, the court did not err in overruling objection to witnesses' testimony.21
Two cases involved the competency of children to testify. In one case
the supreme court found that the trial court abused its discretion in permit-
ting a girl aged five years and* four months to testify, 2 and in another case
the appellate court found the testimony of a boy six years of age to be com-
petent.23
In two rape cases the appellate court approved of the trial court's per-
mitting prosecutrix to exhibit to the jury the child born of the intercourse
for the purpose of comparing the child's features with those of the defen-
dant.2' Our court had not previously ruled on this question and there is a
conflict of authority in other jurisdictions.
D. Cross-examination
Where defendant's daughter was the deceased, the court, in reversing
a manslaughter conviction, held it was erroneous and prejudicial to de-
fendant, for the state to be permitted to examine defendant's wife on cross-
examination concerning the way defendant treated the witness. On direct
examination the wife was asked how the defendant treated the children,
including the deceased, but was not asked how he treated her, and the court
found that she was clearly examined on a subject not brought out in direct
examination, in violation of Section 546.260, Missouri Revised Statutes.
(1949). 25
Limiting the scope of the cross-examination is within the sound discre-
tion of the trial court; 28 and the same is true concerning a request for mis-
trial due to incidents arising during the course of the cross-examinationY.2
21. State v. Brown, supra note 10.
22. State v. Jones, 360 Mo. 723, 230 S.W. 2d 678 (1950).
23. State v. Tillett, supra note 12. In this and the Jones case the court dis-
cusses this matter fully, saying that there is no precise age at which a child can be
considered competent or incompetent. In each case the trial judge is to determine
this by appropriate questions, and his decision can only be set aside where there
has been an abuse of this discretion. The four fundamental elements are: a) present
understanding of, or intelligence to understand on instruction, to tell the truth; b)
mental capacity at the time of occurrence in question truly to observe and register
such occurrence; c) memory sufficient to retain an independent recollection of ob-
servations made; d) capacity truly to translate into words the memory of such
observations.
24. State v. Johnson, 234 S.W. 2d 219 (Mo. 1950); State v. Bryant, 234 S.W.
2d 584 (Mo. 1950).
25. State v. Black, supra note 3.
26. State v. Ronimous, 227 S.W. 2d 58 (Mo. 1950).
27. State v. Ronimous, supra note 26; State v. Mahan, 226 S.W. 2d 593 (Mo.
1950).
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E. Instructions
The court is not required to instruct the jury upon the defense of alibi
as part of the law of the case, without a request from the defendant for such
an instruction;28 and in absence of a request by the defendant, the court is
not bound to instruct upon questions which are merely cautionary and col-
lateral to the principal issues involved in the case. 29 Failure to instruct the
jury that a unanimous verdict was required was not fatal, where when ver-
dict of guilty was returned, the jury was polled and the court ascertained
that the verdict was unanimous.3 0
Where defendant was charged with the crime against nature, and the
charge was supported by substantial evidence, the trial court properly re-
fused to instruct that if ihe jury found prosecuting witness's testimony to
be contradictory or contrary to human experience the jury should disregard
such testimony unless corroborated, as being comment on the evidence.',
In a larceny case, where uncontradicted evidence shows the value of the
property stolen to be over thirty dollars, an instruction on petit larceny is
improper; 32 likewise where evidence does not justify any inference that
defendant had attempted but failed in his purpose, the court properly
refused defendant's instruction submitting the issue of an attempt to commit
a crime.3 3
In the case of State v. McGee,3 4 the constitutionality of the instruction
relative to the defense of insanity was raised. By this approach, the court
was again asked, without avail, to review and reverse its former decisions
28. State v. Johnson, 234 S.W. 2d 219 (Mo. 1950); State v. Missey, supra
note 14.
29. State v. Lee, supra note 2 (on question whether a confession is voluntary.
Where state's main instruction admitted the essential facts to be proved by the
state to authorize a conviction, defendant's requested instruction submitting the
converse of the facts and issues, but which did not do so correctly, was properly
refused; but had they been correct, court was obligated to give them); State v.
Bradley, supra, note 6; State v. Mahan, 226 S.W. 2d 593 (Mo. 1950) (involving
accomplice's creditability as a witness where there was testimony in addition to that
of the accomplice).
30. State v. Brown, supra note 10.
31. State v. Wilson, 233 S.W. 2d 686 (Mo. 19$0); however an instruction
that if defendant filed to avoid arrest, jury might take that into consideration in
determining guilt or innocence was not subject to objection as a comment on the evi-
dence. State v. Bryant, supra note 24.
32. State v. Stegall, 226 S.W. 2d 720 (Mo. 1950).
33. State v. Wilson, supra note 31. And in a rape case where state showed
penetration, however slight, instruction covering attempted rape or common assault
is not proper. State v. Coffman, supra note 18.
34. 234 S.W. 2d 587 (Mo. 1950).
[Vol. 16
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that the doctrine of "volitional insanity" or "irresistible impulse" is not
recognized in this state. The court approved the instruction which limits
the defense of insanity to the test of knowledge of right from wrong, and re-
fused to extend it to include those cases where the individual may be able
to distinguish between right and wrong, but still have an uncontrollable
impulse to commit an unlawful act.
In another case where defendant was charged with murder, and some
evidence showed that defendant, after starting an argument, abandoned his
attempt and this was made known to deceased, and defendant later had to
kill deceased to protect himself, an instruction to the effect "if defendant,
without a felonious intent, did not enter in a difficulty ... ", was reversible
error, as narrowing defendant's right of self-defense. 35
Where there was evidence that the shooting of deceased was justified
in defense of defendant's home, failure to give an instruction on the law as
to defense of habitation was reversible error.36 The same was true where
there was a failure to instruct on the question of whether the shooting was
accidental or not, where there was some evidence that it was.-r
In another case defendant admitted taking certain hogs but claimed
that he did so at the direction of his father who was entitled to the hogs.
The defense was submitted to the jury on the usual grand larceny instruc-
tion with these words added, "without any honest claim thereto." State's
contention that this clause was a sufficient submission of defendant's defense
was overruled, the court pointing out that defendant did not have or make
any honest claim or right to the hogs, but his defense was that his father
had the right and he was acting under his father's direction.38
Where evidence for the defense does not establish an actual battery
upon defendant's person, it is insufficient to require an instruction on man-
slaughter; 39 however, where the evidence shows personal violence to defen-
35. State v. Mayberry, 226 S.W. 2d 725 (Mo. 1950). Under this instruction
the jury may well have thought defendant's right of self-defense was lost to him
and was not revived if the jury believed defendant entered into the difficulty with
felonious intent although jury may have also believed defendant's testimony tending
to show he nevertheless repented and had attempted in good faith to withdraw. In
State v. Colbert, 226 S. W. 2d 685 (Mo. 1950) court approved a self-defense instruc-
tion.
36. State v. Kizer, 230 S.W. 2d 690 (Mo. 1950).
37. State v. Dunbar, supra note 20.
38. State v. Webster, 230 S.W. 2d 841 (Mo. 1950). Point advanced in this
case was that the subject matter of the defense must be embodied in a separate
instruction.
39. State v. Kizer, supra note 36.
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dant a manslaughter instruction should be given even though defendant, as
a witness, claims he killed deceased to save his own life.40 Where evidence
shows a man was killed in perpetration of a robbery, the court did not err in
failing to instruct on second degree murder or manslaughter. 1
In State v. Dunbar, supra,4 2 reversed on other grounds, the court held
that the inclusion of the words, "or to do some great bodily harm," in the
instruction was not error, even though information only charged defendant
with intent to kill.
Defendant is not entitled to an instruction that he is to receive the
benefit of the doubt as to the severity of the punishment.43
F. Argument of Counsel
Failure to grant a mistrial because of counsel's argument that defendant
was a dangerous man, was not reversible error or an abuse of the trial court's
discretion where there was evidence that the defendant had burglarized a
dwelling house while carrying a deadly weapon. 4"
The court held that in a murder trial, it is within the discretion of the
trial court to determine how far counsel for defendant should be permitted
to go outside the record to detail circumstances of other specific crimes or
trials for the purpose of illustration and argument."3
In a rape case where the defendant was colored, the court found that
the prosecuting attorney's reference to the victim as "this eleven year old
white girl," was not intended to, nor did, arouse a racial prejudice against
defendant.4 6 During the trial of this case the matter was discussed freely
by both sides and no objection was made.
In another case, where defendant's counsel offered in evidence and read
to the jury defendant's written statement of his version of the killing, and in
argument to jury stated that the reason for the state's failure to introduce
40. State v. Edwards, 226 S.W. 2d 592 (Mo. 1950). The doctrine of this case
is that evidence of violence to the person makes a jury question as to whether the
killing was one in hot blood, and that the jury may believe the defendant's testi-
mony concerning the battery, but disbelieve he acted in self-defense, thus he is
entitled to manslaughter instruction in spite of his testimony on self-defense.
41. State v. Bradley, supra note 6; also State v. Britton, supra note 7, where
court properly refused manslaughter instruction.
42. Note 20.
43. State v. Tiedt, supra n. 9.
44. State v. Jones, supra, n. 3.
45. State v. Brown, supra, n. 10.
46. State v. Oscar, 226 S.W. 2d 722 (Mo. 1950).
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such statement in evidence was "up to you," defendant impliedly called
attention to defendant's failure to testify and thereby waived the statutory
right to non-reference by counsel to defendant's failure and invited state's
counsel's reply that they thought defendant's counsel would put defendant
on witness stand and could have cross-examined him. The court held the
right was personal and could be waived by him and that it was waived in
this case. The case was affirmed by a divided court.4 7
G. Verdict
Where there are only two defendant's on trial, a verdict which reads,
"We, the jury in the above entitled cause find both defendant's guilty of
robbery in the first degree by means of a dangerous and deadly weapon, and
assess the punishment of each defendant at twenty years in the peniten-
tiary," is not defective in that it fails to assess the punishment of each de-'
fendant separately.4" The verdict of a jury, even in a criminal case, is not to
be tested by technical rules of construction. The controlling object is to
ascertain the intent of the jury and if this intent is disclosed, the verdict is
good though irregular in form.49
IV. SPEcIFIC OFFENSES
An intentional killing with a deadly weapon raises a presumption of
malice and of murder in the second degree;50 but where the state's evidence
shows the killing in the heat of passion and shows the absence of malice
the presumption is destroyed, and the crime would be manslaughter.-'
Where prosecution was under Section 561.450, Missouri Revised Statutes
(1949), dealing with obtaining money by trick or deception, artifice and
confidence game, due to defendant's passing a bad check, the court found
that the state did not sustain the burden of proof that defendant had no
funds in the bank or that defendant knew he had no funds.52
Where the constitutionality of the section dealing with the crime against
nature was questioned due to the general and vague definition given it in
47. State v. Tiedt, supra, n. 9.
48. State v. Loyd, 233 S.W. 2d 658 (Mo. 1950).
49. State v. Perry, 233 S.W. 2d 717 (Mo. 1950).
50. State v. Lawson, 227 S.W. 2d 642 (Mo. 1950); State v. Whited, 231 S.W.
2d 618 (Mo. 1950).
51. State v. Whited, supra n. 50.
52. State v. Scott, 230 S.W. 2d 764 (Mo. 1950).
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the statute, the court indicated that the definition was sufficient, even though
the matter had not been preserved for review. 3
In State v. Black, supra note 3, where a father was charged with man-
slaughter, there is a good discussion concerning the right of a parent to
punish children. The parent is the judge in his house within certain limits.
Punishment must be for the good of the child and not to satisfy evil passion
of the parent, and punishment cannot be excessive or cruel. All factors are
taken into consideration and-it is question for the jury whether the parent
stayed within his rights.
Where metal stolen by the defendant consisted of three small truck
loads, two taken one night and one the next night, and all was deposited in
one pile, and then later sold in one load, the taking constituted but one




The supreme court in only twenty-five cases during the year 1950
touched upon questions of evidence which the writer deems to be worthy
of note. Again, most of the questions regarding evidence were determined
along generally established rules.
JUDICIAL NOTICE
In only two cases was the question of judicial notice mentioned by the
court. In the case of In re DeGhteest's Estate., the court stated it would
take judicial notice of federal executive orders that have the force and effect
of law. However, under the Missouri statutes, purported printed regulations
of the Republic of France were not admissible as prima facie evidence of
regulations, and the statute making the laws of foreign nations an issue for
the court was not in effect. 2
The court also took judicial notice that during the twenty years prior
to 1950 there had been a very great increase in the number of motor vehicles;
53. State v. Wilson, supra, n. 33.
54. State v. Stegall, Supra, n. 32.
*Attorney, Mexico. B.S., University of Missouri, 1940, LL.B., 1944.
1. 232 S.W. 2d 378 (Mo. 1950).
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that they are now extensively used for transportation of persons and prop-
erty; and that off street parking tends to facilitate traffic and avoid hazards
to life and property.3
RELEVANCY, MATERIALITY, COMPETENCY
A. Competency in General
The court held in Menzi v. White,- that the word "original" is a relative
term. This was a case involving a purported will of one Berenice Ballard
Barker. In the trial and pleading of the case, the court found vagueness and
equivocation as to the physical documents. The court referred to one as "an
executed duplicate," while the appellant referred to the action as involving
a "duplicate original." In discussing the matter, the court points out that
the term "original" may mean completely and fully executed by the maker,
or may merely mean a physical original document. In this instance, they
were referring to a carbon copy which had been executed-
In a case arising out of a collision of an automobile and a truck, Ford
v. Dal,5 a prior statement of a witness was offered at the trial. The witness
testified at the trial to four statements of fact regarding the sounding of a
horn, the screeching of brakes, the location of a car, and the presence of a
truck. In the prior statement, the witness had made exactly contrary state-
ments with regard to these four items. This statement was offered for
impeachment purposes. Objection was made that the impeaching statement
contained a number of conclusions which invaded the province of a jury.
Among these were, "That there was nothing for him to do but hit the John
Ford car on the center of its right side"; "The truck driver did everything
he could to avoid the accident"; "And it appears to me that he was solely
to blame for the accident." The trial court admitted the statement for
impeachment purposes. The supreme court held that apparently the trial
judge was applying the rule followed in some jurisdictions, to-wit: That if
the broad statement of opinion contains an implied assertion of fact incon-
sistent with an assertion of fact made by the witness, it is admissible for
impeachment purposes. The court states, however, that this is not the rule
in Missouri. But the court held that the reading of the exhibit was not
prejudicial and therefore did not require reversal. The court held that either
3. Bowman v. Kansas City, 233 S.W 2d 26 (Mo 1950).
4. 228 S.W. 2d. 700 (Mo. 1950).
5. 228 S.W. 2d 800 (Mo. 1950).
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the jury believed what the witness said on the stand, in which event the
exhibit did not impair the force of what he said, or disbelieved what he
testified to on the stand because of his prior contradictory factual state-
ments. They also stated that the error was cured by an instruction regarding
the statement.
In New York Life Insurance Company v. Feinberg,6 a lay witness was
called to testify as to the appearance of the insured in a life insurance policy.
The action was brought by the life insurance company in equity, to cancel
two life insurance policies on the life of one Philip Feinberg. The court held
that the testimony of lay witnesses that the insured appeared to be well
and healthy, and that he was physically active, did not carry much proba-
tive value in the face of the positive testimony by two physicians that the
insured had a heart disease and had been so advised by a physician.
In State v. Medley and State v. Fitlken," the defendants objected to the
introduction of evidence of a prior conviction for automobile theft and grand
larceny. Both defendants were jointly charged, tried and convicted of the
possession of burglar's tools. The court held that one necessary requirement
for conviction was the proof of intent that the burglar tools were in posses-
sion to be used for burglarious purposes, and the evidence of the prior
conviction was admissible as tending to show this necessary item of proof.
In another criminal case, State v. Johlnson s objection was made to
evidence on the basis of competency. This was a prosecution for statutory
rape. The State offered in evidence the child which the prosecuting witness
testified to have been born as the result of the acts of the defendant. Objec-
tion was made on the grounds that it would tend to prejudice the jury and
that it would not shed any light on the case whatsoever. The supreme court
held that in such a case the exhibition of the child was proper evidence to
show that the crime was committed; to show that the child was conceived
prior to the time when the mother arrived at the age of consent; and for the
purpose of comparison on the question of race or color. They held that
there is a question as to whether it may be exhibited for the purpose of
enabling a jury to compare its features and characteristics with those of
the accused. In this instance, however, they held that since the evidence
was competent, the mere fact that it was prejudicial, or might have been
prejudicial, was no ground for exclusion. The matter was left to the discre-
6. 229 S.W. 2d 531 (Mo. 1950).
7. 232 S.W. 2d 519 (Mo. 1950).
8. 234 S.W. 2d 219 (Mo. 1950).
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tion of the trial court, and the weight of authority supported the ruling of
the trial court. The holding in this case was followed in a case of State v.
Bryant,9 which was another prosecution for statutory rape, involving the
same question of evidence. The court did not mention the former case, but
stated that the weight of authority seemed to favor the rule, and that while
the probative value of a comparison was debatable, it was a circumstance
which could be considered by the jury.
B. Parol Evidence Rule
Comrerce Trust Company v. Watts,10 was an interpleader suit by the
Commerce Trust Company alleging that it held funds in a joint bank ac-
count under the names of Crandall and Watts. Crandall had died, and Watts'
title to the balance of the funds in said bank account was challenged by the
administrator of Crandall's estate. It was shown that there was a written
agreement between the trust company and Crandall and Watts establishing
the joint bank account and the terms thereof, including the right of survivor-
ship. The administrator contended that parol evidence should be introduced
to show the terms of the account, and to whom the balance of the money
in the account belonged. It was his contention that the parol evidence rule
was inapplicable in this case because the deposit agreement was not a valid
contract nor a transfer of a present interest at the time it was entered into.
The court held that this was not true, that it was a contract, that the parol
evidence rule applied, and that in the absence of fraud, duress, mistake or
mental incapacity, an unambiguous contract could not be varied and a new
and different contract substituted by parol evidence. It was pointed out
that the parol evidence rule is one of substantive law and not a rule of
evidence, and that even if parol evidence were received without objection,
it must be ignored.
C. Cross Examination
In the cases of State v. Brown" and Hilton v. Thompsont 2 the court
reaffirmed the stand that the scope of cross examination is ordinarily a mat-
ter of discretion with the trial court, and that unless such discretion is
abused, the upper court will not interfere.
9. 234 S.W. 2d 584 (Mo. 1950).
10. 231 S.W. 2d 817 (Mo. 1950).
11. 227 S.W. 2d 646 (Mo. 1950).
12. 227 S.W. 2d 675 (Mo. 1950).
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Again speaking of cross examination, the court in State v. Black,1
restated the general rule that in a criminal case cross examination can only
extend to those matters referred to in the examination in chief. This was a
prosecution for manslaughter. The wife of the defendant testified for the
defendant. On direct examination, the wife was asked regarding treatment
of the children by the defendant, and the relationship between the defendant
and his children. On cross examination, the wife was questioned regarding
the relationship between herself and the defendant, and was asked whether
or not she had been hurt by the defendant numerous times and as to whether
or not she was scared of the defendant. The court held this to be error and
improper examination as relating to other matters not covered on direct
examination.
WITNESSES
Pieler v. Kansas City Public Service Company,1 4 presented an interest-
ing use of unsworn written statements. In this instance, one of the defend-
ant's witnesses was impeached by the plaintiff. The defendant then intro-
duced prior unsworn written statements made by the witness out of the
presence of the plaintiff. The court held them to be admissible for the
purpose of rehabilitation of the witness.
The cases of State v. Jones1r and State v. Tillet x present an interesting
picture regarding the use of children as witnesses. In the Jones case, a crim-
inal case, the court allowed a five year old child to testify. The child stated
that she knew what it was to tell the truth and then when little girls took
an oath and did not tell the truth, some of them went to jail. However, it
was not shown that the witness knew what jail was, and on cross examina-
tion, the child stated that she did not know what an oath meant; that she
had not been to school; that she could nor read nor write; and from the
testimony it appeared that the Witness was incapable of having a just im-
pression of facts respecting which she was examined or of relating them truly.
The court held that the trial court abused its discretion in permitting the
child to testify. The court said in this instance that there was no presump-
tion that an infant under the age of ten years had sufficient intelligence,
discretion and understanding to testify as a witness, and the party offering
13. 227 S.W. 2d 1006 (Mo. 1950).
14. 226 S.W. 2d 681 (Mo. 1950).
15. 230 S.W. 2d 678 (Mo. 1950).
16. 233 S.W. 2d 690 (Mo. 1950).
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such a witness has the burden of proving the capacity and competency to,
testify.
In the Tillett case, a six year old boy was offered as a witness. In
qualifying the witness, the prosecution questioned the boy quite closely
upon his knowledge of what an oath was, whether or not he believed in God,
whether he knew what might happen if he did not tell the truth, and of his
general knowledge of the difference between the truth and a lie. The record
showed that out of the hearing of the jury many qualifying questions were
asked in an extensive preliminary hearing. At the close of the preliminary
hearing, the trial court overruled the objection, and observed that, "He is
a bright boy." The court, in ruling upon the admissibility of his testimony
upon appeal, stated that they had gone over the testimony of the boy care-
fully and that it clearly appeared that he was an intelligent boy, with a
capacity to observe and register the events about which he testified. The
court then set forth the rule of the four fundamental elements required to
be present to make a child of tender years competent to testify as follows:
(1) present understanding of or intelligence to understand, on instruction,
an obligation to speak the truth; (2) mental capacity at the time of the
occurrence in question truly to observe and to register such occurrence:
(3) memory sufficient to retain an independent recollection of the observa-
tions made; and (4) capacity truly to translate into words the memory of
such observation.
In an action to establish a lost will, the defendants objected to the
testimony of the beneficiary of the will on the grounds that the beneficiary
was not competent to testify as to the contents of the will and as to who
the witnesses to the will were.17 The court, relying upon Mann v. Balfoutr,"
held that the beneficiary is competent to establish the contents of a lost
will. In this case, however, the testimony was limited to testimony as to
the names to identify the propounded will, and not for the purpose of proving
its due execution.
ADMISSIONS AND CONFESSIONS
Wilson v. Miss Hulling's Cafeterias, I-nc.,'19 was an action for damages
for personal injuries sustained when the plaintiff stepped upon a substance
on the floor of the cafeteria and slipped and fell. An alleged statement of
17. Wright v. McDonald, 233 S.W. 2d 19 (Mo. 1950).
18. 187 Mo. 290, 303, 86 S.W. 105 (1905).
19. 229 S.W. 2d 556 (Mo. 1950).
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the manager of the cafeteria to the effect that the cafeteria would assume
responsibility for everything was held not to be admissible. The court held
it not to be admissible either as an admission against interest or as a part
of the res gestae. It was shown that the manager was not present when the
plaintiff fell and could only know of the fall by hearsay, and that if a foreign
matter was on the floor as alleged, it had been wiped up before the manager
arrived.
After judgment for the plaintiff in Davis v. Kansas City Public Service
Company,20 the trial court sustained a motion for a new trial, which was
reversed by the Kansas City Court of Appeals. This was an action for
injuries arising out of a collision between a street car and the plaintiff's
automobile. Upon transfer to the supreme court, the order granting the new
trial was reversed with orders to reinstate the verdict and the judgment.
A portion of the evidence in the case concerned the testimony as to estimates
of time, speed, and distance. The plaintiff had testified to some damaging
estimates of time, speed and distance, and the defendant attempted to
establish that such testimony on the part of the plaintiff was binding upon
him. The supreme court holds that the plaintiff, in estimating time, speed
and distance, is not making a judicial admission, but an estimate, and that
the plaintiff can avail himself of the testimony of other witnesses for the
plaintiff in this regard. The court distinguishes this situation from the
situation in the case of Steuernagel v. St. Louis Public Service Company,21
in which the court held that the plaintiff could not claim the benefit of any
of the defendant's evidence which contradicted the plaintiff's own testimony
and which was at war with the plaintiff's theory of the case. In the present
instance, the testimony was not in conflict with the plaintiff's theory of the
case, but in accordance with such theory. The holding of the court follows
that in ffemminghaus v. Ferguson,12 holding that a plaintiff can avail him-
self of favorable testimony of a defendant, but that he cannot invoke it on
one theory of recovery as to one defendant and reject it on another theory
as to another defendant. The court points out that this is the general rule
as to estimates of speed, time and distance.
PRIVILEGES
In the case of State v. Black,28 a prosecution for manslaughter, the
testimony of the defendant's wife at a coroner's inquest was offered at the
20. 233 S.W. 2d 669 (Mo. 1950).
21. 357 Mo. 904, 211 S.W. 2d 696 (Mo. 1948).
22. 358 Mo. 476, 215 S.W. 2d 481 (Mo. 1948).
23. 227 S.W. 2d 1006 (Mo. 1950).
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trial. The court held that this testimony was privileged as to the defendant
and the wife, and that unless the privilege was waived by the defendant
such testimony could not be used.
State v. Dunbar24 involved the prosecution of a husband for felonious
assault upon his wife. The court held that his wife was a competent witness
against the husband in such a case, but that the statute providing that
neither spouse shall be required to testify made it reversible error to compel
the wife to testify against her husband after testimony by the wife that she
did not desire to testify and that she appeared as a witness only because
she had been subpoenaed. It was likewise held that the admissibility of the
testimony should be determined according to the marital status at the time
the testimony is offered and not at the time the offense was committed.
PRESUMPTIONS
In Donald v. Missouri-Ka-nsas-Texas Railroad Co.,25 the court held the
plaintiff contributorily negligent as a matter of law on the presumption
that the plaintiff saw the defendant's approaching locomotive. This was an
action for damages arising out of a collision between a truck driven by the
plaintiff and a locomotive owned by the defendant. The court held that,
giving consideration to the physical facts, to look was to see, and that the
plaintiff's testimony that he looked and could not see the defendant's train
must be disregarded as contrary to the physical facts. They held that if he
looked and did not see, as he said, he did not look with any degree of care,
and was contributorily negligent as a matter of law.
EXPERT AND OPINION EVIDENCE
Norton v. Johnsoiz2 6 was a suit to set aside a will on the ground of
mental incapacity. Evidence was offered by a room-service waiter as to the
sanity of the testatrix. The court affirmed the rule that the opinion of a
lay witness as to the sanity of the testatrix should be admitted so long as
the witness gives facts upon which such opinion is based, and so long as
facts are consistent with the opinion given. The same holding was made
by the court in the case of McCoy v. McCoy,27 an action for partition with
a counterclaim to set aside a deed.
24. 230 S.W. 2d 845 (Mo. 1950).
25. 231 S.W. 2d 627 (Mo. 1950).
26. 226 S.W. 2d 689 (Mo. 1950).
27. 227 S.W. 2d 698 (Mo. 1950).
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The necessary qualifications for testifying as an expert, or as to giving
the opinion of the witness with regard to the value of land, were reviewed
and set forth in State ex rel Kansas City Power & Light Co. v. Gauld.28
This was an appeal from a condemnation proceeding in which the appellant
contended that the respondent's witnesses failed to qualify as experts with
regard to testimony on damages. The court reviewed the many Missouri
condemnation cases with regard to the necessary testimony in witnesses to
testify as to damage to land in a condemnation hearing, and holds rever-
sible error the introductoin of evidence when it is shown that the testimony
regarding the witness's opinion as to the decrease in the value of land by
reason of the right of way is based upon pure speculation, or upon elements
which are not proper items of damage.
HEARSAY
Tennison v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co.29 was an action for dam-
ages for the wrongful discharge of the plaintiff, who was a brakeman. It
was alleged that he was discharged for an alleged violation of the rule
against drinking liquor or intoxication. It was contended that he had not
violated the rule, and in support of such, the statements made by another
brakeman during an investigation by the railroad company conducted over
an hour after the occurrence of the event involved, to the effect that the
plaintiff showed no signs of being intoxicated, were excluded from evidence.
Upon appeal, the supreme court held that such statements were properly
excluded, being hearsay, and not coming under any of the exceptions to
the hearsay rule. The defendant attempted to introduce them as an admis-
sion against interest on the part of the speaking co-worker, alleging that it
would have been to the co-worker's interest to have the plaintiff discharged,
so that the co-worker could move up a step in the ranks of seniority. The
court held this argument to be too indirect and remote.
An interesting exception to the hearsay rule was involved in the case of
Scott v. Missouri Insurance Company.30 This was an action on a life insur-
ance policy, which was contested by the insurance company on the grounds
that the insured was not in good health at the date of the issuance of the
policy. The plaintiff sued for the amount of the policy and alleged damages
28. 230 S.W .2d 850 (Mo. 1950).
29. 228 S.W. 2d 718 (Mo. 1950).
30. 233 S.W. 2d 660 (Mo. 1950).
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for failure to exercise good faith on the part of the defendant. The defendant
company offered in evidence the report by the Retail Credit Company which
was made at the request of the company after the death of the assured,
and which tended to establish that the insured was not in good health at
the time of the issuance of the policy. This was excluded by the trial court
and alleged as error on appeal. The supreme court held that, while the
report was hearsay for the purpose of proving the truth of the statements
therein, it should have been admitted in evidence as a link in the chain of
circumstantial evidence tending to show that the defendant had made a
reasonable investigation, and had ascertained facts which would cause a
reasonable person in good faith to believe that the insured had heart trouble
when the policy was issued. They held that it was error to exclude the
exhibit. Of course, the opponent would have had the right to an instruction
limiting the extent to which the jury could consider the evidence.
THE HUMANITARIAN DOCTRINE
WILLIAM H. BECKER, JR.
[Editor's Note. Continuing developments in this field make it desirable
to have Mr. Becker's article include a discussion of cases decided in 1951.




In 1950 the supreme court handed down five insurance decisions, which
is about the average for the past several years. These decisions do not appear
to involve any departure from well-established insurance law. In Young v.
New York Life Insurance Company,' the court permitted recovery for
double indemnity for death by accidental means where traumatic pneumonia
activated a dormant tuberculosis, despite some rather plain policy provisions
seemingly to the contrary. In Zumwalt v. Utilities Insurance Company,2
the court adopted the test of fraud or bad faith in determining the liability
*Attomey, Joplin, Missouri. LL.B., University of Missouri, 1935.
1. 360 Mo. 460, 228 S.W. 2d 670 (1950); 221 S.W. 2d 843 (Mo. App. 1949).
2. 360 Mo. 362, 228 S.W. 2d 750 (1950).
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of an insurer for failing to settle a personal injury claim within the policy
limits. In Scott v. Missouri Insurance Company,3 the court dealt with a
question of waiver by the insurer and release by the beneficiary. In Dyscle
v. Bostian,4 a question of cancellation of a workmen's compensation policy
was involved. In Persons v. Prudential Life Insurance Company of Americau
the question was as to the effective time of change of beneficiary. A more
detailed summary of these cases follows.
In Young v. New York Life Insurance Company, supra, the deceased
fell while washing windows when the ladder on which he was standing slip-
ped. His injuries caused traumatic pneumonia, which activated a dormant
tuberculosis and caused death. The widow sued for double indemnity under
the policy provisions requiring that ". . . death . . . resulted directly and
independently of all other causes from bodily injuries affected solely through
external, violent and accidental means . . . provided, however, that such
Double Indemnity shall not be payable if the Insured's death resulted, di-
rectly or indirectly, from . . . (g) infirmity of mind or body; (h) illness or
disease; or, (i) any bacterial infection other than that occurring in conse-
quence of accidental aand external bodily injury."
The court affirmed judgment for the plaintiff, on the ground that de-
ceased might not have died of tuberculosis had it not been for the fall and
the fall activated a dormant condition resulting in death. This seems to
nullify the above quoted provisions (g), (h) and (i). The court recognized
that a division of authority exists but concluded that the cases allowing
recovery represent the sounder view.
In Zumwalt v. Utilities Insurance Company, supra, the insured sued
the insurer for failure to settle a damage suit within the limits of a certain
liability insuraice policy. The court holds that the test of liability of the
insurer is not whether the insurer was guilty of negligence in failing to settle,
but whether the insurer was guilty of fraud or bad faith. Offering to pay
less than the limit of the policy if the insured would contribute the balance
of the amount required to meet the settlement demand is evidence of bad
faith.
The insured was not entitled to penalties under Section 6040 of the
1939 Statutes6 because the statute applies only to actions under terms of
the insurance contract and not to tort actions growing out of the contract.
3. 233 S.W. 2d 660 (Mo. 1950); 222 S.W. 2d 549 (Mo. App. 1949).
4. 233 S.W. 2d 721 (Mo. 1950); 229 S.W. 2d 25 (Mo. App. 1950).
5. 233 S.W. 2d 729 (Mo. 1950).
6. Mo. REv. STAT. § 375.420 (1949).
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Scott v. Missouri Insurance Company, supra, was an action on an indus-
trial life policy. The defense was that the insured was not in good health
at the date of the policy, that the insured had wilfully misrepresented her
health at the time of application and that the beneficiary had executed a
release. As to the release, the court held that it was a question for the jury
and that the trial court should have admitted a report of investigation made
by the Retail Credit Company for the insurer as tending to show that the
defendant had made a reasonable investigation and had reason to believe
the insured had long standing heart trouble which caused her death.
As to alleged waiver by defendant of the untruthful answers in the
application, the court held that for there to be a waiver, the jury must find
that the soliciting agent knew that the answers given in the application
were false.
In Dycke v. Bostian, supra, the question involved was whether cancel-
lation of a workmen's compensation policy had been completed prior to
claimant's injury. The policy provided for cancellation by either party on
written notice "stating when, not less than ten days thereafter, cancellation
shall be effective." The insured sent the polices to the agent for cancellation,
without specifying any date, but the agent did not until the day of the injury
send them on to the branch office, where they were received the follow-
ing day.
The court held that actual cancellation is necessary, as distinguished
from a mere intention to cancel. Perhaps the parties could have agreed to
cancel on less than ten days' written notice, but under Section 6009 of the
1939 Statutes,7 prohibiting cancellation after the insured has become re-
sponsible for loss, there could be no cancellation unless it was completed
before liability occurred.
In Persons v. Prudential Insurance Company of America, supra, the
issue was whether the insured made an effective change of beneficiary. The
policy provided the insured could change beneficiary without consent of the
beneficiary by written notice to the insurer, ". . . such change ... to become
effective only when a provision to that effect is endorsed on or attached to
the policy by the company. .. ." On June 8, the insurer's St. Louis office
received a signed request, dated June 7, requesting defendant be named
primary beneficiary. On June 8, the St. Louis office forwarded the applica-
tion to the home office, where it was received on June 10. On June 18 (after
7. Mo. REv. STAT. § 379.195 (1949).
31
et al.: Work of Missouri Supreme Court 1950
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1951
372 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 16
insured died June 16, but prior to receipt of notice of death) the home office
endorsed the change of beneficiary on the policy. The court holds that since
the insured had substantially complied with the company's requirements,
the change was effective before his death. Any act of the insurer thereafter
was a mere formality.
PROPERTY
WILLARD L. ECKHARDT*
ORIGINAL TITLES-AGRICULTURAL COLLEGE LANDS
The State of Missouri acquired by floating grant 330,000 acres of non-
mineral land "in place" under the Act of Congress of July 2, 1862,1 popularly
known as the "Morrill Act."2 These lands comprise three-fourths of one per-
cent of the total area of Missouri. These lands frequently are referred to
as "Agricultural College Lands," and the usage is proper if no inference is
drawn that title to such lands was or is in any particular college of agricul-
ture.3 Section 1 of the act was in terms a present grant to the state.4 Sec-
tion 2 provided that the lands "shall be selected" from available land within
the State. Section 5(7) required acceptance by the state within two years
from July 2, 1862, and Section 5(3) required the state accepting the bene-
fits to provide a college of agriculture and the mechanic arts within five
years.
Missouri accepted the benefits of the Morrill Act on March 17, 1863.1
An act of March 19, 1866, provided for three agents to select the lands to
*Professor of Law, University of Missouri. B.S., University of Illinois, 1935,
LL.B., 1937; Sterling Fellow, Yale University, 1937-1938.
1. Act of July 2, 1862, c. 130, §§ 1-8, 12 U.S. Stat. 503; 7 U.S.C.A. §§ 301-308,
This act, with the exception of § 7, was not incorporated in U. S. Rev .Stat.
(1875, 1878), probably because the grants made thereby were regarded as executed,
and the provisions incidental thereto as merely temporary. Historical Note to
7 U.S.C.A. § 301.
See DONALDSON, THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 223, 229-231, 710-711, 1249-1250 (1884).
This volume sometimes is cited as 3 LAND LAWS; because of the numerous collections
of land laws, this form of citation may be confusing.
2. This act is to be distinguished from the Morrill Act of 1890, Act Aug. 30,
1890, c. 841, 26 U. S. Stat. 417, 7 U.S.C.A. §§ 321-328.
3. Mo. Laws 1870, p. 19, § 18, uses the term "Agricultural College Lands."
See infra, n. 12 as to title to such lands.
4. "That there be granted to the several states," etc., 7 U.S.C.A. § 301:
"There is granted to the several states," etc.
5. Mo. Laws 1863, p. 34, Joint Resolution approved March 17, 1863.
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which the state was entitled.6 The Act of Congress of July 23, 1866 extended
the time for providing the college to July 2, 1872.7 On Februray 24, 1870,
Missouri established an Agricultural and Mechanical College and a School
of Mines and Metallurgy.8
The Morrill Act did not convey the fee simple to designated land, and
did not require patents to be issued for land selected by the state. Conse-
quently the grant under the Morrill Act was controlled by an earlier general
act of August 3, 1854, which provided: "In all cases where lands have been,
or shall hereafter be, granted by any law of Congress to any one of the
several States and Territories; and where said law does not convey the
fee-simple title of such lands, or require patents to be issued therefor; the
lists of such lands which have been, or may hereafter be certified by the
Commissioner of the General Land-Office, under the seal of said office,
either as originals, or copies of the originals or records, shall be regarded
as conveying the fee simple of all the lands embraced in such lists that
are of the character contemplated by such act of Congress, and intended
to be granted thereby; but where lands embraced in such lists are not of the
character embraced by such acts of Congress, and are not intended to be
granted thereby, said lists, so far as these lands are concerned, shall be
perfectly null and void, and no right, title, claim, or interest shall be con-
veyed thereby."9
6. Mo. Laws 1866, p.-91, approved March 19, 1866, and effective from passage.
Mo. Laws 1870, p. 19, § 19, as amended by Mo. Laws 1871, p. 38, § 1, made
further provision for selection of lands in case of the full 330,000 acres had not been
selected previously.
See also Mo. Laws 1864, p. 98, as Joint Resolution approved Dec. 11, 1863.
7. Act July 23, 1866, c. 209, 14 U. S. Stat. 208; 7 U.S.C.A. § 305(7).
8. Mo. Laws 1870, pp. 15-21, §§ 1-30, approved February 24, 1870, and
effective from passage
The College of Agriculture [and Mechanic Arts] was opened in the fall of
1870 at Columbia. The School of Mines and Metallurgy was opened in the fall
of 1871 at Rolla. See VILEs, THE UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI, A CENTENNIAL HISTORY
298, 470 (1939).
9. Act of Aug. 3, 1854, c. 201, 10 U. S. Stat. 346; U. S. Rev. Stat. § 2449
(1875); 43 U.S.C.A § 859
See PATTON, LAND TITLES § 160, n. 84 (1938).
For a discussion of problems with state selections and uncertainty as to titles
thereunder, together with recommended corrective legislation, see REPORT OF THE
PUBLIC LANDS COMMISSION sliii-xliv; XC-XCi, §§ 224-226 (1880). Such uncertainty
as exists is principally from the proviso in the statute quoted in the text above.
See Milner v. United States, 228 Fed. 431 (C.C.A. 8th 1915), appeal dismissed
248 U. S. 594, 39 Sup. Ct. 132, 63 L.Ed. 437 (1918), where title of United States
to [mineral] land listed and certified to the state was quieted as against persons
having equitable title from state, where such persons by fraudulently representing
such lands to be non-mineral moved state agents to select such lands; title also was
quieted against a good faith mortgagee.
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Under the above acts the State of Missouri received legal title to the
lands selected by the agents when the lists thereof were certified to the
state by the Commissioner of the General Land Office.10 No patent from
the United Staates to the State of Missouri was necessary. The records are
now in the office of the Secretary of State in Jefferson City.
Conveyance of the lands by the State of Missouri must be by patent,
prior to February 24, 1870.1 From and after February 24, 1870, conveyances
of such lands are by deed executed by the president of the Board of Curators
of the University of Missouri, signed by him, with the seal of the corporation
attached thereto, and attested by the secretary of the board.1 2
State v. Lundry"3 seems to be the first Missouri case discussing these
lands and what is necessary to prove title thereto. Defendants were con-
victed of cutting trees on agricultural college lands in violation of Missouri
Revised Statutes § 560.480 (1949). One question was the propriety of
amending the information: the original information charged them with
cutting trees on the land of the University of Missouri; this was amended to
Board of Curators of University of Missouri;4 this was further amended to
State of Missouri held for the use and benefit of the Board of Curators of
10. McNee v. Donahue, 142 U. S. 587, 601, 12 Sup. Ct. 211, 35 L.Ed. 1122
(1892). "No title to lands under that grant [Morrill Act of 1862] vested in the
State until their selection, and listing to the State."
11. SILVERS, MISSOURI TITES § 12 (2d ed. 1923).
12. Mo. Laws 1870, p. 21, § 26; Mo. Laws 1889, p. 275; Mo. Laws 1909, p. 884,
Mo. REV. STATS § 172.380 (1949).
SILVERS, MISSOURI TITLES § 12 (2d ed. 1923) states that said lands "are con-
veyed by deed of 'the Board of Curators of the Univresity of the State Missouri,'
executed by the president of that board," etc. GILL, MIssouRI TITLES § 65 (3d ed.
1931), states: "Agricultural College lands are conveyed 'by the Board of Curators
of the University of Missouri since Acts 1870-15."
Neither of the above statements is altogether correct. The deed is that of the
State of Missouri, and the State of Missouri is the grantor. From 1870 to 1909
a commissioner appointed by the curators had the power to sell the lands at the
price fixed by the board of curators: Mo. Laws 1870, p. 19, § 19; Mo. Laws 1871,
p. 38, § 1; Mo. Laws 1889, p. 272, § 7293. From 1909 to date the board has the
power to sell the lands: Mo. Laws 1909, p. 892, § 44; Mo. REV. STATS. § 172.380
(1949).
The form of conveyance for these lands in current use runs from "the State of
Missouri, grantor, represented by the Board of Curators of the University of Mis-
souri, acting through the President of said Board," but is signed
President, Board of Curators of the University of Missouri." The form of the con-
veyance results from the fact that the power the execution thereof is not by the
board but by certain officers of the board designated by statute.
13. 233 S.W. 2d 734 (Mo. 1950).
14. Mo. REV. STATS. § 172.020 (1949): "The university is hereby incorporated
and created a body politic, and shall be known by the name of 'The Curators of
the University of Missouri,' and by that name shall have perpetual succession,
power to sue and be sued," etc.
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the University of Missouri. The court held these amendments did not
amount to making a different charge but were within the statutes of jeo-
fails.' 5
Proof of title in the principal case was by a copy certified by the
present Secretary of State, of a report made January 1, 1867, showing
lands selected and located under the Morrill Act of 1862, and by a copy,
certified by a previous Secretary of State and recorded in the local county
deed records, of The Certificate of Grant [apparently the list as certified
by the Commissioner of the General Land Office], both including the tract
in question. The defendants contended that the ownership of the land
could be established only by a patent from the United States. The court
held that the certified copies were sufficient proof of ownership, title having
vested in the state upon the selection and listing [and certification thereof
to the state] of the land. The court distinguished cases cited by the de-
dendants which involved lands under other acts of Congress, swamp lands,'-
New Madrid certificates,'7 and land granted in aid of a railroad.' s
ADVERSE POSSESSION
Claim of Ownerslip--Seisi?. Within Ten Years
The facts in Pahler v. Schoenals" were as follows. John William Castle,
record title holder, died in 1933. There was no administration, assignment of
dower or election. The widow, Estella, continued to live in the home until
her death in 1947. A son, William Castle, plaintiff's grantor, was living in
the house at the time of his father's death and continued to occupy a room
there with his wife "for some time." The defendant, who claimed title by
15. The court said (emphasis added): "Thus, while the legal title was held by
the State, the University was not only the beneficial owner, but had power to sell
and convey the land for the state. . . ." The statement that "the University was...
the benificial owner" would seem to be too broad, as a principle of general applica-
tion, in view of Wyoming ex. rel Wyoming Agricultural College v. Irvine, 206 U. S.
278, 27 Sup. Ct. 613, 51 L.Ed. 1063 (1907), affirmig 14 Wyo. 318, 84 Pac. 90
(1906). In that case the court said: "The grant made in this statute is clearly to
the State and not to any institution established by the State." See also State v.
Bryan, 50 Fla. 293, 39 So. 931 (1905).
The Missouri court, however, did not adopt the extreme position urged by the
Attorney General in Respondent's Brief, p. 27: ". . . it is submitted the record dis-
closes proof of ownership of such property was vested in the Board of Curators of
the University of Missouri, a corporation."
16. Stephenson v. Stephenson, 71 Mo. 127 (1879).
17. Hammond v. Johnston, 93 Mo. 198, 6 S.W. 83 (1887).
18. Hamilton v. Badgett, 293 Mo. 324, 240 S.W. 214 (1922).
19. 234 S.W. 2d 581 (Mo. 1950).
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adverse possession, was a sister of the widow and lived across the street.
Defendant moved in with the widow in 1933, paid taxes, insurance, and
took care of the widow. The widow died in 1947 and in 1949 the son, heir
at law, conveyed the land to plaintiff. She had judgment, which was affirm-
ed,'in her suit to quiet title and in ejectment. Payment of taxes and insur-
ance by defendant was evidence of claim of ownership; however she was
in and out of her own house, and in deposition she testified the first
time she really made a claim was when the widow passed away and that she
never thought she had a right to the house at all but was just living there;
in addition, in 1947 defendant filed a claim against the widow's estate
stating the widow owned the property. On the above evidence of intention,
the trial court did not err in finding defendant did not establish title by ad-
verse possession.
The court further points out that the son's cause of action did not arise
for at least some time after his father's death, inasmuch as the widow had
certain rights of occupancy.20 Defendant apparently argued for a literal
reading of the basic statute on adverse possession, Missouri Revised Statutes
§ 516.010 (1949),21 which provides (emphasis added): "No action for the
recovery of any lands ... shall be commenced, had or maintained by any
person ... unless it appears that the plaintiff, his ancestor, grantor or other
person under whom he claims was seized or possessed of the premises in
question, within ten years before the commencement of suck action." The
court without discussion rejects the defendant's interpretation. The Missouri
basic statute is similar to the older English statutes,22 requiring proof seisin
in the claimant or person under whom he claims within a specified period of
years next preceding the action. The modern method is to limit the action to
a specified period of years after the cause of action (right to possession)
arises.23
Mistaken Boundary Line-Claim of Ownership--Itention Test
In Morrow v. Elmore4 plaintiff and his predecessors since 1924 had
occupied his own lot plus an adjoining strip 14.7' x 160' x 5.25'. Apparently
20. Apparently the court refers to the widow's right of quarantine, "until
dower be assigned," Mo. REv. STATS. § 469.220 (1949). Quarantine was for forty
days at common law. Magna Charta, c. 7 (1215); 28 Mo. Rev. Stat. Ann., p. 2.
21. At p. 583.
22. Statute of Westminister I, 3 EDw. I, c. 39 (1275); Statute 32 HEN. VIII,
c. 2, § 3 (1540).
23. Statute 21 JAc. I, c. 16 (1623).
24. 234 S.W. 2d 613 (Mo. 1950).
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the parties mistakenly assumed a fence and the side of a driveway were the
true line. The occupancy consisted of using the strip for a garden and
lawn; more important, part of plaintiff's house (about two feet) was on the
strip and the plaintiff's sidewalk was on the strip. The court held plaintiff
had acquired title by adverse possession; plaintiff had been in actual, open,
exclusive, hostile and notorious possession. "Such possession was hostile
and inconsistent with any other theory than a claim of ownership." 25
The encroachment of the house and sidewalk may distinguish this case
from cases where there is simply occupancy up to a mistaken boundary line,
cases which have caused more difficulty in Missouri under the "intention"
test. The court does not mention the intention test, and the case may
indicate that the court is moving away from that test.26
By Person Who Already Has Title by Unrecorded Deed
After an adverse possessor has acquired title by the running of the
statute of limitations he has a legal title which does not appear of record.
There are no provision in the recording act, Missouri Revised Statutes §
442.380 et seq. (1949), for the recording of such a title, and consequently
the recording act is inapplicable in determining the rights of a bona fide
purchaser for value from the person who formerly had title and still appears
of record to have title. In such case, a bona fide purchaser for value from the
former owner gets no better title than his grantor had, which is none.
In the usual case where the adverse possessor is still in possession this
should present no real hardship to the purchaser, who by examining the
premises will discover the fact of possession and then can make appropriate
inquiries of the possessor. It may be, however, that the adverse possessor
will be out of actual possession, with no one in actual posssession, at the time
the record title holder conveys to the bona fide purchaser. Here an examina-
tion of the premises would not disclose the adverse possession, although
inquiries in the neighborhood might. The extreme case is where the adverse
possessor is out of actual possession, the record title holder has resumed
actual possession, and with both record title and actual possession as indicia
of ownership he conveys to a bona fide purchaser. A purchaser under such
circumstances would not be apt to make inquiries in the neighborhood
as to the history of the possession.
25. Id at 614.
26. Head, Work of Missouri Supreme Court for 1941-Property, 7 Mo. L. REv.
408, 410-411 (1942); Eckhardt, Work of Missouri Supreme Court for 1948-Prop-
erty, 14 Mo. L. REv. 371, 377-378 (1949).
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Corpus Juris Secundum states that the person who acquired title by ad-
verse possession is protected in all three cases. "After the adverse possession
has ripened into title, the original owner cannot, as is shown in the title
Vendor and Purchaser § 362 [66 C.J. p. 1194 notes 10, 11], by'taking posses-
sion and conveying the land, or by conveying while claimant is not in actual
possession, to a bona fide purchaser, convey to the latter any title which
could be enforced against or affect the title acquired by adverse possession,
and a fortiori a conveyance by the original owner should not affect the
rights of the claimant who at the time of the conveyance was in possession.""
The section of Corpus Juris referred to, 66 C.J., Vendor and Purchaser §
1056, states: "In some jurisdictions it has been held that," etc. A principal
authority relied on and quoted is a Missouri case, Ridgeway v. Holiday.2s
In Ridgeway v. Holiday, one Voteau was the common source of title.
In 1859 Halford, his attorney-in-fact under a defectively acknowledged
power of attorney, made an oral conveyance and delivered possessison to
Bennett, who a year later made an oral conveyance and delivered possession
to plaintiff Ridgeway. The successive periods of adverse possession by
Bennett and Ridgeway, which the court held could be tacked, made more
than the ten year period; and therefore in 1869 Voteau's title was extin-
guished and Ridgeway acquired legal title. In 1870 Voteau brought an
action of ejectment against Ridgeway's tenant who suffered a default
judgment pursuant to which Voteau was put into possession; Ridgeway, who
had title by adverse possession was not named as a party and had no notice
of the action. Thereafter Voteau, who had possession and appeared of
record to have title, quitclaimed to defendant Holiday who entered into
possession; Holiday had examined the record title and found perfect record
title in Voteau, and although Holiday knew of the ejectment action, he did
not know Ridgeway, that he had been in possession, or that he made any
claim. In Ridgeway's action of ejectment against Holiday, judgment for the
plaintiff was affirmed. In the course of its opinion, at p. 454, the court
made the much-quoted statement: "But it is contended by the defendant
that he is a purchaser for value from Voteau who appeared from the record
to be the owner, and was in possession without any notice of the prior
adverse possession which passed the title to Ridgeway, or of any claim on
his part to the premises; and that as against him, the defendant, Ridgeway,
27. 2 C:J.S. Adverse Possession § 204.
28. 59 Mo. 444, 454 (1875).
(Vol. 16
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cannot assert title; that to permit him to do so, would be giving to an
adverse possession greater force and efficacy than is given to an unrecorded
conveyance. These objections, it must be admitted, are very forcible. The
registry act, however, cannot, in the nature of things, apply to a transfer
of the legal title by adverse possession, and such title does not stand on the
footing of one acquired and held by an unrecorded deed, and of such title, the
purchaser may not expect to find any evidence in the records."
The court's further statement in Ridgeway v. Holiday, which Corpus
J-0is omits from its quotation, is as follows: "Whether it is incumbent on
the owner, by adverse possession, to perpetuate the evidence of his title by
proceeding to remove the cloud thereon, occasioned by the existence of the
record title in another, so as to affect subsequent purchasers with notice, it
is not necessary to inquire. We are relieved of any discussion of this subject,
by the character of the conveyance under which defendant claims. It is a
quit-claim deed and will not support his claim of being a purchaser for a
valuable consideration without notice. He took under it only what Voteau
could lawfully convey, (Oliver vs. Piatt, 3 How. U. S., 333; 3 Wheat., 449;
Bogy vs. Shoab, 13 Mo., 380;) and his title having passed to the plaintiff
as completely as if he had transferred it by deed, the defendant took noth-
ing by his quit-claim deed from Voteau, and can have no better right to
the possession than Voteau had. Besides knowledge that Voteau had
recovered possession of the premises in ejectment was sufficient notice of an
adverse claim and possession to put the defendant upon inquiry as to the
nature of that claim and possession."
A recent A.L.R. annotation2s discusses the entire problem. In the course
of the annotation the editor discusses Ridgeway v. Holiday and notices the
court's statement that Holiday had notice by reason of his knowledge of
the earlier ejectment action, but does not notice the court's principal reason,
that Holiday took by quit-claim deed from Voteau. 0
It would seem to be an open question in Missouri whether the court
would protect a person who has acquired title by adverse possession as
29. Title by Adverse Possession as Affected by Recording Statutes, 9 A.L.R.
2d 850 (1950).
30. The rule in Missouri seems to be that a grantee under a quitclaim or special
warranty deed takes free of unrecorded deeds or other recordable instruments, but
takes subject to and with notice of outstanding equities or other claims not required
to be recorded. Eckhardt & Peterson, Possessory Estates, Future Interests, and
Conlveyances in Missouri, § 94, text introduction to ANN. Mo. STAT. C. 442 (Ver-
non). See collection cases in 2 GILL, REAL PROPERTY LAw IN MissouRi 890-89.5
(1949).
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against a grantee under a warranty deed from the record title holder who
has reacquired possession, but it would seem clear that if the adverse posses-
sor is still in possession he will prevail over a grantee from the record title
holder.
On the other hand, under the "actual notice" provision of the Missouri
recording act,31 a purchaser is charged with notice of the rights of parties
in possession only if the purchaser in fact knows of the possession; conse-
quently a bona fide purchaser from the record title holder may take free of
the rights of a person in possession under an unrecorded deed. This little-
known doctrine has been ably discussed by Mr. Bruce A. Ring, Assistant
Attorney, State Highway Commission, in a recent issue of the Missouri
Law Review.32 It follows that a person with title by adverse possession is
better protected than a person with title by an unrecorded deed. The person
with title by adverse possession may be completely protected even though
he does not continue in actual possession.
This raises the question whether a person who has been in possession
of land for ten years under an unrecorded deed can base his title on adverse
possession where it would be to his advantage to do so. To put the issue
crudely, can a person hold adversely to himself? I used this issue as the
basis for an examination question in" 1950. 33 Within six months two Missouri
Supreme Court cases gave a partial answer.
King v. Fascling" was a suit to quiet title against a tax deed and a
quitclaim deed. The tax sale was pursuant to the provisions for tax sales
for cities of the first class, Missouri Revised Statutes § 93.290 et seq. (1949).
The property, worth at least $900, was sold for $4.26, less than 1 of 1 %,
and clearly under the Missouri authorities the amount was so inadequate as
to make the sale voidable for legal fraud. The facts were that one King
and his wife, now his widow and plaintiff, acquired title in 1935, and entered
31. Mo. REv. STATS. § 442.400 (1949).
32. Ring, Comment, Possession as Notice Under Missouri Recording Act, 16
Mo. L. REV. 142 (1951).
33. In the examination in Conveyances, July 22, 1950, the following question
was used: "In 1930 A went into adverse possession of Blackacre, unoccupied land
owned by G, by using it for grazing, having fenced it. In 1935 G discovered the
facts and after some negotiations with A, duly conveyed Blackacre to A for its
fair value. A did not record the deed. A continued to use Blackacre in the same
way until 1942 when he sold his livestock and left for a distant city to take a ship-
yard job. In 1943 G duly conveyed Blackacre to D, who had searched the records
and examined the premises for possession. D went into possession. In 1944 A
brought a suit in ejectment and to determine title against D. What decree? Why?"
34. 234 S.W. 2d 549 (Mo. 1950).
[Vol. 16
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into and remained in possession thereafter, but the deed was not recorded
until 1949. Defendant Fasching received a tax deed on November 1, 1948,
having paid 2 of 1% of the value of the land. Defendant had actual
knowledge of plaintiff's possession and claim in November, 1948, and appar-
ently had actual knowledge of plaintiffs possession before the tax sale. In
December, 1948, the plaintiff's grantor quit-claimed to the defendant for
a recited consideration of $10 and other valuable consideration.-5 The de-
fendent thus claims under both the tax deed and the quit claim deed. The
quitclaim deed may be disposed of summarily because the defendant had
actual notice of the plaintiff's possession and claim at the time he took the
quitclaim deed, and therefore is not entitled to the protection of the record-
ing act. The tax deed is voidable because of the shocking inadequacy of
price, if the plaintiff is entitled to attack the deed, and it would seem that
title under an unrecorded deed and possession, both antedating the lien for
taxes and the tax sale, entitles plaintiff to attack the tax deed. Consequently
there was no need to determine whether the plaintiff, in possession for more
than ten years under an unrecorded deed, had acquired title by adverse
possession.
The issue appears as point three in Appellants' Brief: 36 "The Court
erred in finding respondent was entitled to redeem the real estate from the
tax sale. Appellant was not the record owner of the real estate and there-
fore not entitled to contest the sufficiency of the tax deed. Both sources
of appellants' title are superior to that of respondent." Six cases37 are cited
as authority for the point, but the point and the authorities are not men-
tioned in the argument. The issue of adverse possession is raised by the
Respondent's Brief, points one and two,38 and argument.39 The opinion
35. The recited consideration does not appear in the briefs or opinion, but does
appear in the transcript.
36. Appellants' Brief, p. 6.
37. Payne v. Lott, 90 Mo. 676, 3 S.W. 402 (1887); Lucas v. Current River Land
& Cattle Co., 186 Mo. 448, 85 S.W. 359 (1905); Harrison Machine Works v.
Bowers, 200 Mo. 219, 98 S.W. 770 (1906); Hoffman v. Bigham, 324 Mo. 516, 24
S.W. 2d 125 (1930); Hobson v. Elmer, 349 Mo. 1131, 163 S.W. 2d 1020 (1942);
Gee v. Bullock, 349 Mo. 1154, 164 S.W. 2d 281 (1942).
38. Respondent's Brief, p. 5. Point I: "Superior title, that is, a title good for
purposes of attack or defense, may be acquired by adverse possession." Point II:
"In this case respondent's title by adverse possession was superior to any other title
relied upon by appellants, the city tax deed being void and subject to redemption
by reason of the inadequacy of price constituting fraud."
39. Respondent's Brief, p. 8. "... This long, open, notorious, continuous and
adverse possession of this property by the plaintiff-respondent and her family was
both actual and constructive notice to all the world that it was their home, that
they claimed it, they were paying taxes upon it, public tax records show taxes
41
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follows the Respondent's Brief and Johnson v. McAboy4" in recognizing "the
right of one claiming title by adverse possession to question a tax deed
where the adverse possession antedated the lien for taxes." This and the
court's conclusion that "Plaintiff's adverse possission defeats defendants'
title under the quitclaim deed," leads one to the conclusion that the plain-
tiff who had title under an unrecorded deed could establish an independent,
original title by adverse possession. 41
King v. Fasclhing was in Division Number Two. A similar case, Shaw
v. Armstrong,4 2 was decided five weeks later in Special Division Number
Three. Livingstone, the defendant, acquired title in 1930, by an unrecorded
deed, and was in possession from 1930 to date through himself or tenants.
Taxes, assessed in the name of one Nelson, were delinquent for 1936 through
1942. In 1943 on the third sale under the Jones-Munger Act, Missouri Re-
vised Statutes § 140.250 (1949), the land was sold to one Harbison through
whom the plaintiff claims, for the amount of delinquent taxes, 12.8% of the
value of the land. The collector's deed was executed in 1948. This was a
suit to quiet title, apparently under the Jones-Munger Act, Missouri Re-
vised Statutes § 140.330 (1949). The trial court found for plaintiff on the
sale ground defendant had no record title to the land; the judgment was
reversed with direction to enter judgment for the defendant.
Shaw v. Armstrong could have been decided simply on a point raised by
the court, that the tax deed was void under Missouri Revised Statutes §
140.410 (1949) because more than four years had elapsed between the date
upon it assessed against the plaintiff-respondent. Even a warranty deed executed
by any prior grantee of the property could not have availed against the title estab-
lished by plaintiff-respondent and her deceased husband.... Neither the tax deed
nor the second quit claim deed of William C. Barrow and his wife could avail any-
thing against the long, continued, open, notorious and adverse possession of plain-
tiff-respondent and her family in the property... ."
40. 350 Mo. 1086, 1091, 169 S.W. 2d 932, 935 (1943). Defendant went into
possession under 1932 deed, recorded in 1934. Plaintiffs claimed under a 1940 Jones-
Munger tax deed, for 1934-37 taxes. With reference to the defendant's right to
attack the tax deed the court said: "It appears from the evidence that defendants
were in possession of the described lands, under claim of ownership and color of
title, prior to the accrual of the lien for state and county taxes and the alleged
foreclosure of such lien by a tax sale to plaintiff. Defendants, therefore, have the
right to challenge the sufficiency of the foreclosure proceedings and the tax deed.
... A party in possession under claim of ownership has a better title than one who
has no title or possession."
The action was one quiet title and in ejectment, under Mo. REv. STATS. §§
524.060 [ejeetment], 527.150 [quiet title] (1949).
It should .be noted that possession was for less than ten years.
41. Apparently the title acquired by adverse possession was in tenancy by the
entirety.
42. 235 S.W. 2d 851 (1951).
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of the tax sale and the date of the collector's deed. The court, however,
relied on an additional ground that the amount paid at the tax sale, 12.8%,
was so grossly inadequate as to constitute fraud.
The further ground relied on by the court was that defendant was en-
titled to attack the tax deed, even though he had no record title, because he
had perfected his title by adverse possession. The plaintiff's argument that
defendant must have record title is based on Missouri Revised Statutes §
140.330(1) (1949). 4 3 After answering this argument the court says: "Un-
der the facts defendant had such possession as to enable him to perfect his
title by adverse possession for more than ten years." King v. Fasching, to
the same effect, decided five weeks earlier, is not referred to.
The doctrine of these cases, that a person who has title under an unre-
corded deed can acquire an independent title by adverse possession-i.e. by
possession adverse to himself-may lead to difficulties if applied generally
as a principle of property law. 4
MORTGAGEs-TwENTY-YEAR LIMITATION
Missouri Revised Statutes § 516.150 (1949) provides two bars to the
foreclosure of a mortgage or deed of trust: foreclosure is barred if the
statutes of limitation have barred the obligation; and foreclosure is barred
by the lapse of twenty years from the date of obligation is due on the face
of the mortgage or deed of trust, unless before the end of such period a
proper instrument is filed for record showing the amount due. A title exam-
43. This section provides (emphasis added): "Any person holding any deed of
lands or lots executed by the county collector for the nonpayment of taxes, may
commence a suit in the circuit court of the county where such lands lie, to quiet
his title thereto, without taking possession of such lands, and all parties who have,
or claim to have, or appear of record in the county where such land or lot is
situated, to have any interest in, or lien upon, such lands or lots, shall be made
defendants in such suit, and no outstanding unrecorded deed, mortgage, lease or
claim slall be of any effect as against the title or right of the complainant as fixed
and declared by the decree made in such cause.'
In answer the court says, at p. 855; "First, we call attention to the fact that
this section of the statute stating the manner of quieting title requires the plaintiff
to make parties defendant all persons who have or claim to have or appear of
record in the county where such land or lot is situated. This does not limit the
defendant's right to a deed of record and the statements there made in said section
of the statute that no outstanding unrecorded deed, mortgage, lease or claim shall
be of any as against the title as declared by the decree of the court does not
mean that a defendant in possession who might have a good and sufficient title
by virtue of the statute of limitation could not redeem land sold for taxes or could
not defend in any action to quiet title against a plaintiff holding a tax deed which
is invalid for any reason."
44. For a further discussion of the problem, with authorities from other juris-
dictions, see Note by Ring, 16 Mo. L. REV. 461 (1951).
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iner cannot pass an old unreleased deed of trust in reliance on the fact
that the obligation may have been barred by the stautes of limitation, be-
cause the facts are outside the record and interest payments, etc., may keep
the obligation alive for an indefinite period. On the other hand, the due
date as shown on the face of the instrument of record showing the amount
due are matters of record, and the title examiner may pass an old unreleased
deed of trust where more than twenty years have elapsed since the due date
as shown on the face of the instrument if there is nothing else of record with
regard to the deed of trust.45
In Carwood Realty Co. v. Gangol,46 the supreme court said, by way of
dictum, or held, as an alternative ground for decision, that § 516.150 is a
statute "of 'repose,' meaning, in legal parlance, that it simply precludes the
bringing of an action to enforce rights, it affects the remedy only and may
not be employed in securing affirmative relief." The plaintiff brought suit to
cancel a trustee's deed in foreclosure and to quiet title, on the ground the
foreclosure was barred by § 516.150. The court found that the note had not
been barred by limitation, and that a proper affidavit had been recorded
so that there was no bar under the twenty-year provision of § 516.150. The
court's construction of the statute may resolve the conflict between decisions
in the courts of appeals.
Whether § 516.150 may be the basis for affirmative relief was first con-
sidered by the supreme court in Stock v. Schloman.47 That was an action
begun in 1927 to determine title; the defendant's answer admitted the
plaintiff owned the fee, but prayed that a note and mortgage dated March
16, 1891, due one day later, and for which no affidavit had been filed for
record, be declared a valid lien on the land; plaintiff's reply asked that the
mortgage be cancelled of record. The trial court's judgment was that the
mortgage was a valid lien. On appeal to the supreme court, the court held it
did not have jurisdiction and transferred the case to the Kansas City Court
of Appeals. In the course of its opinion the supreme court said, expressly by
way of dictum: "Plaintiff, in the prayer of his reply, does ask that the mort-
gage be declared null and void, and that it be cancelled of record. The
query suggests itself, Is plaintiff entitled in a court of equity to affirmative
relief on the facts admitted in his pleadings? A statute of limitations may be
45. SILVERS, MISSOURI TITLES 340-343 (2d ed. 1923). See also GILL, MISSOURI
TITLES § 531 (3d ed. 1931).
46. 232 S.W. 2d 399, 401 (Mo. 1950).
47. 322 Mo. 1209, 1217, 18 S.W. 2d 428, 432 (1929).
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used as a defense, but not as the basis for affirmative relief; or, as it has
been stated, as a shield but not as a sword. And it has been held that, since
he who seeks equity must do equity, a mortgager will not be permitted in
a court of equity to maintain an action to cancel the mortgage on the sole
ground that foreclosure thereof has been barred by a statute of limitations
while the debt secured thereby remains unpaid. [Citation of cases and text
authority] However, since the solution of this question pertains to the
adjudication of the case rather than to determination of the question of
jurisdiction, we refrain from discussion or decision thereof."48
The Kansas City Court of Appeals held in the same case, Stock v. Schlo-
1an: 49 "The amendment of 1921 [§ 516.150) is plainly not a statute of re-
pose but one of extinguishment containing its own limitations. Therefore
after the lapse of twenty years from the date that the note in suit fell due as
shown on the face of the mortgage, the lien of the mortgage, under the
circumstances, became absolutely extinguished. . . . It is claimed by the
defendants that the Supreme Court intended to decide the merits of the ap-
peal when it transferred the cause here for lack of jurisdiction in that court."
However, the court refused to cancel the mortgage of record, because the
relief was sought in the reply and not in the petition," and the court
expressly did not pass on the question as to whether such relief would be
possible without payment of the note. This case, on its construction of §
516.150, has not been considered by the supreme court.
The St. Louis Court of Appeals considered the problem in Milby v.
Murplyr1 and came to a different construction of the statute. Plaintiff
sought to have the court declare that by reason of the twenty year provision
"null and void and of no force and effect," and that the real estate is "for-
ever released from the lien of said deed of trust." A decree for defendant
was affirmed. The court did not determine the sufficiency of an affidavit filed
for record, but based its decision on the proposition that § 516.150 is a
statute of repose, and not a statute of extinguishment, and cannot be made
the basis for a plea of affirmative relief. The court said, however, that the
statute may be used by way of defense. 52 This case was quoted from with
approval in the principal case.
48. See also Greenfield v. Petty, 346 Mo. 1186, 1195, 145 S.W. 2d 367, 371
(1940).
49. 226 Mo. App. 234, 42 S.W. 2d 61, 63 (1930).
50. On this point only, overruled by Rains v. Moulder, 338 Mo. 275, 284,
90 S.W. 2d 81, 85 (1936).
51. 121 S.W. 2d 169, 171 (Mo. App. 1938).
52. In Rice v. Hughes, 240 Mo. App. 35, 208 S.W. 2d 821 (1948), a case where
the twenty-year provision of Mo. REv. STAT. § 516.1,50 (1949) applied, the plain-
45
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PARTITION BETWEEN LIFE TENANT AND REMAINDERMEN
Noyes v. Stewart53 clarifies some phases of the problem as to when
partition lies when future interests are involved.54 Rubin Hill died in 1905,
devising--a tract of land to his widow for life, with remainder to four named
children and their bodily heirs (William Hill, Thomas Hill, Mary Hill
Shields, and Annabel Hill Williams), with the further provision that if
any child died not survived by issue, then his share should go to those per-
sons who would be the testator's heirs if he died when such child died." The
widow died in 1908, and in 1908 Mary Hill Shields brought suit for partiton.
The Commissioners set off four tracts of twenty-four acres each, and the
court duly approved. The court then ordered the sale of the fee of the parcel
set off to Mary Hill Shields, with commutation of the value of the life estate.
The land was sold to plaintiff's predecessor for $760, and after costs were
deducted Mrry Hill Shields was paid the commuted value of her life estate,
$463.73. The balance, $192.51, was placed in trust for the remaindermen
and in 1946 amounted to $530.06." The purchaser now brings a suit to
tiff sought to foreclose an equitable lien, the record of the deed of trust being notice
of the equitable lien. Judgment for the defendant, who sought no affirmative re-
lief, was affirmed. The court said that the plaintiff had a lien under the deed of
trust, but that it could not be enforced.
The plaintiff's theory, perhaps not too clearly expressed, evidently was similar
to the doctrine that a seller may waive his rights under a conditional sale agree-
ment, avoid the 75% refund provision of the statute, and foreclose an equitable
vendor's lien. See Owens, Foreclosure of Conditional Vendor's Equitable Lien ax
Method of Avoiding Harsh Refund Statute, 3 Mo. BAR J. 7 (1932). The plaintiff
apparently was attempting to waive any remedies under the deed of trust and
to foreclose an equitable lien to which § 516.150 may not be applicable. The opinion
does not indicate that the court saw the plaintiff's theory.
53. 235 S.W. 2d 333 (Mo. 1950). This case is the subject of a recent note:
Clark, Future Interests-Partition-Contingent Remainders, 19 KAN. CITY L. Rev.
208 (1951).
54. Hudson, The Transfer and Partition of Remainders in Missouri, 14 U. or
Mo. BULL. L. SER-. 3, 33 (1917); id. 26 Yale L. J. 24 (1916); Nelson, Partition,
where Life Estates and Remainders are Involved. 42 U. OF Mo. BULL. L. SER. 5
(1931); Ottman, Comment, Partition in Missouri,,6 Mo. L. REv. 87, (1941).
55. The interests created were as follows: Life estate in widow; remainder for
life in each child; contingent remainder in fee in heirs of the body, alternative
contingent remainder in fee in "heirs" of testator; defeasible vested reversion in
testator's heirs.
There is no mention in opinion or briefs of this revision. It is a reversion whose
significance is largely theoretical. Quaere whether such a defeasible vested interest
would bring this case within the doctrine of Reinders v. Koppelmann, 69 Mo. 482
(1878), where it was held that a life tenant who had a life estate in the whole and
a vested remainder in fee in one-eighth, could maintain partition against the owners
of a vested remainder in fee in five-eighths and the "owners" of a contingent re-
mainder in fee in one-quarter. This possible line of argument was not raised.
56. Respondents' Brief, p. 6.
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quiet title against the grandchildren and great-grandchildren of the testator;
the trial court entered a decree for the plaintiff. On appeal, the decree was
reversed for two reasons. First, the sale of the fee in the 1908 partition suit
exceeded the relief sought, and this part of the judgment was coram non
judice and void.5 7 Second, even though such a sale had been prayed for,58
there is no authority for partition between a life tenant and contingent re-
maindermen, and a judgment for partion in such a case is void, even though
a party has joined who might ultimately become one of the remaindermen.
The court distinguished and confined to their facts four earlier Missouri
cases, Reinders v. Koppelman, 5 9 Sikemeier v. Galvin,60 Sparks v. Clay,61
and Acord v. Beaty."2
"PARTITION'--NoN-PRODUCTIVE LIFE ESTATE-SALE OF FEE
In Noyes v. Stewart,3 discussed above, the court notices Missouri Re-
vised Statutes § 528.010 et seq. (1949), enacted in 1925, authorizing the
sale of the fee on the petition of the life tennant in certain cases of non-
productive life estates. The act provides for paying from the proceeds of
the sale "the commuted value of any estate as may be commutable and so
requested to be by the owner or owners thereof, as in other suits in parti-
tion." In WilUite v. Rathzbur, 64 the court sustained the validity of the act
applied to estates created before the act as to sale and reinvestment, but
held that the provision for paying the commuted value was void as to life
estates created before the effective date of the act. In Brittin v. Karren-
brock,cE the court held that a life estate created by will in 1913 is not com-
57. The petition apparently was in conventional form with prayer for sale be-
cause partition in kind could not be effected "without great prejudice to the parties
in interest." Respondents' Brief, p. 5, states: "The prayer of the petition prays,
among other things, for a sale of the lands in the petition described." The point
is not developed in the Argument, and it would seem that there was no prayer
for a sale of a part set off in kind.
,58. Another twenty-four acre tract was set off to Annabel Hill Williams. She
mortgaged this tract, and the purchaser at foreclosure brought suit in 1911 to par-
tition this tract. It was sold to plaintiff's predecessor for $760; the successor to the
life tenant received $433.83, and $147.78 was placed in trust for the remaindermen;
the fund in 1946 amounted to $303.57 (Respondents' Brief, p. 8).
This issue as to this 1911 sale was the same as the second issue with reference
to the 1908 sale, discussed in the text.
59. 68 Mo. 482 (1878), briefed supra n. 55.
60. 124 Mo. 367, 27 S.W. 551 (1894).
61. 185 Mo. 393, 84 S.W. 40 (1904).
62. 244 Mo. 126, 148 S.W. 901, 41 L.R.S., N.S. 400 (1912).
63. 235 S.W. 2d 333, 338 (Mo. 1950).
64. 332 Mo. 1208, 61 S.W. 2d 708 (1933).
65. 186 S.W. 2d 35, 38 (Mo. 1945).
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mutable; the court's interpretation of the statute indicated that a life estate
created after the effective date of the act is not commutable. In Noyes v.
Stewart the court indicates again that under this statute a life tenant is
not entitled to the commuted value of a life estate. The court does not
mention any possible distinction between life estates created before July
9, 1925, and those created on and after that date, and the court's remarks
could be confined to those created before July 9, 1925, inasmuch as the
court was considering life estates created in 1905 and partition suits in
1908 and 1911. A practical objection to commuting the value of a life
estate is that the statutes enacted in 1905, Missouri Revised Statutes §§
442.430-.550 (1949), are based on 6% interest and an obsolescent mortality
table.66
CONSTRUCTION OF LIMITATIONS AND RELATED PROBLEMS
A. Future Interests Following Powers of Disposal in First Taker
In Vaughan v. Compton,8 7 the court continues to apply a doctrine
which for many years has defeated the intention of grantors and testators.
The typical case is where A conveys or devises to B and his heirs, but if B
does not convey or devise, over to C and his heirs. Missouri cases, in accord
with the weight of authority, hold that the limitation creates a fee simple
absolute in B, and that C's shifting executory interest is void. The reason
generally given in the cases is that C's interest is void because it is repug-
nant to B's interest. An alternative theoretical explanation is that the
limitation of the shifting executory interest is an attempt to provide for for-
feiture on intestacy, and that the restraint on devolution by intestacy is void.
On the other hand, if A conveys or devises to B for life, with power to
convey or devise the fee, but in default of the exercise of the power remain-
der to C and his heirs. Missouri cases hold that B has a life estate and
power of appointment, and that C has a valid vested remainder, defeasible
on exercise of the power. Missouri cases show a strong preference for con-
struing a limitation as creating a life estate with power and remainder,
rather than as a defeasible fee with power and shifting executory interest.
It is obvious that in both types of cases the intention of the grantor or
testator is to create the same interests in substance, and if the scrivener
66. Cf. Mo. REv. STAT. § 145.200 (1949), concerning valuation of present
and future interests for inheritance tax purposes.
67. 235 S.W. 2d 328 (Mo. 1950).
48
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 16, Iss. 4 [1951], Art. 1
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol16/iss4/1
19511 WORK OF MISSOURI SUPREME COURT FOR 1950 389
forgets the technical distinction and by chance makes the wrong choice of
words the intention will be defeated.
Two Missouri cases in 1950 illustrate the operation of the rule. Glide-
well v. Glidewel 8 was concerned with a will which may be paraphrased as
follows (emphasis added): "I hereby give, devise and bequeath to my said
wife all property owned by me at my death. And it is my will that if upon
the death of my said wife there shall be any of my property remaining undis-
posed of, I give, devise and bequeath the same to the church of the Nazarene,
to have and to hold the same absolutely." The trial court held the widow
took a fee simple absolute and that the gift over was void. On appeal it
was held that the widow received a life estate, with power to make an
inter vivos disposition but not a testimentary disposition, with valid re-
mainder to the local church. In the course of determining that the widow
received a life estate and not a fee, the court points out that "absolutely"
was used with reference to the gift to the church, but was not used with
reference to the gift to the widow.
Vaughan v. ComptoP9 was concerned with a will which provided in
part as follows (emphasis added): "Item 8: If my beloved husband Dr.
R. F. Cook, should survive me, then I give, devise and bequeath to my
beloved husband, Dr. R. F. Cook, all of the rest, residue and remainder of
my estate, absolutely and in fee simple, with the right to sell, use and other-
wise dispose of said property. [ ] Item 9: At the death of my beloved
husband, Dr. R. F. Cook, if he should survive me, or at my death if he
predecease me, I give all of the property that I may own at my death that
may not have been disposed of by my beloved husband during his lifetime,
as follows: I give, devise and bequeath the property remaining at the death
of Dr. R. F. Cook, if he should survive me, at my death if he should pre-
decease me to [named nieces and nephews, defendants]; absolutely and in
fee simple, share and share alike." The plaintiff was the heir at law of Dr.
Cook and claimed the property undisposed of at his death. The trial court
held Dr. Cook had a life estate only with power of disposal, and that the
gift over to defendants was valid. On appeal it was held Dr. Cook took a
fee simple absolute which descended to his heir at law, plaintiff. The court
points out that the gift to Dr. Cook was "aboslutely and in fee simple." The
court says, at p. 332: 'But if testatrix thought (erroneously) that (by the
68. 360 Mo. 713, 230 S.W. 2d 752 (1950).
69. 235 S.W. 2d 328 (Mo. 1950).
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will now before us) she could direct the ultimate disposition of property her
husband did not dispose of, her dearth of exact legal information in that
respect does not free us to follow her uninformed conceptions. We are legally
bound by the language testatrix used in her will. We cannot write a new will
for her. We can neither ignore its unambiguous words nor under the guise of
interpretation strike from Item 8 of her will the words 'aboslutely and in fee
simple.' Those words mean just what they say. And having granted to her
husband in Item 8 of her will an estate in fee simple absolute, testatrix had
nothing left which was subject to speciall imitation, condition subsequent
or executory devise. We cannot, for textatrix or for defendants, now write
into Item 9 of the will any words or any expression implying that the estate
granted in Item 8 was only for the life of her husband, with a remainder
over."
The holding in Vaughan v. Compton would seem to be amply sup-
ported by earlier Missouri cases. Inasmuch as the court shows no disposi-
tion to overrule this line of cases, it is hoped that the General Assembly
will enact the necessary legislation to change the rule. The problem will
be fully reviewed in a forthcoming issue of the Missouri Law ReviewY°
B. "Personal Property" Construed as "Personal Effects"
In Obetz v. Boatmen's Nat. Bank of St. Louis l the court construed
"personal property" to mean "personal effects.172 The pertinent portions of
the will were as follows (emphasis added): Items Two through Seven were
bequests of specifically described pieces of jewelry to named persons; "Eight.
I will and bequeath all of my clothing, jewelry and personal property not
otherwise disposed of herein.., to Lela Loew and Mrs. Harry Obetz, share
and share alike;" Item Nine was a bequest of $10,000 to a named person;
"Ten. I will, devise and bequeath all the rest and residue of my estate,
real, personal or mixed, and wherever situate, to the following persons in
the following manner: [one-sixth to Mrs. Harry Obetz, five-sixths to other
named persons]." The estate of the testatrix consisted solely of personality
at the execution of the will and at her death. At her death she left certain
70. Moore, Comment, Executory Limitations Following Powers of Disposal, 17
Mo. L. REV. - (1952). See also Eckhardt & Peterson, Possessory Estates, Future
Interests, and Conveyances in Missouri, § 59, text introduction to ANN. Mo. STAT.
c. 442 (Vernon); 2 GILL, REAL PROPERTY LAW IN MIssoURI, 918-929 (1949); and
the recent exhaustive annotation, 17 A.L.R. 2d 7-227 (1951).
71. 234 S.W. 2d 618 (Mo. 1950).
72. It took some four thousand seven hundred and fifty words to construe
the will which, p. 622, "seems to have been drawn with meticulous care."
[Vol. 16
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personal effects (clothing, jewelry, figurines, etc.), and $290,000 in bonds,
stocks and cash. Mrs. Obetz brought action for declaratory judgment that
she was entitled to one-half of the $290,000 under Item Eight, on the theory
that "personal property" in that item meant "personal property." The court
concluded that "personal property" in Item Eight had not been used in
"the broad and general acceptance of the term, which would include every-
thing except real estate," but was used in the sense of "personal effects."
Therefore the $290,000 fell into the residue.
C. "Wife" as Including a Second Wife
A troublesome problem of construction arises where there is a limitation
to "wife" or "widow" and the question is whether a subsequent wife is
included. The "unborn widow" case gives trouble under the rule against
perpetuities: A devises to his son B for life, then to B's "widow" for life,
then to such of their children as survive the widow. If "widow" includes
persons other than B's present wife, the remainder to the surviving children
may vest too remotely, and violates the rule against perpetuities; B's widow
may not be his present spouse and may be a person who was born after
the testator's death.7 3
In Scullin v. lercantile-Comerce Bank & Trust Co.,7 4 a case where
there was a limitation of a future interest to the "wife" of the testator's
son, who was married at the date the will was executed and was married to
the same wife when the testator died, the court held that "wife" did not
include a subsequent wife, the plaintiff. The plaintiff argued that the first
wife, Julia, was mentioned by name ten times in other parts of the will,
and therefore "wife" in clause L under which she claimed would include a
second wife. The court, in considering the will as a whole, found the intent
so clearly expressed that there was no room for construction (i.e. considera-
tion of surrounding circumstances); the same result would have been reached
by considering circumstances. The court follows the leading Missouri case,
Gannett v. Shepley,75 and indicates that when the named spouse is married
at the date of the execution of the will there is a presumption that "wife"
means the person to whom the named spouse is then married and does not
include a subsequent wife.76
73. See Leach, Perpetuities in a Nutshell, 51 HARv. L. REv. 638 (1938).
74. 234 S.W. 2d 597 (Mo. 1950).
75. 351 Mo. 286, 172 S.W. 2d 857 (1943).
76. Note, 63 A.L.R. 81 (1929).
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D. Simidtaneous Death--Common Disaster
Stewart v. Russell77 was concerned with a situation where a husband-
stepfather, wife-mother, and daughter were last seen alive October 21 or 22,
1946, and whose badly decomposed bodies were discovered October 29, 1946,
in their family residence owned by the mother. All three had died of carbon-
monoxide poisoning. The plaintiff, former husband of the wife, and father
of the daughter, brought an action to determine title, on the theory that the
mother died first, the house went by intestate descent to the daughter, and
upon the daughter's death went by intestate descent to him. The real de-
fendants were the brothers and sisters of the mother, who claimed the step-
father and daughter died first, and that they took by intestate descent from
the mother. The heirs at law of the stepfather were nominal defendants
but made no claim. Title was quieted in the brothers and sisters of the
mother. The court held there is no presumption as to survivorship or as to
simultaneous death in the case of a common disaster, and if survivorship is
an essential element in a case, the party asserting it has the burden of
proving it. The evidence was such that no finding could be made as to sur-
vivorship. In such case "devolution of property of necessity is determined
on the theory the deaths occurred simultaneously, not because the fact of
simultaneous death is prseumed, but because he who asserts the contrary
has failed to prove it.' ' 7s Consequently title was quieted in defendants.
Inasmuch as these cases turn on the burden of proof and the inability to
sustain it, it would seem that if the present plaintiff had beeen defending
a suit to quiet title, he would have had judgment. There is no indication
in the briefs of opinion that anyone was in the actual possession of the
premises. It would seem that if the divorced husband (the present plaintiff)
had been the first to go into actual possession after the deaths, he could
have successfully maitained that possession, because the burden then would
be on the brothers and sisters of the former wife (the present defendants) to
establish survivorship, a burden they could not sustain under the evidence in
this case.
The principal case was not controlled by the provisions of the Uniform
Simultaneous Death Law, effective in 1947.79 Missouri Revised Statutes §
471.010 (1949) provides: "Where title to property or the devolution thereof
77. 227 S.W. 2d 1011 (1950).
78. At p. 1014.
79. Mo. REv. STATS. c. 471 (1949). See generally, Magruder, Comment, The
Uniform Simultaneous Death Act, 13 Mo. L. REv. 230 (1948).
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depends upon priority of death and there is no sufficient evidence that the
persons have died otherwise than simultaneously, as determined by a court
of competent jurisdiction, the property of each person shall be disposed of
as if he had survived, except as provided, otherwise in this law." The result
in the principal case would have been the same under the Uniform Simul-
taneous Death Law. However, the new act prevents capricious results,
possible under the common law where a person may win or lose depending
on whether he happens to be plaintiff or defendant.
TAXATION
ROBERT S. EASTIN*
There were few decisions of the Supreme Court of Missouri during 1950
directly on the subject of taxation. Set out below, however, are a number of
cases embracing subjects more or less collateral, but deemed relevant thereto.
I. ASSESSMENT AND COLLECTION OF GENERAL PROPERTY TAXES
In State ex rel. Jackson County Library District v. Evans, it was held
that there was no statutory basis for the separate apportionment by the
State Tax Commission of the distributable property of public utilities among
library districts and mandamus will not lie to compel such an apportionment
by the commission. Compare with State ex rel. Benson v. Union Electric
Company2 where such distributable property was held subject to the library
tax at the local rate if the value thereof in the library district could be de-
termined by other means than an apportionment by the State Tax Com-
mission.
The City of Independence annexed certain territory located within the
Inter-City Fire Protection District on February 2, 1948. In Long v. City of
Independence3 the court held that the property in the annexed area was
subject to city taxation for 1948 since the assessment had not been completed
on the date of the annexation. Property within the city at the time the
assessment is actually made is subject to taxation for the current year
although the assessment must be on the basis of January 1 values.
Attorney, Kansas City. LL.B., 1941, University of Missouri.
1. 360 Mo. 1052, 232 S.W. 2d 386 1950).
2. 359 Mo. 35, 220 S.W. 2d 1 (1949).
3. 360 Mo. 620, 229 S.W. 2d 686 (1950).
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Such annexation left the property in the annexed area subject to both
city taxes and taxes for the Fire Protection District. Thereupon, the 1949
Legislature passed what is now Section 321.320, Revised Statutes (1949),
withdrawing from Fire Protection Districts in counties of the first class hav-
ing a population of over 450,000, territory incorporated in a city not wholly
within the district, which covered the Independence situation. In 1949, pur-
suant to this statute, the County Court of Jackson County refused to extend
the levy of the Fire Protection District against the property annexed to
Independence. In a mandamus proceeding, Iter-City Fire Protection Dis-
trict v. Gambrell,'4 the district attacked the statute on the ground of its
unconstitutionality in that (a) it was an attempt to create an additional and
prohibited class of counties, (b) it did not apply to all Class 1 counties and
(c) the subject matter was not clearly expressed in the title. The statute,
however, was held constitutional, but the emergency clause attached thereto
was held invalid because the act was not in fact one for the immediate pres-
ervation of the public peace, health or safety. The act, therefore, did not
go into effect until October 14, 1949 after the date upon which the county
court extended the 1949 tax levy. As a result, the district was entitled to
have its taxes for 1949 levied on the territory annexed to Independence, al-
though not thereafter.
II. USE OF FUNDs RAISED By TAXATION
The moneys received by a taxing agency from the state on account of
the intangible tax must be apportioned among the various purposes for
which taxes on tangible property are levied in the precise ratio which the
tangible tax rates bear to each other. Thus, where the levy of the City of
St. Louis specified a certain amount for library purposes, the St. Louis Public
Library was entitled to a similar apportioned amount from the intangible
tax funds.' This case involved a special library tax voted by the people and
it may be doubted whether the decision goes beyond such taxes and taxes for
debt service funds on indebtedness voted by the people.
The expenditure of tax moneys for municipally owned off-street parking
facilities, pursuant to statutory and charter authority, is for a public purpose
and within the powers of Kansas City.-
4. 360 Mo. 924, 231 S.W. 2d 193 (1950) (en banc).
5. State ex. rel. Board of Directors of St. Louis Public Library v. Dwyer, 234
S.W. 2d 604 (Mo. 1950) (en banc).
6. Bowman v. Kansas City, 233 S.W. 2d 26 (Mo. 1950) (en banc).
[Vol. 16
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III. Spci.. TAXES
A city operating under a charter adopted by the voters, pursuant to
Section 19, Article VI of the 1945 Constitution, has the power to establish
sewer districts and to issue tax bills against property in a district to pay for
sewer improvements therein, without an enabling act of the legislature, if
such power is conferred by the city charter. Where notice by publication
is given and an opportunity to be heard afforded prior to the formation of
the sewer district, the decision of a city council as to the property to be
included within the district is conclusive, absent fraud or oppression, and a
plaintiff therein who failed to so appear and protest cannot sue and enjoin
collection of the tax bills on account of matters of fact which could have
been raised at that time.7
A county court may levy a maintenance tax upon property in a "county
court" drainage district for the purpose of cleaning out and repairing the
drains and ditches under what is now Section 243.330, Revised Statutes
(1949), and as not required to follow the procedure set out in what are now
Sections 243.220 and 243.230.8
IV. TAX SALES AND TITLES
The holder of an unrecorded deed who has been in open and notorious
possession for more than ten years prior to sale for city taxes in St. Joseph
has a sufficient right in the property to assert that the tax deed was voidable
because the consideration was shockingly inadequate.9 However, no such
right exists in a person whose possession was but permissive prior to the
tax sale, who acknowledged the title of the purchaser at the sale and who
only thereafter and for nominal consideration acquired a quit claim deed
from some (but not all) of the former owners.10 In contrast it was held,
in Adams v. Smith," that a purchaser, for a substantial consideration, of
the interest of the former fee owner at execution sale held after a tax sale
under the Jones-Munger law could attack the tax deed on the ground of
gross inadequacy of consideration. Here, however, the party asserting the
tax title was the vendee of the purchaser at the execution sale and was
estopped, in equity, from acquiring and asserting an adverse title.
7. Giers Improvement Corporation v. Investment Service, Inc., 235 S.W. 2d
355 (Mo. 1950).
8. Drainage District No. 1 Reformed v. Matthews, 234 S.W. 2d 567 (Mo.
1950).
9. King v. Fasching, 234 S.W. 2d 549 (Mo. 19O).
10. Eld v. Ellis, 235 S.W. 2d 273 (Mo. 1950).
11. 360 Mo. 1082, 1232 S.W. 2d 482 (1950).
55
et al.: Work of Missouri Supreme Court 1950




The 1947 School Reorganization Law [now Sections 165.657-165.707,
Revised Statutes (1949)] was held constitutional and districts reorganized
thereunder were held to have the power to incur indebtedness and to issue
bonds therefor and (impliedly) to levy taxes to pay the principal and inter-
est thereof.12
When a proposal to divide a common school district and to release a
portion to District A and a portion to District B, under what is now Section
165.300, was defeated at a special election, a proposal to annex the entire
district to District A cannot be submitted at a special election held within
the ensuing two years1 3
A new consolidated school district cannot be formed by following the
procedure outlined in Section 165.277 et seq., Revised Statutes (1949),
where the territory contains all or part of an existing consolidated school
district, but the procedure specified in Section 165.273 is exclusive. 4
B. Cities
In State ex inf. Taylor ex rel. Kansas City v. Nort Kansas City,"
it was held that: (a) Kansas City, operating under a special charter adopted
by the voters, may annex unincorporated territory by amending its charter
to change the boundaries therein set forth and is not required to follow any
statute requiring a greater majority (reiterating the rule of City of West-
port v. Kansas City);" (b) City A which takes the first step toward annexa-
tion of a given area prior to City B has priority in the territory in spite of
the fact that City B completes its annexation procedure before City A; and
(c) Kansas City's annexation of some seventeen square miles in Clay Coun-
ty was reasonable.
C. Drainage and Levee Districts
The annexation by Kansas City of an area (previously unincorporated)
in an existing levee district did not have the effect of withdrawing the an-
12. State ex rel. Reorganized School District v. Holmes, 360 Mo. 924, 231 O.2d 185 (1950).13. State ex rel. Rice ex rel. Allman v. Hawk, 228 S.W. 2d 78 (Mo. 1950).
14. State ex inf. Taylor ex Tel. Zeliff v. Whitford, 233 S.W. 2d 694 (Mo. 1950).
(en banc).
15. 228 S.W. 2d 762 (Mo. 1950) (en banc).
16. 103 Mo. 141, 15 S.W. 68 (1890).
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nexed area from the district even though the district could not have been
originally formed incorporating land within the limits of Kansas City.17
VI. MISCELLANEOUS
The act of the 65th General Assembly increasing the state gasoline tax
(House Committee Substitute. for House Bill 165) was subject to referen-
dum as it was neither an appropriation act nor an act for the immediate
preservation of the public peace, health or safety1 Such referendum may
be had at a special election called by the legislature by means of a concur-
rent resolution and not by a bill.19
TORTS
GLENN A. McCLEARY*
While the number of cases in the field of tort law continued to occupy
a goodly portion of the court's time, there were very few situations which
did not fall within well settled doctrines in the case law of this state. The
cases having to do with the humanitarian doctrine continue, due to their
importance to the lawyers of Missouri, to receive a separate and more
adequate treatment by Mr. Becker.
I. NEGLIGENCE
A. Duties of persons in certain relations
1. Possessors of land
In the cases appealed during the period under review that involved the
liability of a possessor of land for injuries sustained on the land, plaintiffs
in the main were unsuccessful in making submissible cases. In Anderson v.
Kansas City Baseball Club,' it was held that a petition did not state suf-
ficient facts to constitute a cause of action, where it was alleged that the
defendant baseball club seated the plaintiff in a portion of the grand stand
in the baseball park unprotected by wire screen and failed to warn the
plaintiff of the hazards, and that the defendant's usher stated to the plain-
tiff that the seat was safe and that hundreds of people sat there every day,
17. State ex rel. Collins v. Rooney, 235 S.W. 2d 260 (Mo. 1950) (en banc).
18. Heinkel v. Toberman, 360 Mo. 58, 226 S.W. 2d 1012 (1950) (en banc).
19. Bohrer v. Toberraan, 360 Mo. 244, 227 S.W. 2d 719 (1950) (en banc).
*Professor of Law and Dean of the Law School, University of Missouri.
1. 231 S.W. 2d 170 (Mo. 1950).
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even though plaintiff, an invitee, had no knowledge of the rules or strategy
of the game. The court held, where a baseball game is conducted under
usual conditions customarily prevailing in baseball parks, it is not necessary
that all seats be screened against the hazard of driven balls, and the obliga-
tion to provide a place which is reasonably safe for spectators is fulfilled
when those portions of the stands which are most frequently subject to the
hazard of foul balls are screened. Nor does the fact that spectators in
unscreened seats in a baseball park may be struck by balls which are fouled
or otherwise driven into the stands present an unreasonable risk to specta-
tors which imposes a duty to warn. "This risk," held the court, "is a neces-
sary and inherent part of the game and remains after ordinary care has been
exercised and is not the result of negligence on the part of the baseball club."
It was also pointed out that "the danger of balls being fouled into the stands
is open and obvious to any one who possesses normal powers of observation.
A knowledge of the rules or strategy of the game is not necessary to a real-
ization of such hazard."
Dickinson v. Eden Theatre Co.2 was an action for injuries resulting
when a 65 year old patron of the theatre, while standing in the outer lobby
of the theatre, was knocked down when a newspaper vendor collided with
her. In affirming the directed verdict for the defendant in the trial court,
the court found that the evidence did not establish the existence of anything
inherently dangerous in the customary conduct and activity of the vendor
in selling newspapers in the lobby of the theatre without the consent or
objection on the part of the defendant, and that the defendant under the
evidence had no duty to prevent the newspaper vendor from moving about
the lobby while theatre patrons were entering and leaving the theatre. The
one isolated instance given in evidence, where this newspaper vendor had
bumped shoulders with a witness in the lobby but without making any
impression on the witness at the time, was insufficient to charge the defend-
ant with notice of the likelihood of injury to patrons or invitees resulting
from the newspaper vendor's presence in the lobby.
In Wilson v. Miss Iulling's Cafeterias, Iwc.,3 injuries were sustained by
the plaintiff who was a patron in defendant's cafeteria when she stepped on
some foreign substance on the floor of the cafeteria and fell. From a verdict
for the defendant the plaintiff appealed. The witnesses for the defendant
2. 360 Mo. 941, 231 S.W. 2d 609 (1950)
3. 360 Mo. 559, 228 S.W. 2d 556 (1950).
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testified that there was no foreign substance on the floor. There was evidence
of some physical infirmity in one foot of the plaintiff and the defendant's
theory was that her fall was due to her physical condition, since she appeared
to stumble or fall forward within four feet of the table at which she had
been sitting. The trial court had given for the defendant as a part of its
main instruction "that the mere fact that plaintiff fell and sustained an
injury while upon defendant's premises . .. does not of itself warrant you
in finding against the defendant." The plaintiff contended this was mislead-
ing and argumentative, but the court ruled it was cautionary in nature and
within the discretion of the trial court.
It was held that a directed verdict should have been given for the
defendant in Nelson v. Kansas City,4 where the plaintiff sought to recover
for injuries sustained when something fell on him as he was walking through
a gate in a fence at the municipal airport. The plaintiff, an airline employee,
knew that this gate was not used by employees or by the general public and
that it was opened only on special occasions. He had requested permission
from policemen guarding the gate to go through the gate, in order to see an
arriving dignitary, and to avoid passing through the crowd which had gath-
ered for the purpose of seeing the dignitary. At the time and place where
he was injured, plaintiff was a mere licensee. He had gone to the gate for
his own pleasure and was not in the performance of his duties.
In Lownecker v. Borrs,5 a submissable case was made by the plaintiff
in an action for injuries allegedly resulting to her while a guest of a hotel
operated and owned by the defendants. In attempting to move a large,
rather old-fashioned Morris chair, the toe of one of the plaintiff's shoes was
caught underneath the chair, causing her to fall. An investigation disclosed
that there was a rather heavy, sharp-pointed wire hanging down from the
mechanism under the chair. The manager said the wire was from a coiled
spring which had pushed through the bottom of the chair. The sharp wire
bad pierced the toe of the plaintiff's gabardine shoe, causing her to fall as
she was in the act of moving the chair. The plaintiff-guest had complained
generally to the defendant's manager about the uncomfortable condition of
the chair and had discussed the need of repairs on the chair on several
occasions over a period of eight or nine months. The court recognized that
although hotel keepers are not insurers of the safety of their guests they are
4. 360 Mo. 143, 227 S.W. 2d 672 (1950) (en banc).
5. 360 Mo. 529, 229 S.W. 2d 524 (1950).
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under a duty to exercise reasonable care to keep and maintain their premises
and furnishings in a reasonably safe condition. Therefore, the granting of
a new trial to the plaintiff by the trial court after it had directed a verdict
for the defendants was affirmed.
2. Lessor-lessee relationship
A decision of considerable interest to lessors of commercial establish-
ments is the case of Warner v. Fry.6 The action was for personal injuries to
plaintiff's head and back, while seated at a table drinking beer in a tavern,
caused by the plaster falling on the plaintiff from the ceiling in defendant's
building which had been leased to the proprietor of the tavern. The plaster
that fell was about 6 to 8 feet in diameter and about two and one half inches
thick. Sufficient plaster fell to fill three tubs and its weight was estimated
at 30 to 40 pounds. The ceiling was 19 feet high. The place was described
as a "neighborhood tavern." Most of the people who came there were
regular customers and long-time acquaintances of the lessee. These patrons
would frequently.sit there reading newspapers, listening to baseball broad-
casts and occasionally singing to the music. No meals were served and there
was no prepared place for dancing. There was a coin operated juke box and
a small portable radio in the tavern. The lessee on two occasions had called
the attention of an agent of the real estate agency, to which she paid the
monthly rent, to the condition of the ceiling. The last time was eight days
before the plaster fell. A day or two following the fall of the plaster, the
husband of the defendant came in and looked at it. After a verdict for the
plaintiff for $20,000 the trial court sustained the defendant's motion for
judgment in accordance with the defendant's motion for a directed verdict.
On appeal the court held the "public use" rule, that a lessor is liable for
injuries to a tenant or his invitees because of defects in the premises leased
for the purpose involving public use thereof, was inapplicable to ordinary
commercial establishments, where the primary purpose was not to assemble
large groups at the same time. The decision is treated more fully in 16
Missouri Law Review 71 (1951).
3. Railroads and other carriers
In O'Brien v. Louisville & Nashville R.R.,7 the action was brought
under the Federal Employers' Liability Act for injuries sustained while the
6. 360 Mo. 496, 228 S.W. 2d 729 (1950).
7. 360 Mo. 229, 227 S.W. 2d 690 (1950).
(Vol. 16
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plaintiff was working as a member of a switching crew. In a switching oper-
ation, which necessitated that plaintiff step from a moving car to open a
gate into an industrial plant, he stumbled as he stepped off the car and fell
over a chain which had been fastened to the track, drawn through the fence
and attached to a truck. It was dark at the time of the accident and the
plaintiff did not see the chain which had been there 17 days. It was plainly
visible in the daytime. The court held that the evidence warranted a recov-
ery on the theory that defendant was negligent in not furnishing a reason-
ably safe place to work. It was further held, where two railroads indis-
criminately used yards owned by them, the fact that the track where the
switchman was injured belonged to one railroad did not affect the liability
of the other railroad which employed the switchman.
The basic question raised on appeal in Hilton v. Tkompsoio was whether
the duty of the employer railroad of furnishing a reasonably safe place to
work applied to construction work. The plaintiff was employed by the
defendant as a member of a bridge and building crew and was injured
while assisting in the repair of a bridge on defendant's railroad. The crew
was engaged in replacing wooden stringers on the bridge. A stringer weigh-
ing between 1200 and 1300 pounds was being brought from a supply pile by
a derrick car which was pulled by a motor car. The stringer was secured by
a hook on the end of a cable running from the windlass and was suspended
in mid-air about 16 to 20 inches from the side of the derrick car. Nothing
was used to counterbalance the weight of the suspended stringer. In stop-
ping the motor car, plaintiff alleged that the foreman caused the derrick
car to jerk and jolt, to become unbalanced, and to be derailed. It toppled
to the side on which plaintiff was riding, throwing him to the public road
which ran beneath the bridge. The court declined to follow the line of cases
which hold that the master owes a duty to furnish a reasonably safe place
to work for his employees, as this rule is inapplicable where the very work
the employee is employed to do consists in making a dangerous place safe.
It approved an earlier holding that, in construction work where conditions
are constantly changing, the duty of providing a safe place of work cannot
be imposed to the same extent as in the case of work done in a more per-
manent location because, under these conditions, it is impossible to keep
the place of work, the actual physical location in which the work is done, as
safe as a place in a completed structure. Under such circumstances, "the
8. 360 Mo. 177, 227 S.W. 2d 675 (1950).
61
et al.: Work of Missouri Supreme Court 1950
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1951
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
duty of providing a safe method of carrying on the work increases and '...
the employer's duty is not merely safety of the place of work of his em-
ployee, but also his safety in his place of work; in short, a safe environment
as well as a safe place'."
A distinction between prematurely starting a taxicab, before the pas-
senger has had a reasonable opportunity to become seated, and other carriers
such as trains, streetcars and busses, was drawn in Biehle v. Frazier,0 where
the court said "Unlike in the instances of trains and streetcars or even busses
it is not a usual operation of an automobile or taxicab to start before the
passenger is seated. . . ." Therefore, an instruction that defendant would
not be responsible for injury to the plaintiff as a result of the usual motion
of a motor vehicle being started in operation, and the jury must return a
verdict for the defendant if they believed from the evidence that plaintiff's
injuries were not caused by the taxicab driver starting the cab suddenly
with a jerk, was held to be prejudicially erroneous to the plaintiff as with-
drawing the hypothesis, warranted by the evidence, in instructions given at
plaintiff's request, that the driver negligently started the cab forward before
the plaintiff had a reasonable opportunity to be seated. The judgment for
the defendant was reversed and the cause remanded.
Two earlier courts of appeals decisions had read into the statute requiring
a railroad to construct and maintain suitable openings through its embank-
ment to connect with water courses, so as to afford a sufficient outlet to
permit all water to get through its embankment to the lower side whenever
drainage of such water has been rendered necessary, the additional requre-
ment that the ditch, drain or watercourse connecting below the embank-
ment must be amply sufficient to carry off the water, and if it was not
amply sufficient to do so there was no duty on the railroad to let the water
through its embankment. The Missouri Supreme Court, in Smithpeter v.
Wabash R.R., °0 held that 'Vhat was said in those cases in that respect is
not the law, and should not be followed." The court held a "sufficient"
outlet under the statute to permit all water to get through its embankment
to the lower side, whenever drainage of such water has been rendered neces-
sary, refers only to the opening through the embankment, and the water
which the railroad must let through its embankment is not limited to such
water as can be carried off within the banks, drains, ditch or watercourse
9. 360 Mo. 1068, 232 S.W. 2d 465 (1950).
10. 360 Mo. 835, 231 S.W. 2d 135 (1950). (en banc).
(Vol. 16
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below the railroad. This opening must afford sufficient draining, including
surface water, whether within the natural banks of the watercourse or
whether outside those banks and within levees. The use of the natural wat-
ercourse by the drainage district and the building of levees by the district
were held not to change the nature of the watercourse, nor relieve the de-
fendant of its stautory duty. The judgment was affirmed for the destruction
or damage to the plaintiff's crops by flood waters resulting from the violation
of the statute.'
11. Several other cases noted below, involving the liability of railroads for
personal injuries, did not raise legal problems of sufficient importance to be given
fuller treatment. In Graves v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry., 360 Mo. 167, 227 S.W. 2d
660 (1950), a speed of a train moving at 75 to 80 miles per hour over a country
crossing, used by three families and others when they come to visit or to make
delivery or to haul stock, did not constitute submissible negligence. The double
track line was crossed by the country road at approximately a right angle. The
crossing was not a concealed one and the day was clear. On the issue of whether
warning signals were given there was substantial evidence that they were sounded
while there was no substantial evidence that they were not sounded. On the latter
was the negative testimony of a passenger on the train, who was playing cards, and
the plaintiff. No submissible case was made on this specification of negligence. The
order of the trial court granting plaintiff a new trial was reversed with directions
to reinstate the verdict for the defendants.
In an action against the defendant streetcar company for the death of an occu-
pant of the automobile in a collision with a streetcar, evidence that skidding auto-
mobile with rear wheel caught between streetcar track and ridge of ice alongside
of the track could have been stopped or driven off tracks in time to avoid collision, if
the streetcar had been stopped sooner or its speed slackened, was held in Wood v.
St. Louis Public Service Co., 228 S.W. 2d 665 (Mo. 1950), to make a submissible
case on the question of the negligence of the motorman in not keeping a proper look-
out and in not stopping the streetcar in time to avoid the collision.
In an action under the Federal Employer's Liability Act for injuries sustained
when a blacksmith's helper was hit by a channel iron which weighed about 600
pounds and was 10 to 12 feet in length, the evidence showed that three men were
carrying the iron, the plaintiff carring the rear end and the other two men the front
end, when the iron slipped from the hands of one of the men on the front end,
causing it to fall to the floor and causing the injuries to the plaintiff. The evidence
further showed that it usually took four men to carry an iron of this weight and
size, but the foreman, after an unsuccessful attempt to find a fourth man, instructed
the three men to proceed saying: "Go ahead, you three fellows can carry it. Do the
best you can." A submissible case was held to have been made, In Prince v. Kansas
City Southern Ry., 360 Mo. 580, 229 S.W. 2d 568 (1950), on the issue as to the
company's negligence in not providing sufficient men to carry the iron.
In Widener v. St. Louis Public Service Co., 360 Mo. 761, 230 S.W. 2d 698(1950), the court, after verdict for plaintiff for $5,000 for personal injuries, affirmed
the ruling of the trial court in sustaining plaintiff's motion for a new trial on the
issue of damages only. The case involves an interesting issue on damages resulting
from the activation of a dormant disease, in this case a recurrence of schizophrenia.
But ignoring the plaintiff's recurring insanity, the physical injuries were such as tojustify an award in a greater amount than the $5,000.
A judgment for the plaintiff was reversed in Ottley v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry.,
360 Mo. 1189, 232 S.W. 2d 966 (1950), for injuries received while working as a
freight car inspector in the defendant's yards, on the ground that plaintiff's evidence
was insufficient to make a submissible case on the question of the defendant's negli-
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4. Automobiles
While the case of Dinger v. Burnhartz2 involves imputing negligence
to the parent from permitting a 15 year old son to operate the automobile
in violation of the statute, so as to establish contributory negligence, the case
carries broader implications. The automobile was operated by the son, with
his mother, the plaintiff, on the front seat beside him, when it collided with
gence, in ordering and requiring plaintiff to crawl under standing cars on a switch
track on his way to inspect cars on another track and in violently striking one
end of such standing cars by shunting other cars onto the track from a lead track
without warning. No duty to warn plaintiff inspector was made out where no
member of a railroad switch crew, shunting freight cars onto a switch track, knew
that the freight car inspector was crawling under couplers between two of a string
of coal cars standing on such tract, and where no member of the crew had notice
of his intention to do so and were not required to ascertain that he was cutting
across the freight yard in violation of the company's safety rule, and where no rule,
regulation, practice or custom required any other employee of the company to
sound a signal or give car inspectors notice or warning of intention to start such a
switching movement The facts that assumption of risk is no defense to an action
under the Federal Employers' Liability Act and that contributory negligence dimin-
ishes damages recoverable under that Act do not permit a recovery for injuries of
which the employee's own negligence is the sole proximate cause.
Vail v. Thompson, 360 Mo. 1009, 232 S.W. 2d 491 (1950), involved the Kansas
last clear chance doctrine which permits a recovery to a contributorily negli-
gent plaintiff only when such person is in helpless peril from which by the exercise
of reasonable care he cannot extricate himself. A judgment on a verdict for the
plaintiff was reversed.
In Nance v. Atchison T. & S. F. Ry., 360 Mo. 980, 232 S.W. 2d 547 (1950), the
action by a railroad switch foreman against his employer, for injuries sustained
during the course of his employment, was submitted under the Kansas statutes
which deprived an employer, who rejects the Workmen's Compensation Act, of the
defenses of assumption of risk and contributory negligence. The plaintiff was struck
by a grain door during the course of his employment, and his theory of liability
was the failure of the employer to provide a safe place to work. A judgment for
the plaintiff for $18,000 was set aside and judgment was entered for the defendant
on the ground of failure to make a submissible case, in that he failed to show evi-
dence from which an inference could be drawn that the alleged unsafe condition
reasonably could have been anticipated by the defendant, and that the defendant
had the required actual or constructive notice of such condition.
In Piehler v. Kansas City Public Service Co., 360 Mo. 12, 226 S.W. 2d 681
(1950), the plaintiff's instruction submitting primary negligence contained thefollowing: "... if you further find and believe from the evidence that at said time
and place plaintiff in the exercise of ordinary care for his own safety had his knee
up on the seat on the right-hand side of said streetcar near the rear with one hand
on the window sill of an open window and the other hand upon the signal buzzer
sounding the same, if you so find, and if you further find ... ," The court reversed
a judgment for the plaintiff, an eleven year old boy, for injuries sustained by falling
out of the street car window, while a passenger on the street car, and proximately
caused by the operator's negligence in that he accelerated the speed with an unusualjerk, thus causing the -boy, while kneeling on the seat to ring the buzzer, to fall out
of the open window. The court held that this instruction did not require a finding
that the plaintiff was in the exercise of ordinary care for his own safety. It was
said that "The phrase 'in the exercise of ordinary care for his own safety' is in-
complete to require an independent finding of the ultimate fact of 'ordinary care,'
[Vol. 16
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the defendant's truck. They were on the way to park the car so the mother
could go to a show. The 15 year old son had procured a driver's license
to operate an automobile, having made a false affidavit that he was 16 years
old. The case might have been decided on the question of imputed negli-
gence, in the event of a finding that he was acting as her agent at the time.
This was the immediate question raised on the appeal. The court, however,
went further and treated the problem of the liability of parents for resulting
injuries when they entrust an instrumentality, capable of becoming a source
of danger to others, to an incompetent or reckless child, or when the law
prohibits the entrusting of the instrumentality to the child. After setting
forth the sections of the statutes which provide in part that "No person
under the age of sixteen (16) years shall operate a motor vehicle on the
highways of this state," Missouri Revised Statutes (1939, Section 8401(i),
and Section 8466 of the Missouri Motor Vehicle Driver's License Law that
"No person shall cause or knowingly permit his child or ward under the
age of sixteen (16) years to drive a motor vehicle upon any highway when
such minor is not authorized hereunder or in violation of any of the pro-
visions of this article," the court concludes that, although violation of these
sections are made misdemeanors, their provisions apply in civil as well as
criminal actions, and that "our statutes declare that one under the age of
sixteen years conclusively does not possess the requisite care and judgment
to operate vehicles on the public highways without endangering life and
property."
lacking a verb; and, standing merely as a modifying phrase, characterizes the sub-
mitted physical facts as constituting 'ordinary care' without requiring the jury to
so find. Compare a required finding 'that . . . plaintiff was in the exercise of ordi-
nary care for his own safety and' et cetera." The instruction, held the court,
"tended to give plaintiff an advantage to which he was not entitled as jurors are
authorized to consider all facts bearing on their ultimate conclusion of ordinary care
on the part of the plaintiff. ..."
Donald v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R.R., 231 S.W. 2d 627 (Mo. 1950), and
Howie v. St. Louis S.W. Ry., 360 Mo. 771, 230 S.W. 2d 703 (1950), held plaintiff
contributorily negligent as a matter of law where plaintiff's truck collided with de-
fendant's train at an intersection and, if plaintiff had looked as he said he did, he
could have seen the train in time and, at the speed he was going, could have stopped
his truck in time to have avoided the collision
Under Illinois law, where there was nothing which would lead the operators of
a freight train to believe that the driver of a truck, who drove onto the crossing at
a speed of 2 to 3 miles an hour, did not intend to stop before driving upon the
tracks, and there was a short blast of the whistle a second or so before the impact,
and the brakes on the train were applied in emergency, the evidence in an action
for the death of the truck driver did not justify a submission on the ground that
the operators of the train were guilty of willful and wanton negligence. Howie v.
St. Louis S.W. Ry., 360 Mo. 771, 230 S.W. 2d 703 (1950).
12. 360 Mo. 465, 228 2d 696 (1950).
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In a case of first impression before the supreme court, a verdict and
judgment, in Taylor v. Taylor.1 3 were affirmed in an action brought by a
mother against a 22 year old son, who lived at home as a member of the
family, for damages for the death of her husband resulting from the crash
of the son's autmobile into a bridge abutment when the lights on the auto-
mobile failed. The evidence showed that the lights of the automobile were
known by the son to be defective and that the father, while riding as a guest,
was injured when the automobile hit the bridge abutment as a result of its
lights going out. On the appeal to set aside the verdict and judgment for
$15,000, the defendant contended as one of his grounds that it was contrary
to public policy to permit a parent to sue a child where they were living
together as members of the family. The court held that this general rule
was not applicable where the child was of age at the time the cause of
action arose.
In Cuddy v. Schtenewark,'1 4 the injuries to the plaintiff were sustained in
a head-on collision between two automobiles. It appeared that the defendant
had driven at such speed that he had come suddenly upon an automobile
preceding him in the same direction, and that he applied his brakes for about
20 feet before swerving into the opposite lane and colliding with plaintiff's
on-coming automobile. The' negligence alleged in the petition was that the
defendant negligently drove his car across the center line of the pavement
and in the line of the opposite bound traffic and into plaintiff's car. The
instruction, as to the manner of operation of the automobile, was stated in
the words of the statute that the driver of a motor vehicle should drive
"at a rate of speed so as not to endanger life or limb of any person," but
did not predicate any verdict. Such instruction was held not to inject the
speed issue into the case so as to go outside of the issues made by the plead-
ings. It was also held not to constitute reversible error to instruct the jury
in the words of the statute as to the defendant's duty under the law as to
the manner of operating his automobile, even though such instruction was
stated abstractly and did not predicate a verdict. It was pointed out, how-
ever, that "It would conform with the better practice, often suggested to
the bar, that if the plaintiff desired to use the above satutory words in an
instruction, she should have incorporated them in her theory instruction
predicating a verdict."1 5
13. 360 Mo. 994, 232 S.W. 2d 382 (1950).
14. 231 S.W. 2d 689 (Mo. 1950).
15. Other cases involving liability arising from automobile accidents. Where a
truck driver applied vacuum brakes which failed, and attempted to use the hand
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5. Supplier of a chattel
Blankenship v. St. Joseph Fuel Oil & Manufacturing Co."- was an action
for personal injuries arising out of the rental and use by the plaintiff's em-
ployer of a street sweeping machine owned by the defendant. The broom
was between the one front wheel and the rear wheels and was driven by
means of a chain and sprocket arrangement from the axle between the rear
wheels. The chain and sprockets were exposed-not guarded. The operator
stood on a steel grating platform located across the right-half of the space
between the rear wheels. When the sweeper lurched, or jarred, or hit some-
thing, plaintiff-operator was caused to be thrown off balance and to fall
sideways, his leg catching in the chain and sprocket. Plaintiff charged negli-
gence against the defendant-bailor for supplying a sweeper that was danger-
ous to the person operating it in that the chain and sprockets were un-
guarded, and that the defendant knew or should have known that the
sweeper was dangerous to a person operating it in that condition. The court
held the general rule, that a bailor who negligently fails to furnish a chattel
reasonably fit and proper for the use intended may be answerable to a third
person, was not applicable where the bailee himself has specifically selected
it and where there is no representation of warranty, express or implied, of
defendant respecting the suitability of the article for any particular pur-
pose. Furthermore, where the defect is patent, there is no liability of the
brake which would not bring his truck to a stop, and no evidence was produced of
any legal excuse why the hand brake was inadequate, the trucking company was
found, in Sams v. Adams Transfer & Storage Co., 234 S.W. 2d 593 (Mo. 1950), to
be guilty of negligence, and liable for injuries resulting to a passenger on a streetcar
which was struck at an intersection by the truck and for damages to the streetcar.
Wendel v. Shaw, 235 S.W. 2d 266 (Mo. 1950), held that where defendant con-
tracted to take temporary custody of a four year old child for hire during the
temporary absence of the parents of the child, and the defendant took the child for
a ride in his automobile into Kansas to a pony ring, such transportation was not
gratuitous and the child not a guest within the Kansas automobile guest statute.
The court said "It seems to us that taking plaintiff by automobile to the pony ring
was just something defendant decided to do in doing his job of taking care of the
infant plaintiff." In McGuire v. Steel Transportation Co., 359 Mo. 1179, 225 S.W.
2d 699 (1950), a light truck of the defendant in which plaintiff was riding and a
tractor-trailer side-swiped on a upgrade curve. Negligence was predicated on the
defendant's failure to keep his truck as closely to the righthand side of the road as
practicable. No evidence was offered to make a submissible case on this issue. There
was no mandatory duty to use the two or three feet of black top or asphalt pave-
ment or shoulder adjacent to the two-lane concrete highway until the defendant
should have become aware that the on-coming truck would not yield one half of
the usually traveled portion of the concrete highway.
Wise v. Coleman, 360 Mo. 829, 230 S.W. 2d 870 (1950), was based on the ,In-
diana guest statute whereby the guest must show wanton and willful misconduct by
the operator of the automobile.
16. 360 Mo. 1171, 232 S.W. 2d 945 (1950).
67
et al.: Work of Missouri Supreme Court 1950
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1951
408 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 16
bailor to third persons for injuries from the patent defects in the bailed
article. Here the sweeper was not a complicated machine, "the chain and
sprockets were in view and as readily comprehensible as the chain and
sprocket of a bicycle." The plaintiff's employer, the bailee, had used the
sweeper many time and knew as much about its condition as did the bailor,
and it had remained in the same condition for approximately two years.
Since the bailee would have no claim against the bailor for the alleged defect
in the bailed article, likewise the bailee's employee would have no claim
against the bailor. No submissible case was made.17
6. Employer-employee relationship
In Linam v. Murphy,"" in an action for injuries to a student airplane
pilot, the court ruled that "a pilot instructor, on a training flight in a dual
control plane who took the controls and, despite the student pilot's protest
and without his interference with the controls, operated the plane for his own
personal thrill, was acting within the scope of his employment, and his em-
ployers are liable to the student for injuries resulting from their employee's
negligent operation of the plane." The court was of the opinion that it was
impossible for the pilot instructor to have deviated from or gone without
the scope of his employment from the time he took the plane off from the
home airport, and that he was still acting within and had not departed from
his employment when he continued to operate the plane after he had ordered
the plaintiff to release the controls. Since his acts in taking control and
thereafter operating the plane were part of his duties and, within the scope
of employment, the buzzing of objects at low altitudes, resulting in striking
the wires of a power line and in injuries to the plaintiff when the plane
crashed, could not be said to be a frolic of his own or for his own enjoyment.
17. Plaintiff's theory in Stone v. Farmington Aviation Corp., 360 Mo. 1015,
232 S.W. 2d 495 (1950), was that his injuries in a crash of an airplane, which he
had rented and was operating, resulted from the breaking of a safety belt on the
rear seat, which threw the occupant of the rear seat against the plaintiff's seat and
thereby injured him. He alleged that the belt "was old and rotten and defective
and not suitable for the purpose for which it was intended." From the testimony as
to the condition of the belt, the most that the court might have inferred was that
it was not a new belt. It was held that the evidence was insufficient to show that the
breaking of the safety belt caused or contributed to the plaintiff's injuries. Further-
more, it was impossible to say that, except for the breaking of the belt, the plaintiff
would not have been injured. The plane had crashed at a 45 degree angle. The
engine and fire wall of the plane were pushed back toward the pilot's seat and "lie
was jammed up almost to the instrument board, practically against it." The plane
was so badly wrecked that it was sold for junk.
18. 360 Mo. 1140, 232 S.W. 2d 937 (1950).
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Since the student was one of the other parties to a contract which defendants
had entered into with him and the United States government and for their
services to the plaintiff the defendants were paid by the government, plaintiff
on this flight was not an employee, nor a bailee or charterer of the plane, nor
a guest of either the defendant or the pilot instructor. The relationship was
that of a carrier rather than a master, and the degree of care required was
to be determined by the common law principles of negligence. The judgment
of the trial court directing a verdict for the defendant was reversed and the
cause remanded.
B. Res ipsa loquitur
In Jones v. Thompson,"9 the question was whether the defective freight
car was under the exclusive control or right of control of the defendant
railroad company when the plaintiff sustained his injury, so as to enable
him to make a submissible case under the doctrine res ipsa loquitur. The
plaintiff-shipper, while lawfully unloading the railroad car, attempted to
force a damaged door open in the usual manner. The bottom rollers of the
door were off the bottom rail and, as he forced the door, it fell on him
causing the injuries complained of. The local agent of the railroad company
had told the plaintiff that he had checked the condition of the car and that
it was all right to go ahead and unload it. The court held the res ipsa loquzi-
tor doctrine applicable, distinguishing carload shipments of bulky freight,
which require the consignee to unload and which gives him a measure of
control, from mingled shipments requiring the railroad company to separate
and unload. In the latter situation the company remains constructively in
the control of the car.
In an employee's action against a railroad company for injuries sus-
tained when a railroad car, in which the employee was separating and sta-
bilizing freight, gave a sudden and violent jerk, causing freight to fall and
bruise his foot, the trial court sustained the defendant's motion for a directed
verdict on the ground that there was no substantial evidence showing that
the defendant railroad had any control of or right to control the instrumen-
talities which caused the box car to jerk, including the switching operations
of the Terminal Railroad switching crew. On appeal, in Raze v. St. Louis
Southwestern Ry.,20 the court held that while the Terminal switch crew and
switch engine may or may not have caused it, or it may have been the result
19. 360 Mo. 285, 228 S.W. 2d 673 (1950).
20. 360 Mo. 222, 227 S.W. 2d 687 (1950).
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of something done by some one else, or of some force that had not been
explained, the defendant railroad was in control of the yards and the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur was applicable. The judgment was reversed and the
cause remanded.
Whether the plaintiff pleaded and submitted specific negligence, so as
to lose the benefit of a res ipsa loquitur case, was before the court in Wenzel
v. St. Louis Public Service Co. 2 1 In her petition the plaintiff alleged that
"the said bus suddenly and violently and in a very unusual manner jerked,
jarred and jolted and the front door thereof was caused to be opened, di-
rectly causing the plaintiff to be thrown from the said bus. . . ." In its first
instruction the trial court submitted plaintiff's case on the theory of res
ipsa loquitur, hypothesizing the occurrence as follows: "said bus suddenly
and violently and in a very unusual manner, jerked, jarred and jolted and
the front door thereof was caused to be opened while the bus was in motion."
The defendant-appellant contended that general negligence was submitted
by the hypothesis of a sudden and violent motion of the bus, and that the
submission of general negligence was combined with a submission of specific
negligence by hypothesizing "and the front door thereof was caused to be
opened while the bus was in motion." The court held that no direct evidence
was introduced and there was no pleading or submission of the specific act
or omission which caused the bus suddenly and violently to jerk, and there
was no direct evidence of pleading and no submission that the bus driver
opened the doors, or in what manner the doors were causedl to be opened.
The case was held to have been properly submitted under the doctrine
res ipsa loquitur.
However, where the plaintiff's evidence established the specific acts
of negligence there can be no submisson under the doctrine. In Venditti
v. St. Louis Public Service Co.,22 the action was for personal injuries as the
result of a collision between two of defendant's busses. The plaintiff put
on the stand as her witnesses the operator of each of the busses involved in
the collision. Neither of these men was in the employ of the defendant at the
time of the trial. Their testimony covered the facts of the cause of the
collision. The case, held the court, should have been submitted as one of
specific negligence. 23
21. 235 S.W. 2d 312 (Mo. 1950).
22. 360 Mo. 42, 226 S.W. 2d 599 (1950).
23. Where injuries were sustained by the plaintiff as a passenger on a bus,
in a collision between the bus belonging to the corporate defendant and the indi-
vidual defendant's automobile, the submission of the case under the doctrine of
[Vol. 16
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C. Humanitarian Negligence
In view of the significance of the humanitarian doctrine in the Missouri
decisions, special emphasis is given to the cases predicated upon this doctrine
in a separate topic elsewhere in the Review.2
D. Burden of Proof
In Adams v. City of St. Louis,25 an instruction that "the burden of proof
is upon the plaintiff to prove each and every fact necessary for her to recover,
as set out in other instructions given herein .. ." ,was held not to be irrecon-
cilable with an instruction to the effect that the defendant had the burden
of proving that plaintiff was contributorily negligent. It was thought "that
the sense and meaning of the two instructions, when read together, is so
clear that no juror of ordinary intelligence would conclude that the burden
of proof on that issue was upon plaintiff." The court distinguished this
situation from instructions which refer the jury to the pleadings to ascertain
the issues.
The combined effect of three instructions given at the request of the
defendant on the burden of proof in Ford v. Dahl,26 did not unduly emphasize
the plaintiff's burden. Also, where the plaintiff's main instruction submitted
in the disjunctive the defendant's negligence with respect to failure to stop,
failure to slacken speed, and failure to change the course of travel of the
defendant's truck with resulting collision, the defendant's instruction re-
quiring a finding that the defendant was negligent in the respects set out
in the plaintiff's instruction was held not objectionable as requiring plain-
tiff to prove all three acts of negligence.2 T
II. TORTS OTHER THAN NEGLIGENCE
There were several decisions during the year under review in which
liability was predicated in fields of tort law other than negligence. The
three decisions in deceit involved no new questions of law nor were the facts
res ipsa loquitur as to the carrier and under specific negligence as to the individual
defendant was proper under Missouri case law. Rothweiler v. St. Louis Public
Service Co., 234 S.W. 2d 552 (Mo. 1950) (en bane).
24. Discussed by Mr. Becker in the January, 1952 issue.
25. 360 Mo. 806, 230 S.W. 2d 862 (1950).
26. 360 Mo. 437, 228 S.W. 2d 800 (1950).
27. Davis v. Kansas City Public Service Co., 233 S.W. 2d 679 (Mo. 1950),
also involved a consideration of the effect of other instructions on the burden of
proof instruction.
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unusual, and in each case deceit was not made out. The cases are more
valuable as a study of efforts by the parties to obtain some of the money
they had hoped to make in a transaction, but without actually having been
misled .2
The case of Hoock v. S. S. Kresge Co.,29 for false arrest brought
against the owner of a store and its manager, followed the case law of
Missouri that if one but states the facts, as he believes them to be, to a
police officer, and leaves it to the officer to act or not, to arrest or not as a
police officer under the facts sees fit to do, the one reporting is not liable
for the independent action taken by the police. In this case the manager did
not even seek out or voluntarily report the matter to the officer; in fact,
the nearby traffic officer came off his beat, having seen the manager talking
to the plaintiff on the street, and asked the manager the cause of the con-
versation and whether he was having trouble with the plaintiff. It was then
that the manager explained to the officer why he had accosted the plaintiff
on the street not far from the store. The court found that no inference would
be warranted that the manager had instigated, encouraged, countenanced
or caused the plaintiff's arrest. More is required than the mere furnishing of
even wrong information to a police officer before such inference may be
drawn.30
WILLS, TRUSTS AND ADMINISTRATION
GEORGE W. SIMPKINs *
The Missouri Supreme Court had before it in 1950 a total of 27 cases
involving this subject. A number of these involved matters of first impression
in Missouri. Their decision doubtless took much of the time and thought of
28. The evidence was insufficient to make a submissible case in Dolan v. Ra-
benberg, 360 Mo. 858, 231 S.W. 2d 10 (1950), and in Saunders v. Bannister, 235
S.W. 2d 339 (Mo. 1950). Lowther v. Hays, 225 S.W. 2d 708 (Mo. 1950), was
tried to the court without the aid of a jury. The alleged deceit was raised by
counterclaim.
29. 230 S.W. 2d 758 (Mo. 1950) (eiz banc).
30. Other cases not of sufficient significance to discuss: Harper v. St. Joseph
Lead Co., 233 S.W. 2d 835 (Mo. 1950) (malicious prosecution action failed for
failure to produce substantive evidence that the defendants had brought the indict-
ment against plaintiff or to make a submissible case on want of probable cause);
Krone v. Snapout Forms Co., 360 Mo. 821, 230 S.W. 2d 865 (1950) (defense of
truth in an action of libel, as to whether or not defendant had committed a breach
of good faith as charged by the defendant, left to the jury); Reger v. Nowotny,
226 S.W. 2d 596 (Mo. 1950) (assault and battery).
*Attorney, St. Louis. A.B., Harvard, 1930; J.D., Washington University, 1933.
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the court, and these precedents will be of importance for years to come.
Others of the cases were extensions of existing legal principles and we have
tried in the ensuing account to indicate which of the cases represented such
extensions.
I. THE EXECUTION AND PROOF OF WILLS AND TRUSTS
In Burkland v. Starry," the court ruled that the presumption of due
execution of a will arises when the signatures of the witnesses are proved even
though the will contains no formal attestation clause and that such pre-
sumption survives positive testimony of one of the witnesses that the signa-
ture was not properly witnessed and justifies submitting the issue of due
execution to the jury. The opinion follows and extends the principles here-
tofore laid down in German Evangelical Bethel Church, of Concordia v.
Reith.2
Wright v. McDonald3 was a suit to probate a last will of a deceased
lawyer. The case was reversed and remanded for further proceedings be-
cause the execution of the will was not sufficiently proved. The alleged at-
testing witnesses testified that the deceased had requested them to witness
a client's will rather than her own and that, if they in fact attested the de-
ceased's will, they did not know it at the time. The court follows Baxter v.
Bank of Belle4 in ruling that an attesting witness must sign with the inten-
tion of attesting the will of the deceased.
Menzi v. White5 was a suit to establish an executed carbon copy of a
will as the last will of the decedent. The executed ribbon copy had been de-
livered to the deceased and could not be found after her death. After review-
ing the evidence in this case, the court holds that the jury's finding that the
proffered instrument was not the last will of the deceased, because she had
destroyed the executed original with the intention of revoking it, was a
reasonable, permissible inference from all the facts and circumstances and
does not rest on the mere presumption as to revocation of the will by de-
struction of the executed ribbon copy which could not be found. The court
points out that this presumption is a mere procedural one imposing the
duty of production of other evidence by the proponents of the will. It
1. 234 S.W. 2d 608 (Mo. 1950).
2. 327 Mo. 1098, 39 S.W. 2d 1057 (1931) (en banc).
3. 233 S.W. 2d 19 (Mo. 1950) (en banc).
4. 340 Mo. 952, 104 S.W. 2d 265 (1937).
5. 360 Mo. 319, 228 S.W. 2d 700 (19$0).
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should be noted that this "presumption" is thus different from the "presump-
tion" as to the attestation of a will discussed in Burkland v. Starry.0
In Potter v. Ritchardson,7 a printed form of will was completed by
testatrix writing in her name in the beginning of the will, writing out the dis-
positions she wished made of her property and having the usual attestation
clause completed. The will was not subscribed. The court holds that Section
520 of the Missouri Revised Statutes (1939), now Section 468.150, Missouri
Revised Statutes (1949), does not require that the signature of the testator
or testatrix be at the end of the will, overruling the old case of Catlett v.
Catlett.8 The decision contains a very interesting review of the ancient
origins of the rules as to the manner of execution of wills.
In Kane v. Mayhew,9 a typewritten, duly executed will had been
marked up largely in pencil, but partly in ink, by striking out certain clauses
and marking changes in others. The evidence was not conclusive as to who
made these changes. The trial court found that the will as altered was the
true will and probated it as such. The supreme court reversed this ruling
and held that the original will was not revoked in the manner provided by
Section 521 of the Missouri Revised Statutes (1939), now Section 468.240,
Missouri Revised Statutes (1949), by "burning, cancelling, tearing or ob-
literating the same" and hence was still testatrix's will. The court distin-
guishes on their facts the earlier decisions in Crampton v. OsborilP and,
Varnon v. Varnon.11
Norton v. Johson'2 was a will contest based on testamentary incapacity.
The court affirmed a jury verdict that the will was invalid, ruling that there
was sufficient evidence to justify submitting to the jury the issue of testa-
mentary incapacity. A reading of the case is of interest as showing how
skillful counsel for contestants adroitly handled the incidents of the trial
to create an atmosphere favorable to contestant without creating reversible
error.
Tracy v. Sluggett"3 upholds the action of the trial court in setting aside
an indenture of trust on the ground that the grantor was of unsound mind
when she executed the indenture.
6. 234 S.W. 2d 608 (Mo. 1950), supra.
7. 230 S.W. 2d 672 (Mo. 1950), noted 16 Mo. L. REv. 79 (1951).
8. 55 Mo. 330 (1874).
9. 360 Mo. 1140, 225 S.W. 2d 786 (1950).
10. 356 Mo. 125, 201 S.W. 2d 136 (1947).
11. 67 Mo. App. 534 (1896).
12. 359 Mo. 1214, 226 S.W. 2d 689 (1950).
13. 360 Mo. 1119, 32 S.W. 2d 926 (1949).
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II. CONSTRUCTION OF WILLS AND TRUSTS
Bernheimer v. First National Bank of Kansas City14 was a suit for a
declaratory judgment involving determination whether a minor child was
"lawful issue of the body" of his father within the meaning of the will of
the latter's mother. Plaintiff was born four days after the marriage of his
parents, which marriage took place immediately after plaintiff's father had
obtained a Mexican divorce. The court first holds that the meaning of the
will and the status of plaintiff thereunder as lawful issue must be decided
by the law of Missouri, the domicile of the testatrix, and not the law of
California, where plaintiff was born and he and his parents reside, following
Krause v. Jeannette Inu. Co.3- and Zombro v. Moffett."6 The court finds
that under the evidence both parents believed at the time that their marriage
was valid and hence Section 316 of the Missouri Revised Statutes (1939),
now Section 468.080, Missouri Revised Statutes (1949), made plaintiff legiti-
mate even though the marriage was in fact void due to the invalidity of the
Mexican divorce, holding that said Section only requires a child to be born
after the void marriage regardless of when the child was conceived. The
court again considered the ever troublesome problem of the allowance of
attorney's fees in suits to determine the construction of a will and concluded:
"The contention of the two trustees that there must be am-
biguity in the terms of a will to warrant the granting of attorney's
fees to counsel for the several parties in a suit to construe it, im-
plies the ambiguity must be patent. But it is a matter of judicial
knowledge that such ambiguities often are latent, arising on extran-
eous facts though the will be plain on its face. Also in many in-
stances substantial and legitimate doubts as to the meaning and
application of a will may be founded on the law alone, the meaning
of statutes and decisions, etc., or on mixed questions of law and
fact. But from whatever source the doubts arise, and whether the
ambiguity be one of fact or of law, so to speak, the questions are of
equal importance. For instance, in this case there is controversy on
whether the meaning of the phrase 'lawful issue of the body' in Mrs.
Bernheimer's will, as applied to the infant plaintiff, should be inter-
preted under the law and statutes of Missouri or those of California,
and what those statutes mean. And as we have held, there is also a
determinative question of fact as to whether the mother of the in-
fant plaintiff believed his father had been legally divorced from his
preceding wife Sally.
14. 359 Mo. 1119, 225 S.W. 2d 745 (1949) (en banc).
15. 333 Mo. 509, 62 S.W. 2d 890 (1933).
16. 329 Mo. 137, 44 S.W. 2d 149 (1931).
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"Yet two of the three trustees named in the will refused to
bring a suit to construe it, or at least did not do so, leaving that to
the third trustee, plaintiff's father. Thus the ultimate issues have
been fought out by the plaintiff, on the one hand, and the two
charities and the guardian ad litem for unborn issue and his attor-
ney, on the other. All of them have acted in good faith and are
vitally interested. But the questions are also important to the
testamentary trustees in ascertaining the meaning of the will, and
in charting a course for the administration of the trust estate. In
the opinion of the writer these adversary parties are entitled to an
allowance of attorney fees and taxable court costs, but not for per-
sonal expenses. The issue give rise to a 'legitimate dispute' within
the meaning of the Garrison and Kingston cases, supra, and the
court may exercise a 'sound discretion,' within the meaning of the
Kern case.
"But these fees cannot be based alone on the whole amount
of the trust fund, $750,000. Except as to the amount the trusteees
may in their discretion allow the infant plaintiff for maintenance,
education, etc., out of the income of the trust fund, he now has
no fixed interest in it. He may predecease his father, or the father
may have other issue. The two charities will receive nothing unless
the father die without issue. The trial court pointed to these facts
in its opinion. The court also stated counsel for plaintiff and his
father, jointly, would be entitled to a fee of $20,000, if anything,
and counsel for the two charities, jointly, the same amount, but
denied them any allowance at all because of their adversary self-
interest. Considering these facts we think a reasonable allowance
in each instance would be $10,000 jointly, the same as the allowance
to the attorney for the guardian ad litem for unknown issue, along
with taxable court costs."
Obetz v. Boatimen's National Bank of St. LouiS1 7 involved the deter-
mination of the meaning of the words "personal property" in the following
clause of a will of a testatrix owning no real estate, which will contained a
residuary clause:
"Eight: I will and bequeath all of my clothing, jewelry and
personal property not otherwise disposed of herein, remaining at
the time of my death, to Lela Loew and Mrs. Harry Obetz, share
and share alike.
"Nine: In appreciation of the many kindnesses shown to me
in the past, I will and bequeath to Aubrey R. Hammett, the sum
of Ten Thousand ($10,000) Dollars. If he shall predecease me,
17. 234 S.W. 2d 618 (Mo. 1950).
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this shall be divided among his lineal descendants living at the time
of my death.
"Ten: I will, devise and bequeath all the rest and residue of
my estate, real, personal or mixed, and wherever situate, to the fol-
lowing persons in the following manner:
"(a) Lela Loew, Mrs. Coleman Hubbard, Mrs. Harry Obetz,
one-half of said residue to be divided between them, share and
share alike.
"(b) Phyllis Borges, Bessie Burnsides, and Fay B. Cox, one-
fourth of said residue, to be divided share and share alike.
"(c) Orville Billow, John Robert Hubbard, Rector Hubbard,
Thomas Hubbard, Lonnie Hubbard, and Hervey Hubbard, one-
fourth of said residue to be divided betweeen them, share and share
alike."
The court held that the words meant "effects of the testatrix, which are of
personal nature, subject to her personal use, comfort and adornment" and
did not have the technical meaning of personal property and hence did not
include bank accounts, stocks and bonds. The court denied plaintiff an
allowance for attorney's fees, saying:
".... No one could possibly benefit by this litigation but appel-
lant and defendant Lela Loew, who, in her answer was insisting that
the residue of the estate be distributed according to the provisions
of paragraph 10, and that the words 'personal property' in para-
graph 8 meant tangible property similar to jewelry and clothing,
that is, 'personal effects.' We do not think that under the circum-
stances it would be equitable and just for the estate to be burdened
with paying the attorneys' fees of the appellant. The Chancellor
so held and we see no reason to overturn that decision. Sec. 1135,
Mo. R. S. A. Littleton v. General American Life Ins. Co., Mo. App.,
136 S.W. 2d 433. St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Kaltenbach, 353
Mo. 1114, 186 S.W. 2d 578, 579."
Glidewell v. Glideweli8 determined the construction of a mutual will
of B. L. Willis and Huldah Willis, his wife, executed in 1923. By it, B. L.
Willis, who died first, left all his property to his wife. The will then contin-
ued: "And it is our will that if, upon the death of the survivor of us, there
shall be any property remaining undisposed of, we give, devise and bequeath
the same to the church of the Nazarene, to have and to hold the same
absolutely." The court holds that the quoted sentence resulted in Huldah
Willis taking a mere life estate with power of disposition during her lifetime,
18. 360 Mo. 713, 230 S.W. 2d 752 (1950).
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but not by will, rather than a fee simple. Since the local church was incor-
porated, title to its property vested in its trustees, but the devise was not
void.19 An attempt to have the 1923 will probated as the will of Huldah
Willis failed because no evidence of her testamentary capacity was presented.
Likewise, no evidence was presented as to the existence of any contract
not to revoke the will and hence the court followed Plemmons v. Pember-
ton20 in ruling that absent clear and convincing evidence of such agreement
the will was revocable as to Huldah Willis. The court remanded the pro-
ceedings to allow, among other things, a determination of the validity of a
will made by her in 1946.
In Moran v. Suttor1 the court held that the following provision of the
will of J. Vincent Reardon
"Article three. I give, bequeath and devise to my dearly be-
loved wife, Leona E. Reardon, all of my personal effects and pro-
perty, whether real or mixed, except my stock holdings in The Rear-
don Company, a Missouri corporation, which stock I direct to be
distributed as follows:
"To my wife, Leona E. Reardon, 50/100%, To my beloved
daughter, Mary Catherine Reardon, 40/100%, which is to be held
in trust for her by my executors, with power to sell or otherwise
dispose of as they see fit, but retain the proceeds or invest
same for her sole benefit either before or after she becomes of age,
as they may deem advisable or necessary. (Italics ours)
"To my surviving brothers and sisters, to be divided equally
among them, 10/100%."
was unambiguous, sufficiently definite to create a valid trust, and that the
discretion given the trustees did not render the trust void as being unlimited
in duration. The curator of the estate of the minor daughter contended that
all of the income of the trust must be paid over to him rather than allowing
the trustees to expand it in their discretion for the benefit of such minor. In
a case of first impression in Missouri the court denies this attempt to force
circuity of payment and double commissions.
In Hogg v. Falk22 a testatrix provided certain devises to her husband
with remainder over if he died before the "will was executed." The opinion
of a divided court holds that "executed" could not be given its literal mean-
19. 319 Mo. 633, 5 S.W. 2d 1100 (1928).
20. 346 Mo. 45, 139 S.W. 2d 910 (1940).
21. 360 Mo. 304, 228 S.W. 2d 682 (1950).
22. 359 Mo. 1103, 225 S.W. 2d 756 (1949).
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ing since obviously testatrix knew her husband was alive when she signed
the will and holds: (1) it refers to the time when the will is carried out by
making distribution in accordance therewith, but (2) by the terms of this
will the doctrine of equitable conversion is applicable and the real estate is
to be treated as personalty, hence (3) no election of the. husband to take
his statutory rights is necessary, and (4) his conduct in acting briefly as
executor under the will and receiving commissions as such did not waive
his statutory rights. It should be noted, however, that all four of the judges
concurred, two solely and two primarily on the ground that the word "exe-
cuted" meant when the will becomes effective on the death of the testatrix
and not when distribution was made thereunder.
Bogdanovihk v. BogdanoviC7Z23 holds sufficiently definite a devise of
the residue of testator's estate in trust to erect a new school building or repair
and reconstruct the existing school building housing the school deceased
attended in his youth in his native Yugoslavia, distinguishing the cases of
Schmuker's Estate v. Reel,24 Wentura v. Kinnerk,25 and Jones v. Patter-
son,26 while following Burner v. Jones.27
An example of a will construction suit of great interest to the parties
but of little general interest, since it involved only the determination of the
meaning of particular language unlikely to be involved in another case, is
Scullin v. Mercantile-Commerce Bank and Trust Company.28
III. ADOPTION AND ITS EFFECT
Robertson v. Cornett29 was a suit to establish that plaintiff was a pre-
termitted heir of testator. The issues involved were (1) was the adoption
void because of alleged defects in the proceedings for service by publication
on the natural parents and failure to obtain their consent and (2) the effect
of adoption in making the child an heir of the father of the adopting parent.
The court held the adoption valid and then passed to the second question,
which is a matter of first impression in Missouri, and held that the effect
of the former Missouri Statute, Section 9614, Missouri Revised Statutes
(1939), was to make the child an heir of his adoptive grandfather, saying:
23. 360 Mo. 753, 230 S.W. 2d 695 (1950).
24. 61 Mo. 592 (1876).
25. 319 Mo. 1068, 5 S.W. 2d 66 (1928).
26. 271 Mo. 1, 195 S.W. 1004 (1917).
27. 338 Mo. 679, 92 S.W. 2d 885 (1936).
28. 234 S.W. 2d 597 (Mo. 1950).
29. 359 Mo. 1156, 225 S.W. 2d 780 (1949).
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"Since the law of inheritance is the creature of the statute, and
since the statute, Sec. 9614, proviaes that an adopted child shal
be deemed and held for every purpose the child of its adoptive
parents as fully as though borm in lawful wedlock, we hold that re-
spondent is the pretermitted heir of his adoptive grandfather, Ed-
gar M. Robertson.
"Our holding is supported by the case of In re Walter's Estate,
270 N. Y. 201, 200 N.E. 786. In that case it appears that on October
6, 1920, Maude Ayers Ganoung, when three years old, was adopted
by James H. Ganoung who had no children of his own blood. She
lived with her adoptive father until his death January 12, 1933.
Mrs. Alice Ganoung Walter, a sister of James H., and childless,
too, knew all about the adoption; approved it and was very friendly
with Maude. December 2, 1932, some over a month before her
brother James H. died, Mrs. Walter made her will giving all her
property, real and personal, to her brother James H. May 1, 1933,
about 5 months after making her will, Mrs. Walter died. There
was no limitation over of the legacy in the will to James H. in the
event he predeceased his sister, the testatrix. The questions were,
Did the legacy to James H. lapse upon his death? Or did it pass to
Maude, his adopted daughter? It was held that the legacy did not
lapse, but passed to Maude.
"The Court of Appeals set out in the opinion the pertinent
statute of their adoption law. It will not be necessary to set out
this statute here. There was no more in the New York statute to
impel the conclusion reached in the Walter's Estate case than there
is in our adoption statute which impelled our conclusion that re-
spondent is the pretermitted heir of his adoptive grandfather. In
the Walter's Estate case, the court quoted from the case of In re
Cook's Estate, 187 N. Y. 253, 79 N.E. 991, as follows: 'In the eye
of the law, therefore, adopted children are lineal descendants of
their foster parent. They are in the line of descent from him through
the command of the statute, the same as if that line had been
established by nature.' [270 N. Y. 201, 200 N.E. 787]
"Appellants call our attention to Fletcher et al v. Flanary et
al., 185 Va. 409, 38 S.E. 2d 433, 166 A.L.R. 145. That case con-
cerned the construction of a deed, and it was held that by the lan-
guage of the deed it was the intention that only natural and not
adopted children would take as provided in the deed.
"Does our holding that respondent is the pretermitted heir
of Edgar M. Robertson run counter to any rights of his (Edgar
M.'s) under the due process provisions of either the state or federal
Constitutions? Mo. R. S. A. Const. Art. 1, sec. 10; U. S. Const.
Amend. 14. As we have seen the right to inherit property is a
[Vol. 16
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creature of the statute, and not an absolute or natural right, and
there is no constitutional provision, state or federal, prohibiting
the legislature from changing the law (Sec. 306) of descent and
distribution. State ex rel McClintock et al v. Guinotte, 275 Mo.
298, 204 S.W. 806; In re Rogers' Estate, Mo. Sup., 250 S.W. 576;
Magoun v. Illinois Trust & Savings Bank, 170 U. S. 283, 18 S. Ct.
594, 598, 42 L. Ed. 1037. In the brief able counsel for appellants
say that 'the right to make one's will is an unlimited right, except
as expressly provided by Sec. 526 as to lineal heirs of the testator.'
But Sec. 9614, supra, on the subject of consequences of adoption,
in our opinion, makes respondent in effect a lineal heir of his adop-
tive grandfather. On the question of due process appellants cite
these cases: St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Kaltenbach, 353 Mo.
1114, 186 S.W. 2d 578; Crawford v. Arends, 351 Mo. 1100, 176
S.W. 2d 1; In re Flukes, 157 Mo. 125, 57 S.W. 545, 51 L.R.A. 176,
80 Am. St. Rep. 619, and others. It will not be necessary to review
these cases; they just do not support appellants' contention, and
no case does so far as we can ascertain. There would be no more
reason so far as due process and the adoptive grandfather are con-
cerned to exclude respondent as a pretermitted heir than there
would be were he a natural grandson of Edgar M. Robertson, the
testator."
This result would even more clearly follow under the terms of the present
Adoption Law enacted in 1947, Missouri Revised Statutes Section 453.090
(1949).
Mississippi Valley Trust Company v. Palms80 involved the construction
of a will by which, after an intervening life estate, testator left certain prop-
erty "per stirpes to my then heirs at law under the laws of Missouri."
Testator left him surviving seven children. After the death of testator, one
of his daughters died, leaving her surviving three minor children. These
grandchildren of testator were then adopted by their aunt, another child of
testator who had no children of her own. This adoption was under the Act
of 1917. The question was whether this adoption allowed these grandchildren
to claim a double share (1) through their natural parent and (2) through
their adoptive parent. The case involved a question of first impression not
only in Missouri, but also in the United States, although there was con-
flicting authority as to such double inheritance where intestate succession
was involved. The court held that the grandchildren were entitled to only
a single share, saying:
30. 229 S.W. 2d 67$ (Mo. 1950).
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"We concede that Josephine's children, by virtue of their
adoption by their own aunt, testator's daughter, under M. R. S. A.
sec. 306 and Sec. 9614, were heirs at law of testator at the time
of Dickson's death. Tevis v. Tevis, 259 Mo. 19, 167 S.W. 1003,
1007, Ann. Cas. 1917A, 865. But in Brock v. Dorman, 339 Mo.
611, 98 S.W. 2d 672, 674, we said: 'In the matter of construing the
rights of an adopted child to take under a will, it should be borne
in mind that it is not a question of the right of an adopted child
to inherit, but simply a question of the testator's intention with
respect to those who are to share in this estate.!
"Conceding that adopted children, under the Missouri Adop-
tion Statute, Mo., R. S. A., sec. 9614, inherit from the adoptive par-
ent, and that, under some circumstances, they may inherit through
the adoptive parent as an heir at law of the father of such adoptive
parent, it does not follow, that under this will, Josephine's children
were entitled to take a second and additional share of this trust
through their adoptive mother. Testator's intention must govern
here. Through their own blood mother Josephine's children were in
testator's blood line, and, being therein, were already heirs at law
of testator. Can one come twice within the term 'heir at law' and
be a double heir at law? We do not think so. When one is in
testator's blood stream and an heir at law through one's own blood
mother does the artificiality of an adoption by a blood relative
reopen the blood stream a second time for the purpose of a double
share of the inheritance? We do not think so. This must be par-
ticularly true here where the intention of the testator to divide his
estate equally among the seven stirps is so obvious."
IV. CONsTrucrivW TRUSTS
In Proffit v. Housewortt,31 the court finds that the purchase and rehab-
ilitation of a rooming house was a joint enterprise of a husband and wife
and decreed that her heirs held title as constructive trustee for him, even
though the contract of purchase was in her name alone.
V. MISCELLANEOUS CASES
Clark v. Mississippi Valley Trust Company32 is the second appeal. In
the first appeal," the court had directed the trustee to make further invest-
igation and exercise its discretion to determine whether or not the trustee
should exercise the power of encroachment on corpus in case of "extremity
of the beneficiary." The court reviewed the evidence and found that the
trustee had not abused its discretion.
31. 360 Mo. 947, 231 S.W. 2d 612 (1950).
32. 360 Mo. 452, 228 S.W. 2d 808 (1950).
33. 357 Mo. 785, 211 S.W. 2d 10 (1948).
[Vol. 16
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In re Kai nn.s Estate4 upholds the validity of the typical joint and
survivor bank account agreement but holds that the survivor has the burden
of proving that each deposit therein was made with the knowledge and
approval of the decedent where such deposits were made out of the funds
of the decedent which the survivor handled during decedent's lifetime as a
fiduciary for the decedent.
Commerce Trust Company v. Watts"5 holds that where a joint bank
account with right of survivorship was created by a formal, unambiguous
written agreement signed by both parties, then it was binding and neither
parol evidence nor extrinsic circumstances were admissible to vary its terms.
In so holding the court decides a case of first impression in Missouri, but
follows the general rule in other jurisdictions. 6
In Breshears v. Breshears,37 suit had been brought in equity to enforce
the marital rights of a widow in real estate transferred by her husband on
the eve of their marriage to his children by a former marriage, he reserving
a life estate and mortgage for $300.09. The property in question was appar-
ently all the property of the husband and the trial court found that the
deed was executed with the intent of depriving the widow of her marital
rights.
Gardine v. Cottey"8 was a suit by a divorced wife on her own behalf
and on behalf of the minor children born of her marriage with the deceased
to (1) set aside a pre-divorce property settlement for fraud in that her
attorney was in fact also representing the deceased, (2) contest the will for
want of testamentary capacity and undue influence, and (3) have an allow-
ance made out of the estate for the future support and maintenance of the
minor children. The court holds the property settlement void on the grounds
(1) it was against public policy because it provided for an uncontested
divorce and (2) the dual position of the attorney in connection therewith.
After a review of the evidence, the court upholds the action of the trial
court in directing the jury that there was no substantial evidence of test-
amentary incapacity, fraud or undue influence. The court ruled that under
Missouri law the obligation to support the minor children terminated with
the death of the deceased, saying:
34. 229 S.W. 2d 527 (Mo. 1950).
35. 360 Mo. 971, 231 S.W. 2d 817 (1950).
36. See Note, 149 A.L.R. 962 (1944).
37. 360 Mo. 1057, 232 S.W. 2d 460 (1950).
38. 360 Mo. 681, 230 S.W. 2d 731 (1950) (en banc).
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"The divorce statute, Sec. 1519, supra, provides a method for
determining in advance the extent of the husband's common law
obligation for the support of the child. See, Kelly v. Kelly, supra,
47 S.W. 2d 762, 767; Sec. 1519, R. S. 1939, Mo. R. S. A. While
absolute divorce, as recognized by our law, and the consequent
power of courts granting same to make provision for the care,
custody, and maintenance of minor children after marriages are
dissolved, is of purely statutory creation', Robinson v. Robinson,
268 Mo. 703, 186 S.W. 1032, 1033, yet such a judgment for support
is in effect substituted for the common law judgment for support
is in effect substituted for the common law liability of support
which would otherwise exist and which would end with the father's
death. The purpose of the statute apparently is to provide a mode
of procedure for obtaining maintenance for the child and for de-
termining in advance the extent of the common law obligation of
the father and the means of enforcing it against him.
"We think that orderly procedure in the administration of
estates requires that such a claim for future support of minor
children be denied."
The right of enemy aliens to "inherit" property under Missouri law
was upheld in American Red Cross v. Hannibal National Bank,"" even
though the effect of the decision was that the possession of the property
would pass to the Alien Property Custodian.
In Therrien v. Mercantile-Commerce Bank and Trust Company,40 the
court in a 4-3 decision upheld the action of the trial court in dismissing on
motion a suit in which plaintiff sought a judgment that a grantor (then in
German occupied Paris) had revoked pro tanto a revocable trust by de-
livering five checks and writing five letters to charge the amount of the
checks to her account and hold the money in escrow so that the checks
might be paid on presentation. The majority concludes that the checks and
letters were addressed to the Mercantile-Commerce Bank and Trust Com-
pany as a banking institution and not as a trustee of the trust.
Jacquemin v. Mercantile-Comnmerce Bank and Trust Company"t sus-
tained the action of the trial court in dismissing a suit for specific perform-
ance of a contract to devise, on the ground that the services alleged in the
complaint to have been performed did not meet the accepted tests as to the
39. 360 Mo. 297, 228 S.W. 2d 679 (1950).
40. 360 Mo. 149, 227 S.W. 2d 708 (1950) (en banc).
41. 234 S.W. 2d 789 (Mo. 1950).
[Vol. 16
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kind of services required to justify a decree of specific performance in such
cases.
In Rosenberg v. Steiner,42 the court ruled that the evidence was not
sufficient either to prove the making of an alleged oral contract to devise
or the rendition of services thereunder of the character required to justify
a decree of specific performance. Hence the plaintiff was not entitled either
to specific performance or to a judgment for the reasonable value of services
actually rendered.
Jolmson v. Weelera3 rules that the Statute of Limitation runs in favor
of a trustee as against a suit by disinherited heirs bringing suit to have two
charitable trusts created by a will declared void. In so ruling the court
follows its earlier decision in.Odom v. Langston pointing out that the ruling
in St. Louis Union Trust Company v. Kelley45 holds only that where a
trustee brings suit for instructions as to the validity of the trust, a bene-
ficiary thereof who is also an heir was not barred by limitations from setting
up the claim that the trust was void as violating the rule against perpetui-
ties. The case of Atlantic National Bank v. St. Louis Union Trust Corm-
pany" is distinguished on the ground that it involved only the ruling that
the statute would not run in favor of a trustee as against a claim by the
beneficiary of the trust until the trustee had given to the beneficiary notice
that the trustee repudiated the trust.
42. 360 Mo. 447, 228 S.W. 2d 806 (1950).
43. 360 Mo. 334, 228 S.W. 2d 714 (1950).
44. 355 Mo. 109, 195 S.W. 2d 463 (1946).
45. 355 Mo. 924, 199 S.W. 2d 344 (1947).
46. 357 Mo. 770, 211 S.W. 2d 2 (1948).
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THE NEW GENERAL CODE FOR CIVIL PROCEDURE AND
SUPREME COURT RULES INTERPRETED'
CARL C. WHEATON*
OBJECTIVES OF CODE
One of the purposes of the 1943 Code of Civil Procedure was to speed
up litigation. It was particularly intended to eliminate delay in the period
after judgment in the trial court. That was the reason for abolishing writs
of error in civil cases, fixing limited periods for filing and acting on motions
for a new trial, and for taking appeals. 2
EXTENDING TIME FOR DOING SPECIFIED ACTS
Where, on the eighty-ninth day after the defendant filed a motion for
a new trial, the trial court issued a declaration that it would overrule the
defendant's motion, if the plaintiff would enter a remittitur within ten days,
but, upon the plaintiff's failure to make such a remittitur, the motion would
be sustained, the court did not thereby extend the time for granting a new
trial. The court actually did pass on the motion for new trial within 90
days within the meaning of Section 510.360.3 The words "passed on" mean
"determined" and to pass on the motion the court had to decide what was
to be done with the motion and definitely so to state in its order. Neverthe-
less, our remittitur practice has always permitted the court to make such
an order in the alternative when the sole ground for granting a new trial
is an excessive verdict. Therefore, Section 510.360 does not cut down the
time in which the motion must be passed on to less than 90 days when the
court decides to order a remittitur. This remittitur practice is not and never
was based on any statute but comes from the common law and from the in-
*Professor of Law, University of Missouri. A.B. 1911, Leland Stanford
Junior University, L.L.B. 1915, Harvard University. Draftsman for the Missouri
Supreme Court Committee on Civil Practice and Procedure.
1. The interpretations are based primarily on Volume 230 through 239 of
the Southwestern Reporter, second series. The statutory coverage is confined to
those statutes in the MissouRI REvIsED STATuTES (1949) which replace the General
Code for Civil Procedure found in the Laws of Missouri, 1943.
2. Kattering v. Franz, 231 S.W. 2d 148 (Mo. 1950).
3. Nothing to the contrary being stated, sections referred to in this article
are sections in MIssoURi REvIsED STATUTEs (1949).
(426)
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herent power of the court to set aside a verdict, so excessive as to shock the
concience of the court.4
In Dunlap v. Donnell,5 the notice of appeal was filed December 22, 1949.
On March 16th, 1950, within 90 days from the filing of the notice of appeal,
the time for filing the transcript was extended 60 days "from this date."
On May 16-the 61st day thereafter-another 60-day extension was granted
by the trial court, which, if authorized, would have extended the time to
July 16. The circuit court had no right, under Supreme Court Rule 3.26, to
extend the time for filing the trauscript more than six months from the date
of the filing of the notice of appeal, which date would have been June 22.
The trancript filed on July 8, 1950, was, therefore, filed sixteen days late.
However, the court of appeals held that, while it would have been justified in
dismissing the appeal for a violation of the rules, inasmuch as a transcript
had been filed and the parties had briefed and submitted the case without
raising any question as to the timely filing of the transcript, it would con-




Secion 507.040 relating to the permissive joinder of parties is not a
venue statute. Hence, it does not authorize the joinder of defendants who
are residents of different counties in Missouri, when the action is begun in
a county in which none of the parties were resident.6
Section 507.050 permitting the addition of parties on motion may not
be read apart from the applicable statute of limitations respecting amend-
ment. Therefore, it has been held that a party can not be joined after the
statute of limitations has run against the claim against it.7
b. Class Suits
Class actions should be brought by a party or parties having a right to
relief, for the benefit of themselves and others so situated. Where the plain-
tiff is entitled to no relief he can not bring an action for the benefit of others.s
4. Steuernagel v. St. Louis Public Service Co., 238 S.W. 2d 426 (Mo. 1951).
5. 234 S.W. 2d 330 (Mo. App. 1950).
6. State ex rel. O'Keefe v. Brown, 235 S.W. 2d 304 (Mo. 1951).
7. Daiprai v. Moberly Fueland Transfer Co., 223 S.W. 2d 474 (1949).
8. Missouri Veterinary Medical Ass'n. v. Glisan, 230 S.W. 2d 169 (Mo. App.
1950).
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Class suits against members of labor unions are permissible in Missouri.
The provision of Supreme Court Rule 3.07(d), which provides that nothing
in the rule shall be construed to affect the rights or liabilities of labor unions
to sue or be sued merely means that the rule shall not alter the existing
rights of unions to sue or the rights of others to sue unions or their members.9
At the time this rule was adopted, representative suits could be brought
againt unions and their members.
c. Third-Party Practice
A defendant may, in the discretion of the trial court, bring in third
parties who are, or who may be, liable to him in connection with a claim
growing out of his liability on the plaintiff's pleaded cause of action.Y'
The court's jurisdiction to summon a third-party defendant does not
depend on the plaintiff's wishes in the matter, but on the defendant's, pro-
viding that he bring himself within the provisions of the statute.1
When a third party defendant is summoned into court, he becomes an
adversary of the defendant, although the plaintiff does not see fit to make
him an adversary of said plaintiff.12
A third-party defendant has the right to file a claim against the third-
party plaintiff arising out of the same transaction out of which the plaintiff's
claim against the third-party plaintff arose. Since he had this right, he
also had the right to have that claim adjudicated in the pending proceeding,
though the plaintiff dismissed his case against the defendant.13
Since no provision is made for third-party practice in magistrate courts,
on an appeal from such a court to a circuit court that practice is not properly
permitted.14 However, where this practice was permitted in a case in a
magistrate's court, the plaintiff could not successfully appeal because of the
court's error in that respect, in a case in which the evidence was exactly the
same as if no third-party petition had been filed, since the error in permitting
the practice was harmless as to the plaintiff.r'
9. State ex rel. Allai v. Thatch, 234 S.W. 2d 1 (Mo. 1950).




14. Liberty Import Corp. v. Neuman, 234 S.W. 2d 227 (Mo. App. 1950).
15. Frye v. Baskin, 231 S.W. 2d 630 (Mo. App. 1950).
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d. Substitution of
Testamentary trustees of the plaintiff, to whom all property rights in a
judgment against the defendant in an unlawful detainer action passed upon
the death of the plaintiff after the case had been appealed by the defendant,
were proper parties to be substituted as respondents on appeal.16
Where the owner of land, at the time condemnation proceedings were
commenced, died in 1939, and the original owner's sole heir was not substi-
tuted in his stead until 1947, but no objection was interposed by subsequent
grantees of the land condemned when the heir was made a party defendant,
and they affirmatively recognized her status and moved and stipulated that
she be required to interplead with them as to who was entitled to damages
awarded, subsequent grantees were in no position to complain of the fact
that the subsitution was not made within one year after the death of the
original owner.1 7
Where, after a cause is argued and submitted on appeal, the appellant
dies, the appellate court will make its decision as of the date of the submis-
sion of the case rather than to sustain a motion to substitute for the appel-
lant his duly qualified administrator.'8
SERVICE OF SUMMONS
Constructive service by publication is in derogation of the common law.
Authority for it arises solely from the statute creating it, so that, to be
effective, strict compliance with the staute is required.' 9
The fact that one does not know the defendant's present address and is
unable to obtain it is not a ground for permitting published service.
2 0
The repeal of Section 974 of the Revised Statutes of Missouri, 1939,
which permitted a sheriff to amend a return in affirmance of a judgment and
the enactment of Section 506.190, which does not include the word affirm-
ance, did not change the settled law in Missouri that a sheriff's return con-
cerning a summons can not be impeached if the result of such an attack on
the summons will be to nullify a judgment.21
16. McIlvain v. Kavorinos, 236 S.W. 2d 322 (Mo. 19$1).
17. State ex rel. State Highway Commission v. Houchens, 234 S.W. 2d 97 (Mo.
App. 1951).
18. Tuohy v. Novich, 230 S.W. 2d 1$2 (Mo. App. 1950).
19. Orrick v. Orrick, 233 S.W. 2d 826 (Mo. App. 1950).
20. Ibid.
21. Majewski v. Bender, 237 S.W. 2d 235 (Mo. App. 1951l).
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An answer which pleads res adjudicata and asks for affirmative relief
based upon that defense requires a reply. If none is made, affirmative allega-
tions in the answer are admitted.22 It has also been held that a reply is
required to set up any affirmative defense pleaded in an answer.23 This ruling
is based upon the wording of Section 509.090 of the Revised Statutes. This
law provides that, in pleading to a preceding pleading, one must set forth
affirmatively any matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense.
The reasoning is that a preceding pleading may include an answer. Hence,
any affirmative defense to an answer must be pleaded. This is held, notwith-
standing the fact that Section 509.010 states that replies are not required
unless the answer contains a counter-claim or the court orders a reply. The
writer believes that these two sections should be read together and that
affirmative defenses must be pleaded only when the affirmative defense is
to the petition or when the court orders it to be pleaded in a reply.
b. Counterclaims
Section 509.420 makes the counterclaims therein specified compulsory.
A party failing to set up by way of counterclaim in the original suit any
claims arising out of the same transaction out of which the plaintiff's cause
of action arose waives the claims and cannot later assert them.24
For example, a teacher was not permitted to assert his cause of action
for breach of contract which arose as the result of the failure of the directors
of his school to give him the statutory notice of their intention not to re-
employ him, when he failed to counterclaim therefor in an action by the
school directors for an injunction to restrain him from acting as teacher.25
In an action for damage to the plaintiff's automobile in a collision with
the automobile owned and operated by the defendant, the defendant must
set up by way of counterclaim any claim he has against plaintiff for injuries
or property damage sustained in such collision and he can not maintain a
separate action against the plaintiff for such damages.2 6
22. McIntosh v. Foulke, 228 S.W. 757 (Mo. 1950).
23. Hill v. Hill, 236 S.W. 2d 394 (Mo. App. 1951).
24. State ex rel. Mack v. Scott, 23$ S.W. 2d 106 (Mo. App. 1950). In accord:
Deeds v. Foster, 235 S.W. 2d 262 (Mo. 1951).
25 Brinkmann v. Common School Dist. No. 27 of Gasconade County, 238
S.W. 2d 1 (Mo. App. 1951).
26. Hayden v. Yelton, 237 S.W. 2d 249 (Mo. App. 1951).
[Vol. 16
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A defendant in an ejectment action who desires to seek affirmative relief
of the court in determining who has title to the land involved in the eject-
ment action must mandatorily claim the relief in a counterclaim.2
c. Joinder of Claims
An original action against an insurer can not be joined with one against
the insured in an action to recover for wrongful death caused by an airplane
crash. This is true since there is a special statute, Section 379.200, providing
that the insured and insurer can not be sued in this fashion. Any right of
the injured person to sue the insurer seems to be postponed until the former
has recovered a judgment against the insured. Then the injured person may
sue the insured and the insurer in equity to take advantage of the insurance.2 8
d. Counts
A petition for an injunction cannot properly be intermingled with a
petition for a divorce in a single count.2 9
e. Inconsistent Pleading
Though one may, in different counts, state causes of action treating a
contract as valid and as void, it has been held that he may not submit both
claims for decision. It is questionable whether this is correct. If one may
sue on both theories, why should he have to choose between theories at
any time?30
f. Pleading Evidence
Where the plaintiff in stating its cause of action alleges that it is en-
titled to the immediate and exclusive possession of the property described,
that it has a special interest in the property, and that the plaintiff is law-
fully entitled to the possession thereof, it has sufficiently alleged an interest
in the property. It should not set out in its petition the evidence of its title 1
g. Pleading Fraud
In determining the sufficiency of a petition to set aside a judgment of
the probate court allowing a claim against the decedent's estate, unsupport-
27. City of Caruthersville v. Cantrell, 230 S.W. 2d 160 (Mo. App. 1950).
28. State ex rel. Anderson v. Dinwiddie, 359 Mo. 980, 224 S.W. 2d 985 (Mo.
1949).
29. State ex rel. George v. Mitchell, 230 S.W. 25 116 (Mo. App. 1950).
30. Yost v. Seigfreid, 234 S.W. 2d 231 (Mo. App. 1950).
31. Personal Finance Co. of St. Louis v. Endicott, 238 S.W. 2d 51 (Mo. App.
1951).
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ed allegations that the claim was fraudulent, was known by the claimant
to be so and was made for the purpose of deceiving and perpetrating a fraud
upon the court must be disregarded as mere legal conclusions insufficient of
themselves to make out a case of fraud. Fraud must be made to appear from
an allegation of facts actually constituting fraud independently of legal con-
clusions as to the existence of such fraud. 32
h. Pleading a Writing
A pleader may do one of three things in a suit where a claim is founded
upon a written instrument. He may plead the written instrument according
to its legal effect, recite it at length in the pleading, or attach a copy to the
pleading as an exhibit. Having done one of these things, he need do no more
toward pleading the instrument.38
i. Demand for Relief
If a petition fails to state a cause of action in equity, the prayer does
not convert the proceeding at law into one in equity. The demand for
relief is not a part of a cause of action.3 4
j. Exhibits
An exhibit to a pleading is a part thereof for all purposes. It may be
considered in connection with the averments in the petition in passing upon
its sufficiency and in determniing whether the petition states a cause of
action 31
k. Aflm tive Defenses
Payment is an affirmative defense, which must be pleaded before evi-
dence thereof can be introduced against an objection to such evidence."G
1. Surplusage
Where a petition states all of the facts entitling the plaintiff to recover,
and, in addition, states unnecessary facts, the plaintiff will not be required
to sustain the unnecessary part of his pleading or fail in his action, even
though he tried the case on that theory below; but, if he has proved enough
32. Venegoni v. Giudicy, 238 S.W. 2d 17 (Mo. App. 1951).
33. Riley v. White, 231 S.W. 2d 291 (Mo. App. 1950).
34. Zimmerman v. Jones, 236 S.W. 2d 401 (Mo. App. 1950).
35. Corbin v. Hume-Sinclair Coal Mining Co., 237 S.W. 2d 81 (Mo. 1951).
36. Silvey v. Herndon, 234 S.W. 2d 335 (Mo. App. 1950).
[Vol. 16
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to make out a case, he may still recover, and the unnecessary allegations
will be treated as surplusage.3T
m. Admittance of Averments in Pleadings
Allegations contained in a pleading which requires a responsive pleading
stand admitted, if they are not denied in the responsive pleading.3 8
Where the plaintiffs had been in default in the filing of a reply since
December 29, 1948, and knew, on April 16, 1949, that the defendant was
moving for a judgment on the pleadings based on his plan of res judicata
and upon the fact that no reply had been filed or offered for filing until
July 5, 1949, refusal of the trial court to permit the filing of a reply was not
an abuse of its discretion.39
Before the court can be convicted of an abuse of discretion in refusing
to permit a purported reply to be filed out of time, it should at least appear
that the reply offered was sufficient in law to perform the office of that
pleading.40
n. Amendments to Pleadings
Since the adoption of the new civil code, amendments are unlimited in
scope and, with leave, may be filed at any time before final judgment.41
The questions of whether an amendment to a pleading should be allowed
during the course of a trial, and, if so, whether a continuance should follow,
if applied for, are all matters reposing largely in the sound discretion of the
trial court and the test of whether the court abused its discretion is whether
the court's terms protected the rights of the party adversely affected by
affording a reasonable opportunity to meet the allegations of the amend-
ment.
42
Where the plaintiff in an action upon an account fails to set forth in
his petition items of the account or to attach thereto a copy of the account,
it is proper for the court to allow an amendment either amending the peti-
tion itself or attaching exhibits thereto.4 3 Refusal to permit such an amend-
ment on the ground that it was offered after the swearing of the jury is
error.
44
37. Hathaway v. Evans, 235 S.W. 2d 407 (Mo. App. 1950).
38. McIntosh v. Foulke, supra note 22.
39. Ibid.
40. Ibid.
41. Doutt v. Watson, 231 S.W. 2d 230 (Mo. App. 1950).
42. Davis v. Kansas City Public Service Co., 233 S.W. 2d 679 (Mo. 1950).
Runnion v. Paquet, 233 S.W. 2d 803 (Mo. App. 1950) is substantially in accord.
43. J. R. Watkins Co. v. Baker, 236 S.W. 2d 745 (Mo. App. 1951).
44. Ibid.
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The new code provides that the pleadings may be amended at any
time, even after judgment, to make them conform to evidence which has
come in upon an issue not originally raised in the pleadings. This power of
amendment is not limited to instances where such evidence has come in
without objection, but it is provided that, even though the evidence is
objected to at the trial, the court may permit the amendment, and shall do
so freely when the presentation of the merits of the action will be subserved
thereby, and the opposing party fails to satisfy the court that he will be
prejudiced by such amendment. Thus, where the petition in an action by a
passenger against a bus company charged only negligence with respect to
the closing and opening of bus doors, but it was obviously the closing and
opening of the doors, coupled with the further fact that the bus was still in
motion when the doors were opened, which caused the passenger to be
thrown headlong on the pavement, and where the passenger introduced
evidence as to the movement of the bus without any objection, and was
cross-examined with respect to such movement, the court properly per-
mitted the passenger to amend the petition after the conclusion of the trial
to charge negligence in the moving of the bus, and therefore the bus com-
pany was no longer in a position to complain of the reading of an ordinance
dealing with the operation of the bus and of inclusion of the element of the
movement of the bus in the passenger's instruction.45
In an action for injuries to a passenger in the defendant's taxicab,
evidence, admitted without objection or claim of surprise, that the cab was
negligently started forward prematurely before the plaintiff became seated,
entitled the plaintiff to amend his petition to conform to the proof and to
have the case submitted to the jury on that hypothesis.46
Amendments correcting misnomers, even after the running of the stat-
ute of limitation, are permitted. However, where an amendment is deemed
a substitution or an entire change of parties, it will not be allowed after the
running of the statute of limitations. For example, where an action for
death was brought against persons as copartners doing business as a com-
pany and, after the statute of limitations had run against the plaintiff's
claim, the plaintiff filed an amended petition making the company the
sole defendant and alleging it to be a corporation and the original and
amended petition differed only in that the amended petition omitted all
45. Cooley v. St. Louis Public Service Co., 236 S.W. 2d 31 (Mo. App. 1951).
46. Biehle v. Frazier, 232 S.W. 2d 465 (Mo. 1950).
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reference to the individuals sued as copartners and alleged that the com-
pany was a corporation and substituted the word "defendant" for "defen-
dants," the amendment was properly disallowed, since it substituted an
entire change of parties. The statute permitting parties to be dropped or
added at any stage of the action and permitting a party to amend his plead-
ings as a matter of course may not be read apart from the applicable
statute of limitations respecting amendments.47
MOTIONS
a. Admission of Allegations
While a motion to dismiss, which takes the place of a demurrer under
our former practice, admits the allegations of each pleading to which it is
directed for the purposes of that motion, it does not admit the truth of
those allegations for all purposes. It is a limited admission only, and is no
more or less than a claim by the moving party that, even if those allegations
were true, nevertheless they would be insufficient to constitute an effective
pleading.-"
Conclusions of law"0 and forced conclusions from the facts5" are not
admitted by such a motion.
It is permissible for the trial court to hear and decide the issues raised
by the defense of res judicata upon a motion to dismiss. Upon such issues
the motion performs the office of a "speaking" demurrer. The practice of
raising the defense by motion to dismiss is permissive and not mandatory
and such defense may be raised for the first time in an answer.51
b. Motions to Make More Definite
In an action on an account, wherethe itemized statement filed with the
petition showing the account was insufficient to comply with the statute,
it would be proper for the defendants to file a motion to make the statement
more definite and certain. 51
47. Daiprai v. Moberly Fuel & Transfer Co., 223 S.W. 2d 474 (Mo. 1949).
48. Leone v. Bilyeu, 231 S.W. 2d 265 (Mo. App. 1950). In accord: Drainage
Dist. No. 1 Reformed, of Stoddard County v. Matthews, 234 S.W. 2d 567 (Mo.
1950); State ex rel. Public Water Supply Dist. No. 7, Jackson County v. James,
237 S.W. 2d 113 (Mo. 1951); Corbin v. Hume-Sinclair Coal Mining Co., supra
note 35.
49. Drainage Dist. No. 1 Reformed, of Stoddard County v. Matthews, supra
note 48; Corbin v. Hume-Sinclair Coal Mining Co., supra note 35.
50. Drainage Dist. No. 1 Reformed, of Stoddard County v. Matthews, supra
note 48.
51. Metcalf v. American Surety Co. of New York, 232 S.W. 526 (Mo. 1950).
52. J. R. Watkins Co. v. Baker, supra note 43.
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Where the relief sought by the plaintiffs was for the abatement of a
particular alleged obstruction erected by the defendants over an existing
roadway on the defendants' land, in which the plaintiffs claimed an ease-
ment, and for injunctive relief and there was no issue as to the existence and
location of the roadway and no motion was filed to make the description in
the petition more definite and certain, the description of the road as one
extending from the plaintiffs' premises in a southwesterly direction to a
certain hill road, which roadway was located on the defendants' property,
was sufficient and could not be attacked for indefiniteness for the first time
on appeal.53
c. Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings
A motion for a judgment on the pleadings admits all of the facts which
are well pleaded 5 and the motion should not be sustained unless it appears
on the face of the pleadings that the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. "
A motion for a judgment on the pleadings is of common-law origin and
is not favored by courts. It cannot be sustained unless, under the admitted
facts, the moving party is entitled to a judgment, without regard to what
the findings might be on the facts upon which issues are joined." For
example, if an answer pleads a good defense which is determinative of the
issues sought to be raised in the petition, and such defense is admitted by
the reply, or if there be no reply, judgment upon the pleadings is proper. 7
DiscovERY
Under the guise of discretion the trial judge cannot authorize a "fishing
expedition." 8
The mere fact of the institution of a law suit is not a "good cause" for
an unlimited inspection and search of the unknown contents of the defen-
dant's safe-deposit box.59
The statute permitting the inspection of documents clearly requires
that the things to be inspected be designated in the order permitting the
53. Meyer v. Everett, 235 S.W. 2d 130 (Mo. App. 1950).
54. Zimmerman v. Jones, 236 S.W. 2d. 401 (Mo App. 1950). In accord: State
ex rel. Taylor v. Wade, 231 S.W. 2d 179 (Mo. 1950).
55. Zimmerman v. Jones, supra note 54.
56. McIntosh v. Foulke, supra note 22.
57. Ibid.
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inspection; that they c6nstitute or contain evidence material to the issues
in the pending cause; and that they are not privileged. 0
In considering the issue of the materiality of the things of which an
inspection is requested, the appellate court may look to the pleadings, the
application for an order permitting inspection, the evidence in support
thereof and the order as entered, but the issue of relevancy ultimately must
be determined on the basis of the things designated in the order itself and
that requires an examination of them."1
One opposing permission to inspect the contents of a safe-deposit box
has the burden of showing that the objects sought to be inspected do not
constitute or contain material evidence. 2
CONTINUANCES
The granting of a continuance is a matter resting largely within the
discretion of the trial court.63
CONSOLIDATION OF SUITS
A court of equity has the inherent discretionary power to order the
consolidation of actions where the subject matter and relief sought make it
expedient for the court to determine all of the issues in one litigation in or-
der that the rights of the different parties may be adequately adjudicated. 4
RIGHT TO TRIAL BY JURY
The waiver of a jury trial must be an intentional act, and the intention
to waive must plainly appear.65
Where the card listing a case for trial in the circuit court contained a
notation "contested Court-Mech. lien" and the case was a mechanic's lien
suit in which a jury was authorized, and where, when the case came on for
trial, a jury was demanded, the listing card was not an agreement to waive
the jury within the stautory provision that a party shall be deemed to have
waived a trial by jury by filing with the clerk a written consent in person




63. Royston v. Royston, 230 S.W. 2d 777 (Mo. App. 1950).
64. Tracy v. Sluggett, 232 S.W. 2d 926 (Mo. 1950).
65. Hoover v. Abell, 231 S.W. 2d 217 (Mo. App. 1950).
66. Ibid.
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DISMISSALS
Section 510.130 permits one voluntary dismissal without prejudice as
a matter of right.-
This applies to a third-party plaintiff, who may voluntarily dismiss
his third-party petition and commence an action against his third-party
defendant which is entirely unconnected with the action against the third-
party plaintiff.""
The "involuntary dismissal" referred to in Section 510.150, which shall
be "with prejudice unless the court in its order for dismissal shall otherwise
specify" necessarily means an "involuntary dismissal" with notice and an
opportunity to be heard, and not a mere termination of the action by the
court in the absence of the parties pursuant some local court rule. To pre-
vent injustice, it is important for the plaintiff to have an opportunity to
present his claim to have an involuntary dismissal ordered without prejudice.
The code makes this discretionary with the court and, where it appears
that the plaintiff could not have a case or has abandoned it for a long period
of time or is not acting in good faith and only seeks to harass the defendant,
a dismissal without prejudice could properly be denied. When a case is
definitely set for trial and the plaintiff makes default by failure to appear, he
already has notice that some action must be taken and nothing more is re-
quired. Therefore, a dismissal on the court's own motion without a motion
of the defendant and notice thereof, and without notice by the court and
opportunity to be heard on the question of whether the dismissal should be
without prejudice, is not with prejudice and does not constitute an adjudi-
cation on the merits; and it will not prevent the filing of a new action with-
in one year under Section 537.100 or Section 516.230. However, an order of
a trial court sustaining a motion to dismiss on the ground that no cause of
action is stated is an adjudication upon the merits as well as a dismissal
with prejudice, if proper notice of the motion, and opportunity to be heard
thereon, is given, unless the trial court shall otherwise specify. The conclu-
sion seems to be inescapable that such an order, under the plain terms of
the statute, is a final judgment, the reason being that the statute so says.
If a plaintiff desires to file an amended petition, after losing on such a mo-
67. Crispin v. St. Louis Public Service Co., 237 S.W. 2d 153 (Mo. 1951).
Compare Mosely v. McFields, 235 S.W. 2d 399 (Mo. App. 1950), which requires
consent of the court for such a dismissal, since the word "allowed" in the statute
demands such consent.
68. Hayden v. Yelton, 237 S.W. 2d 249 (Mo. App. 1951).
[Vol. 16
98
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 16, Iss. 4 [1951], Art. 1
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol16/iss4/1
1951] WORK OF MISSOURI SUPREME COURT FOR 1950 439
tion, it is up to him to ask leave to do so. The law no longer gives him that
right as a matter of law. If he does not wish to file an amended petition
he has the right to appeal and have the question of the sufficiency of his
pleading determined by an appellate court. Also, the trial court, on a mo-
tion for a new trial, after ruling favorably on the motion to dismiss, may
permit an amended petition to be filed after sustaining the motion for a
new trial, or after setting aside its judgment within thirty days, regardless
of whether or not a motion for new trial has been filed. 69
Where the plaintiff's remedy was under the unlawful detainer statute,
but his petition was based upon an alleged right to an injunction, a dis-
missal, on the ground that the plaintiff had failed to state a cause of action,
would not be with prejudice to a suit for unlawful detainer, where it was
shown, on a motion to set aside the dismissal, that the intention of the court
was to permit the second action to be brought. 6
INSTRUCTIONS
It is a cardinal principle of law that the court shall instruct only on
issues made by the pleadings and supported by the evidence.7 1 However, it
is not error to instruct on an issue not pleaded if the issue is supported by
evidence to which no objection has been entered."2
MOTION FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT
A defendant's motion for a directed verdict admits as true every fact
and circumstance which the plaintiff's evidence tends to prove and it is the
duty of the trial court to give the plaintiff the benefit of every inference of
fact which reasonably can be drawn therefrom. The evidence must be con-
sidered in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and all evidence unfavora-
ble to the plaintiff must be disregarded, except unfavorable evidence of the
plaintiff which is uncontradicted; and the verdict should be directed against
the plaintiff only when the facts in evidence and the legitimate inferences
to be drawn therefrom are so strongly against plaintiff as to leave no room
for reasonable minds to differ.73
69. Crispin v. St. Louis Public Service Co., supra note 67. See also Coyne v.
Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 232 S.W. 2d 377 (Mo. 1950) and Runnion v.
Paquet, supra note 42.
70. Leone v. Bilyeu, supra note 48.
71. Johnson v. Thompson, 236 S.W. 2d 1 (Mo. App. 1950).
72. Doutt v. Watson, supra note 41.
73. Sigmund v. Lowes, 236 S.W. 2d 14 (Mo. App. 1951). In accord: Edison
v. Dean Construction Co., 233 S.W. 2d 820 (Mo. App. 1950); Strawn v. Coca-Cola
Bottling Co. of Missouri, 234 S.W. 2d 233 (Mo. App. 1950).
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Where a jury might reasonably give a verdict for the plaintiff or for
the defendant, a verdict will not be directed;74 but where the plaintiff does
not plead or submit any ground warranting a recovery against the defen-
dant, the court may direct a verdict for the defendant on the plaintiff's
claim.75
Where a defendant moves for a directed verdict, if the plaintiff has
made a case on any ground alleged the defendant's motion for a directed
verdict should be overruled, since such motions are made at the conclusion
of the evidence before the jury is instructed and before the plaintiff has
informed the court of the theory upon which he wishes to sumit the case.10
MOTION FOR JUDGMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH MOTION
FOR DIRECTED VERDICT
The difference between a motion for a directed verdict and an after-
trial motion for judgment in accordance with the motion for a directed
verdict is that, at the time the after-trial motion is presented, the plaintiff
has made known by his requested instructions the theory upon which he
stands. Hence, in passing on the after-trial motion, the court should look
only to the ground or grounds on which the plaintiff submitted his case to
the jury.77
Where the defendant's after-trial motion for judgment in accordance
with its previous motions for a directed verdict advanced but one ground,
and that was that plaintiff under the law and the evidence was not entitled
to recover, the trial court, in sustaining the motion, was not required to
state the ground upon which the motion was sustained as that would require
a wholly unnecessary act 78
Due notice of an after-trial motion for an allowance to the respondent
of an attorney's fee is essential. Failure to give such a notice would be a
denial of due process.79
74. Johnson v. Thompson, supra note 71.
75. New York Central R.R. v. Chicago & E.I. R.R., 231 S.W. 2d 174 (Mo.
1950). Compare Blankenship v. St. Joseph Fuel Oil Mfg. Co., 232 S.W. 2d 954
(Mo. 1950), holding that, if no case is made on the issues submitted in the instruc-
tions, a verdict should be directed.
76. Bean v. St. Louis Public Service Co., 233 S.W. 782 (Mo. App. 1950).
77. Ibid.
78. Ibid.
79. State ex. rel. Perrine v. Keirnan, 237 S.W. 2d 156 (Mo. 1950).
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CASES TRIED WITHOUT A JURY
a. Findings of the Court
When a case is tried without a jury, the trial court is not required to
make findings of fact or declarations of law unless requested to do so b
a party.80
b. Duties of Appellate Courts
When a lawsuit is tried without a jury, on appeal the upper court has
the duty to review the case upon the law and evidence as in suits of an
equitable nature. The judgment may not be set aside unless clearly erron-
eous, and due regard must be given to the opportunity of the trial court to
judge of the credibility of the witnesses."1
This law has, for example, been applied during the past year in equity
cases to a suit to set aside a trustee's deed made pursuant to a foreclosure
sale under a deed of trust,82 to an action to set aside a warranty deed,
wherein the defendant filed a counterclaim for equitable adoption, 3 to an
80. Trask v. Arcadia Valley Bank, 230 S.W. 2d 501 (Mo. App. 1950).
81. Mathis v. Crane, 230 S.W. 2d 707 (Mo. 1950); Gardine v. Cottey, 230
SW. 2d 731 (Mo. 1950); Welborn v. Rigdon, 231 S.W. 2d 127 (Mo. 1950); Proffit
v. Houseworth, 231 S.W. 2d 612 (Mo. 1950); Johnson v. Buffalo School Dist. No. 1
of Dallas County, 231 S.W. 2d 693 (Mo. 1950); Wagner v. Hicken, 232 S.W. 2d
531 (Mo. 1950); Roberts v. Murray, 232 S.W. 2d 540 (Mo. 1950); Handlan v.
Handlan, 232 S.W. 2d 944 (Mo. 1950); Bowman v. Kansas City, 233 S.W. 2d 26(Mo. 1950); Thomason v. Berry, 235, S.W. 2d 308 (Mo. 1950); Bank of Cambria
v. Briggs, 236 S.W. 2d 289 (Mo. 1951); Middleton v. Reece, 236 S.W. 2d 335 (Mo.
1951); Warford v. Smoot, 237 S.W. 2d 184 (Mo. 1951); Hartmaier v. Long, 238
S.W. 2d 332 (Mo. 1951); Ash Grove Lime and Portland Cement Co. v. White, 238
S.W. 2d 368 (Mo. 1951); Wells v. Goff, 239 S.W. 2d 301 (Mo. 1951); Blanke v.
American Life & Accident Ins. Co., 230 S.W. 2d 134 (Mo. App. 1950); Doutt v.
Watson, supra note 41; Frank v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 213 S.W. 2d 234 (Mo.
App. 1950); Bank of Poplar Bluff v. Casey, 231 S.W. 2d 851 (Mo. App. 1950);
Biggs v. Griffith, 231 S.W. 2d 875 (Mo. App. 1950); Murr v. Maxwell, 232 S.W.
2d 219 (Mo. App. 1950); Curlee v. Donaldson, 233 S.W. 2d 746 (Mo. App. 1950);
Common School Dist. No. 27 of Gasconade Co. v. Brinkmann, 233 S.W. 2d 768(Mo. App. 1950); Abbott v. Record, 233 S.W. 2d 793 (Mo. App. 1950); Rucker
v. Fowler, 233 S.W. 2d 809 (Mo. App. 1950); Steinke v. Leicht, 235 S.W. 2d 115
(Mo. App. 1950); Tuller v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 235 S.W. 2d 404 (Mo.
App. 1950); Clinic & Hospital Inc. v. McConnell, 236 S.W. 2d 834 (Mo. App. 1951);
Young v. Moore, 236 S.W. 2d 740 (Mo. App. 1951); McKeown v. John Nooter
Boiler Works Co., 237 S.W. 2d 217 (Mo. App. 1951); Pack v. Pemberton, 237 S.W.
2d 491 (Mo. App. 1951); Adams v. Gardener, 237 S.W. 2d 495 (Mo. App. 1951);
Bay v. Elmer, 237 S.W. 2d 932 (Mo. App. 1951); Rapp v. Rapp, 238 S.W. 2d 80
(Mo. App. 1951); Smith v. City of Hollister, 238 S.W. 2d 457 (Mo. App. 1951);
McBee v. Twin City Fire Ins. Co., 238 S.W. 2d 685 (Mo. App. 1951); Shapiro v.
Shapiro, 238 S.W. 2d 886 (Mo. App. 1951); In re Diehl's Estate, 239 S.W. 2d 523
(Mo. App. 1951); General Contract Purchase Corp. v. Propst, 239 S.W. 2d 563
(Mo. App. 1951).
82. Starr v. Mitchell, 237 S.W. 2d 123 (Mo. 1951).
83. Rich v. Baer, 238 S.W. 2d 408 (Mo. 1951).
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action to enjoin the foreclosure of a deed of trust, for cancellation thereof,
and for cancellation of notes secured thereby, 4 to a suit to set aside an
order allowing a claim on a note, made by a probate court in favor of the
defendant to this suit against the estate of the plaintiff's deceased father,
on the ground that the note upon which the claim was based was forgery
and that the probate court was misled by a fraudulent affidavit filed by the
defendant,"' and to an application for the statutory allowance from the
estate of a deceased wife.80
It has also been applied to an action to recover damages for injuries
sustained in an automobile collision,87 to divorce proceedings, 3 to a replevin
action,s" and to actions to quiet title. 0
This law has also been held applicable to declaratory judgment pro-
ceedings91 and to the review of findings of a referee.9 2
An appellate court, in a case tried without a jury, may consider evi-
dence rejected by the trial court, if it has been duly preserved for the ap-
peal.93 On the other hand, in such a case, the appellate court is not required
to reverse a judgment on account of incorrect rulings on evidence, but may
disregard any incompetent testimony that may have been offered, and reach
a conclusion on the evidence properly admitted. This is true, since the con-
cept of a review of a case includes the idea of disregarding incompetent
evidence. 94
NEW TRIALS
a. Necessity for Motion
It has been held that no motion for a new trial is necessary to preserve
for review the propriety of the court's decision in a proceeding which dis-
missed the plaintiff's second action on the ground that the previous
action on the same cause of action was dismissed with prejudice. The rea-
84. Kramer v. Johnson, 238 S.W. 2d 416 (Mo. 1951).
85. Casserly v. Schofield, 233 S.W. 2d 790 (Mo. App. 1950).
86. McDonnell v. Oxler's Estate, 236 S.W. 2d 568 (Mo. App. 1951).
87. Wyatt v. Hughes, 236 S.W. 2d 371 (Mo. App. 1951).
88. Padgett v. Padgett, 231 S.W. 2d 207 (Mo. 1950); Smith v. Smith, 231 S.W.
2d 637(Mo. App. 1950).
89. Personal Finance Co. of St. Louis v. Endicott, 238 S.W. 2d 51 (Mo. App.
1951).
90. Schell v. City of Jefferson, 235 S.W. 2d 351 (Mo. 1951); Mothershead v.
Milfeld, 236 S.W. 2d 343 (Mo. 1951).
91. Matthews v. McVay, 234 S.'W. 2d 983 (Mo. App. 1950); Butler v. Walsh,
235 S.W. 2d 826 (Mo. App. 1951).
92. McKinley v. Durbin, 213 S.W. 2d 286 (Mo. App. 1950).
93. Kramer v. Johnson, supra note 84.
94. In re Diehl's Estate, supra note 81.
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son given for this holding is that the proceeding is the same as a non-jury
case in which, under Section 510.310, "The question of the sufficiency of the
evidence to support the judgment may be raised whether or not the question
was raised in the trial court."95
b. Grounds for
Since the statutes regulating the method and manner of selecting jurors
are directory and not mandatory, a new trial will not be granted after ver-
dict merely because some irregularity has occurred in the selection and im-
paneling of the juryr
The alleged misconduct of a juror in failing to answer a question on
the voir dire examination as to whether the attorney for one of the defen-
dants had ever represented her as counsel did not authorize a new trial,
where no action was taken by counsel to require the juror to make a specific
answer to the question, and the attorney for such defendant informed the
other attorneys that he had at one time represented the juror in the collec-
tion of a note.97
Perjury of a witness is a valid ground for granting a new trial.9 1
The fact that a party's own witness gives testimony differing from that
which the party expected him to give does not furnish adequate ground for
granting a new trial on the ground of surprise, unless it appears that there
was no want of diligence in guarding against such surpriseY9
A motion for a new trial on the ground that the verdict of the jury is
against the weiglt of the evidence, is not sufficient to attack the verdict on
appeal, 10 but the contrary is true when a verdict or the finding of the trial
court, without a jury, is not supported by any evidence whatever.'' It has
recently been held, however, that an allegation in a motion for a new trial
that the verdict and judgment were not supported by the evidence was
sufficient to require an examination of the evidence by an appellate court.
0 2
For a trial judge in a personal injury action to go into the jury room
and converse with the jury in the absence of the parties and their attorneys
95. Crispin v. St. Louis Public Service Co., supra note 67.
96. Sullivan v. Kansas City Public Service Co., 231 S.W. 2d 822 (Mo. App.
1950).
97. Lemonds v. Holmes, 236 S.W. 2d 56 (Mo. App. 1951).
98. Hicks v. Shanabarger, 236 S.W. 2d 49 (Mo. App. 1951).
99. Silvey v. Herndon, supra note 36.
100. Koch Construction Co. v. Nelson, 213 S.W. 2d 698 (Mo. App. 1950);
Bray v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., 236 S.W. 2d 758 (Mo. App. 1951).
101. Koch Construction Co. v. Nelson, supra note 100.
102. Johnson v. Lea, 229 S.W. 2d 717 (Mo. App. 1950).
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was error requiring that the defendant, against whom a verdict was return-
ed, be granted a new trial, regardless of whether anything prejudicial to
the defendant occurred because of the judge's conduct.10 3
It has been held that prejudice of the jury against the defendant re-
suiting in what he claimed was an excessive verdict can only be remedied
by a new trial, so that such prejudice is a proper ground for a new trial.'0 4
In truth, is a new trial necessary? What of a remittitur?
c. Foundation for Motion
If a person desires to take advantage of an alleged surprise at the trial,
he must object when it occurs and will not be permitted to sit mute and
speculate on the verdict and, when it is found against him, claim a new
trial on the ground of surprise. 05
d. Discretion of Court
Because the trial judge participates in the trial of the case and may
note and study the attentiveness and apparent understanding with which
the jury reacts to the evidence and procedure, that court is vested with con-
siderable discretion in passing upon a motion for a new trial101
During the year this law has been applied to motions for new trials
based on the evidence,10 7 on the conduct of the jury, 08 and on the size of
the verdict. 0 9
In considering the size of a verdict, the trial court has the right to weigh
the evidence. To do so, the trial court may take into consideration all of the
evidence pertaining to the plaintiff's injuries and not merely the plaintiff's
evidence which was most favorable. The trial court has the right to con-
sider and weigh the conflicting evidence offered by the defendant and to
evaluate all of the evidence in the light of the trial court's opportunity to
see, hear and observe the plaintiff and the various witnesses who testify."
103. Wiles v. Stowe, 236 S.W. 2d 21 (Mo. App. 1951).
104. Dye v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., 234 S.W. 2d 532 (Mo. 1950).
105. Silvey v. Herndon, supra note 36.
106. Gedville v. Mahacek, 231 S.W. 2d 305 (Mo. App. 1950). In accord: Mit-
chell v. Pla-Mor, Inc., 237 S.W. 2d 189 (Mo. 1951).
107. Mitchell v. Pla-Mor., Inc., supra note 106.
108. Brady v. St. Louis Public Service Co., 233 S.W. 2d 841 (Mo. 1950).
109. Widener v. St. Louis Public Service Co., 230 S.W. 2d 698 (Mo 1950);
Mitchell v. Pla-Mor Inc., supra note 106; Steuernagel v. St. Louis Public Service
Co., supra note 4; Kasten v. St. Louis Public Service Co., 231 S.W. 2d 252 (Mo. App.
1950); Gedville v. Mahacek, supra note 106.
110. Steuernagel v. St. Louis Public Service Co., supra note 4.
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This use of discretion in passing on a motion for a new trial applies only
to issues of fact and to matters affecting the determination of those issues."'
e. Necessity for Granting Motion
Where the amount of a verdict appears excessive to the trial court, it
is not mandatory that a new trial be granted if such excessiveness can be
cured by a remittitur..1 2 However, where a verdict is the result of passion
and prejudice, a new trial should be granted. 1 '
f. Stating Reasons for Granting Motion
The trial court, in granting a motion for a new trial, must "specify" its
reasons for so doing. It is not enough for a court to state that it grants
such a motion for "error in instructions." It must specify the particular
instructions which are the bases of its ruling and state wherein the errors
in the instructions lie." 4 Also to state that the court erred in admitting,
over the objection and exception of plaintiff, incompetent, irrelevant, imma-
terial, improper, prejudicial and illegal evidence offered by the defendant,
is to give an inadequate ground for granting a new trial. It is too general
to furnish any information to the parties, or to the appellate court, concern-
ing the real basis of the trial court's action." 5
When a trial court grants a new trial without properly specifying of
record the ground or grounds on which the new trial is granted, the pre-
sumption is that the trial court erroneously granted the motion for a new
trial and the burden of supporting such action is placed on the respondent.16
This burden is met if the respondent demonstrates that the motion for
a new trial should have been sustained on any of the grounds specified in the
motion. '" 7
Where the trial court's order granted defendant's motion for a new trial
on the stated ground of "error in instructions" without specifying whether
111. Gedville v. Mahacek, supra note 106.
112. Weber v. St. Louis Public Service Co., 232 S.W. 2d 209 (Mo. App. 1950).
In accord: McKnight v. St. Louis Public Service Co., 235 S.W. 2d 560 (Mo. 1951).
113. Ibid.
114. Davis v. Kansas City Public Service Co., 233 S.W. 2d 669 (Mo. 1950);
Newman v. St. Louis Public Service Co., 238 S.W. 2d 43 (Mo. 1951).
115. Goodman v. Allen Cab Co., 232 S.W. 535 (Mo. 1950). Compare In re
De Gheest's Estate, 232 S.W. 2d 378 (Mo. 1950), in which case the only specific
ground given for granting a new trial was failure to obtain a license to sue. Yet
the court held that, since the new trial order did not limit a further trial to the spe-
cified ground, other matters might be considered at a subsequent trial.
116. Supreme Court Rule 1.10; Davis v. Kansas City Public Service Co., supra
note 114; Goodman v. Allen Cab Co., supra note 115.
117. Goodman v. Allen Cab Co., supra note 115.
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the errors were of law or of fact or what instructions were erroneous, the de-
fendant assumed the burden of pointing out which instructions were correct
or incorrect. Since, in attempting to carry out this burden, he discussed only
the plaintiff's instructions numbers one and two and did not discuss the
plaintiff's instructions three and four or the defendant's refused instructions
number one, the defendant could not complain of the ruling on the plain-
tiff's instructions three and four and on his own refused instruction num-
ber one.""'
The word, "respondent," in Supreme Court Rule 1.10 refers to the party
in whose favor the new trial is granted, who is not always the respondent."'0
g. Production of Evidence to Support Motion
On a motion for a new trial, the moving party may produce records of
the state unemployment office to prove that a witness committed perjury.120
h. Striking Motion from Record
If a motion for a new trial is filed later than ten days after the entry of
the judgment, it is a nullity and is properly struck from the record and
files.'21
i. Time for Ruling on Motion
An order, entered within ninety days after a motion for a new trial is
made, granting a new trial, unless the plaintiff will remit a certain sum
within a few days after the ninety-day period referred to above, is timely,
as it is deemed to be final as of the day it was entered.
22
j. Granting New Trial on Court's Initiative
A court, during the thirty days immediately following entry by it of a
judgment, may, of its own initiative, vacate the judgment and order a new
trial upon its own motion. It has such power during that period whether
there is or is not a motion for new trial. However, that power is discretion-
ary only as to questions of fact and matters affecting the determination of
issues of fact. The manner of the exercise of that discretionary power is a
118. Davis v. Kansas City Public Service Co., supra note 114.
119. Ibid.
120. Hicks v. Shanabarger, supra note 98.
121. Albert J. Hoppe, Inc. v. St. Louis Public Service Co., 235 S.W. 2d 347
(Mo. 1951).
122. McGinley v. St. Louis Public Service Co., 239 S.W. 2d 321 (Mo. 1951);
Steuernagel v. St. Louis Public Service Co., supra note 4.
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question of law, and the court must exercise its discretion in accordance
with the law relating therto.
1 23
Procedurally, the manner of the vacation of the judgment must not be
arbitrary. If the trial court intends summarily to vacate a judgment, the
party in whose favor such judgment stands of record unquestionably is
entitled to reasonable notice and hearing. 24
If a late motion for a new trial is filed, the court, if it sees proper, may
treat it as a suggestion to grant a new trial, and, acting thereon, it may exer-
cise its discretion and grant a new trial during the thirty-day period referred
to above. 2 5 In such a case, if the court's order granting a new trial states
that the motion for a new trial is sustained, in legal contemplation it will
be deemed an action by the court of its own initiative, made at the sugges-
tion of the defendant.12
6
Though a timely motion for a new trial is filed, the court may not, on
its own initiative, grant a new trial after said thirty-day period on any
ground not raised in the motion for a new trial.121
EXCEPTIONS TO RULINGS OF A COURT
To preserve for appeal errors of the trial court one must object to those
errors. Courts, during the year, have applied this doctrine to alleged errors
in admitting evidence, 28 in failing to hold that the plaintiff had not made
a submissible case, 29 in giving instructions,'" and in rulings relating to
arguments. 13'
As to the adequacy of an objection to the court's ruling, it has been
held that where, at the close of the paintiff's evidence, the defendant's mo-
123. Albert J. Hoppe, Inc. v. St. Louis Public Service Co., supra note 121; Mid-
States Equipment Corp. v. Hobart Welders Sales &. Service, Inc., 233 S.W. 2d 757
(Mo. App. 1950).
124. Albert J. Hoppe, Inc. v. St. Louis Public Serevice Co., supra note 121
125. Mid-State Equipment Corp. v. Hobart Welders Sales & Service, Inc., supra
note 123.
126. Ibid.
127. Goodman v. Allen Cab Co., supra note 115; Birmingham v. Kansas City
Public Service Co., 235 S.W. 2d 322 (Mo. 1950); Borders v. Niemoeller, 239 S.W.
2d 555 (Mo. App. 1951).
128. Clark v. McKeone, 234 S.W. 2d 574 (Mo. 1950); Cacioppo v. Kansas City
Public Service Co., 234 S.W. 2d 799 (Mo. App. 1950).
129. Silberman v. Hicks, 231 S.W. 2d 283 (Mo. App. 1950); Doran v. Kansas
City, 237 S.W. 2d 907 (Mo. App. 1951).
130. Bray v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., supra note 100; Sykes v. Stix Baer &
Fuller Co., 238 S.W. 2d 918 (Mo. App. 1951).
131. Clark v. McKeone, supra note 128.
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tion for a directed verdict was overruled and his motion for a new trial,
which raised the contention that he was entitled to a directed verdict, was
overruled, the issue whether the defendant was entitled to a directed ver-
dict was sufficiently raised and preserved and it was unnecessary for the
defendant to go to a useless task of presenting the trial court a formal in-




Only a party to a suit may appeal. Thus, heirs-at-law who have taken
no part in a suit filed against the estate in which they are interested may
not appeal.13
Even a party to an action who is not aggrieved by the judgment ren-
dered therein may not appeal. Thus, where after a verdict for the plaintiff,
the defendant's motion for judgment was overruled but his motion for a new
trial was sustained, the defendant was not aggrieved by any appealable final
order of the trial court adverse to him.13 4
b. Right Statutory
The right of appeal is purely statutory and does not exist where it is
not given by statute.1 3 5
c. Piecemeal Appeal
In the absence of specific authority, appeals do not lie from rulings on
motions which do not involve a final disposition of the cause or from orders
or judgments of an interlocutory nature, as cases are not to be brought to
appellate courts by appeal in detached portions.1 33
However, Supreme Court Rule 3.29 provides, in part, that a judgment
entered upon a verdict returned on the separate trial of one of several claims
in a case constitutes a final judgment for the purposes of an appeal, and, to
this extent, modifies our former conception of a judgment for the purposes
of an appeal.18 7
132. Foulke v. McIntosh, 234 S.W. 2d 805 (Mo. App. 1950).
133. Ruddy v. Labar's Estate, 231 S.W. 2d 833 (Mo. App. 1950).
134. Luethans v. Lahey, 237 S.W. 2d 209 (Mo. App. 1951).
135. Madison v. Sheets, 236 S.W. 2d 286 (Mo. 1951); Schneider v. St. Louis
Public Service Co., 238 S.W. 2d 350 (Mo. 1951); Ruddy v. Labar's Estate, supra
note 133; Shoush v. Truitt, 235 S.W. 2d 859 (Mo. App. 1951); Luethans v. Lahey,
supra note 134; Farmers Mutual Hail Ins. Co. v. Garnand, 238 S.W. 2d 437 (Mo.
App. 1951).
136. Madison v. Sheets, supra note 135.
137. Harper v. St. Joseph Lead Co., 233 S.W. 2d 835 (Mo. 1950); Deeds v.
Foster, 235 S.W. 2d 262 (Mo. 1951).
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For example, in a quiet title action, where the issues of the claim stated
in count 1 of the plaintiff's complaint were separately tried, and a separate
judgment was entered thereon, the judgment was final for purposes of an
appeal.1 88
d. Final Judgments
A judgment which does not dispose of a counterclaim or cross-claim is
not a final judgment.18 9
Also, a judgment, in an action to establish a private road across lands
of the defendants, finding that the allegations of the plaintiff's petition were
true, that the plaintiff was entitled to a private road of necessity on and
across the defendant's land to connect the plaintiff's land with a public
road, and ordering that a private road be established on and across the
defendant's land, and appointing three commissioners to view the premises,
to mark out a road, and to assess damages was not a final appealable
judgment? 40
On the other hand, a dismissal without prejudice is a final judgment. 4-
Again, an appeal lies from an order overruling a motion to vacate a judg-
ment.'1 42 Further, in a condemnation proceeding, a decision rendered by a
circuit court in a separate trial upon a voluntary interplea of conflicting
claims of respective parties to an award deposited in court would be final
and appealable, notwithstanding the fact that the ultimate award of dam-
ages was a question yet to be determined. 4 3
A judgment becomes final, for the purpose of ascertaining the time
within which an appeal must be taken, on the date a motion for a new
trial is overruled.144
However, for that purpose, where a motion for a new trial has been
made, the judgment becomes final, not as of the date of an order granting
a new trial unless a remittitur is made within a stated reasonable time, but
upon the expiration of that period, where the plaintiff does not remit.' *5
138. Mothershead v. Milfeld, supra note 90.
139. Bennett v. Wood, 239 S.W. 2d 325 (Mo. 1951); Deeds v. Foster, supra
note 137; Farmers Mutual Hail Ins. Co., supra note 135.
140. Madison v. Sheets, supra note 135.
141. Granger v. Barber, 236 S.W. 2d 293 (Mo. 1951).
142. Caruthersville School District No. 18 of Pemiscot County v. Latshaw, 233
S.W. 2d 6 (Mo. 1950).
143. State ex rel. State Highway Commission v. Houchens, 235 S.W. 2d 97
(Mo. App. 1950).
144. Starr v. Mitchell, supra note 82.
145. Steuernagel v. St. Louis Public Service Co., supra note 4.
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e. How Taken
1. NOTICE OF APPEAL
(a) Necessity for
The timely filing of a notice of appeal is the statutory "vital step" for
perfecting an appeal and is jurisdictional.146 This is the only requirement
necessary to invoke appellate juridiction. The appeal becomes effective
upon the timely filing of the notice. 14
(b) Time for Filing
It is a mandatory requirement that a notice of appeal be filed not later
than ten days after the judgment or order appealed from becomes final,
except where the ten days have expired and the filing of a notice of appeal,
within six months from the date of final judgment, has been permitted by
a special order of an appropriate appellate court.14s
(c) Docket Fee to Accompany Notice
There can be no valid filing of a notice of appeal until the docket fee
is paid. 4 '
2. Bonds
The recognized purpose of a supersedeas bond is to stay the execution
or enforcement, pending the appeal, of any order or judgment which com-
mands or permits some act to be done, or which is of a nature to be actively
enforced against the party affected. An appeal from an order modifying a
divorce decree with respect to the custody of a minor child comes within
the purview of the statute, and does not stay the enforcement of the order
in the absence of the giving of a supersedeas bond, since the order is not
self-executing, but requires something to be done to carry it into effect.1 10
3. Briefs
(a) Abandonment of Grounds for Appeal
Grounds for appeal which are not briefed are deemed abandonment.1
It naturally follows that they can not be used as bases for appeal, if they are
not included in a motion for a new trial.152
146. Starr v. Mitchell, supra note 82.
147. Kattering v. Franz, 231 S.W. 2d 148 (Mo. 1950).
148. Starr v. Mitchell, supra note 82; Kattering v. Franz, supra note 147;
Mosely v. McFields, 235 S.W. 2d 399 (Mo. App. 1950).
149. Kattering v. Franz, supra note 147; Alberswerth v. Lohse, 232 S.W. 2d
213 (Mo. App. 1950).
150. Green v. Perr, 238 S.W. 2d 922 (Mo. App. 1951).
151. Persons v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 233 S.W. 2d 729 (Mo. 1950);
Giers Improvement Corp. v. Investment Service, Inc., 235 S.W. 2d 355 (Mo. 1950);
Tureman v. Altman, 239 S.W. 2d 304 (Mo. 1951); Sigmund v. Lowes, supra note 73.
152. Steinke v. Leicht, 235 S.W. 2d 115 (Mo. App. 1951).
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(b) Jurisdictional Statement -
Though a technical jurisdictional statement was lacking in a recent
brief, the supreme court took jurisdiction of the case, since the first para-
graph of the brief revealed that title to real estate was involved in the
appeal.'6
(c) Statement of Facts
Where the question involved on appeal was plainly obvious from the
statement of facts in a brief, although the brief did not contain specific page
references to the transcript, the appeal was reviewed both upon law and
the evidence and an appropriate judgment was entered. 15 4
(d) Points and Authorities
Under Supreme Court Rule 1.08 which provides, among other things,
that the brief shall contain the points relied on, which shall specify the alle-
gations of error, with citation of authorities, where the particular point re-
lied on is not made in the manner prescribed by said rule, it will not be
noticed. The point is not properly presented for review if made for the first
time in the argument. 55
Points should be stated definitely. For example, statements that the
verdict is against the evidence, 56 that the "testimony and circumstances of
the parties explain this unreasonable verdict,"'157 and that the court erred in
not sustaining the appellant's motion for a new trial-', have been held to
be too general to present points for review. However, in setting forth points,
one need not use the precise language he employed to state alleged errors
in his motion for a new trial.'"
153. Noyes v. Stewart, 235 S.W. 2d 333 (Mo. 1951).
154. Pahler v. Schoenhals, 234 S.W. 2d 581 (Mo. 1950).
155. Sykes v. Stix, Baer & Fuller Co., 238 S.W. 2d 918 (Mo. App. 1951). See
in accord: Harding v. Triplett, 235 S.W. 2d 112 "(Mo. 1951). Compare Roach v.
Kohn, 235 S.W. 2d 284 (Mo. 1951), in which the court reviewed the case on its
merits, though the specifications of errors were very general and no attempt was
made to apply them to the case, and though no authorities were cited. Also see
Dolan v. Rabenberg, 231 S.W. 2d 150 (Mo. 1950); Clark v. McKeone, supra note
128; Kramer v. Johnson, supra note 84. and Bray v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry.,
supra note 100, in which cases the appellate courts considered a meritorious con-
tention of the appellant, notwithstanding great deficiencies in the form of the
presentation of their appeals.
156. Kasten v. St. Louis Service Co., supra note 109.
157. Jones v. Carter, 234 S.W. 2d 229 (Mo. App. 1950).
158. Kasten v. St. Louis Public Service Co., supra note 109.
159. Sigmund v. Lowes, supra note 73.
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At this point, it should again be noticed that where the trial court
merely sustains a motion for a new trial on broadly stated grounds, the
respondent, who moved for the new trial, is charged on appeal with the
burden of supporting the court's action.' 60
f. Burden of Proof
Where a trial court has granted a new trial assigning as grounds there-
for that the verdict was so excessive as to indicate bias and prejudice
against the defendant, the party complaining of the order granting the new
trial has the burden of showing that there was abuse of discretion on the
part of the trial court.16'
g. Changing Theories on Appeal
On appeal a party will not be permitted to change the theory on which
his case is tried.1
6 2
h. Matters Considered on Appeal
An appellate court will not consider alleged errors which one who has
not appealed claims have been committed by a trial court.18 3 Neither will
an appellate court adjudge matter not appealed from,6 4 matters objected
to too late to make the objection effective,1 5 or those not presented to the
trial court for decision,866 as, for example, those not objected to in a motion
for a new trial,167 or not decided by the trial court. 68 Neither will it con-
sider a point not presented in the appellate transcript.169 Further, the ac-
tion of a trial court in granting a new trial on the ground of the jury's bias
160. Newman v. St. Louis Public Service Co., supra note 114.
161. Dye v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., supra note 104.
162. Smitlipeter v. Wabash R.R., 231 S.W. 2d 135 (Mo. 1950); Nance v. Atchi-
son T. & S. F. Ry., 232 S.W. 2d 457 (Mo. 1950); Frye v. Baskin, supra note 15;
Blankenship v. St. Joseph Fuel Oil & Mfg. Co., 232 S.W. 2d 954 (Mo. 1950); Win-
scott v. Frazier, 236 S.W. 2d 382 (Mo. App. 1951).
163. Corbin v. Hume-Sinclair Coal Mining Co., supra note 3$; Sheridan v.
Short, 237 S.W. 2d 230 (Mo. App. 1951).
164. Stafford v. McDonnell, 238 S.W. 2d 432 (Mo. 1950); Majewski v. Bender,
237 S.W. 2d 235 (Mo. App. 1951); Newman v. St. Louis Public Service Co., supra
note 114.
165. Stremming v. Holekamp Lumber Co., 238 S.W. 2d 31 (Mo. App. 19$1).
166. Graham v. Gardner, 233 S.W. 2d 797 (Mo. App. 1950); Greaves v. Huber,
235 S.W. 2d 86 (Mo. App. 1950); Johnson v. Thompson, 236 S.W. 2d 1 (Mo. App.
1950).
167. Handlan v. Handlan, supra note 81; Kennedy v. Boden, 231 S.W. 2d
862 (Mo. App. 1950); Runnion v. Paquet, supra note 42; Naylor v. St. Louis Public
Service Co., 235 S.W. 2d 72 (Mo. App. 1951); Stremming v. Holekamp Lumber Co.,
supra note 165.
168. Hill v. Hill, 236 S.W. 2d 394 (Mo. App. 1951).
169. McIlvain v. Kavorinos, 236 S.W. 2d 322 (Mo. 1951).
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or prejudice can not be attacked on the ground that the record did not show
bias or prejudice, since the court's action may have been based upon matters
which occurred at the trial, but which could not be preserved in the record.Y7 °
Again, the appellate court does not handle matters occurring after appeal.
For instance, it is the trial court's duty to deal with the question of giving
credit for amounts paid by the debtor since the last appeal. 7 1 On the other
hand, plain errors will be considered even though they are not raised on
the appeal.172 Such error exists where a default judgment is unsupported
by substantial evidence,'17 and where a judgment is excessive.Y 4
i. Duty of Appellate Court
(1) In General
When an appellate court concludes that a judgment entered below is
deficient, it must proceed to consider the merits of the issues, determine and
declare the rights of the parties, dispose of the appeal and give such judg-
ment as the trial court ought to have given." 5 It must also determine
whether an appeal is premature.176
(2) In Connection with Pleadings
On appeal an appellate court is bound by the pleadings before it.-7 It
must accept the facts alleged in a position as true on appeal from an order
dismissing a petition for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted.17  Where an attack on the sufficiency of a petition is made for the
first time on appeal, even conclusions of the pleader may be construed as
allegations of fact,179 and, in general, when a jury returns a verdict in favor
of the plaintiff, on appeal, the plaintiff's petition is entitled to a liberal
construction. 80
170. Mitchell v. Pla-Mor, Inc., supra note 106.
171. Stafford v. McDonnell, supra note 164.
172. Davis v. Kansas City Service Co., supra note 114; Riley v. White, 231
S.W. 2d 291 (Mo. App. 1950); Williams v. Cobb, 239 S.W. 2d 770 (Mo. App. 1951).
173. Riley v. White, supra note 172.
174. Williams v. Cobb, supra note 172.
175. St. Louis Housing Authority v. City of St. Louis, 239 S.W. 2d 289 (Mo.
1951); Tilson v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n. of St. Louis, 236 S.W. 2d 42 (Mo. App.
1951).
176. Deeds v. Foster, supra note 137; Farmers Mut. Hail Ins. Co. v. Garnand,
.rupra note 135.
177. Jacquemin v. Mercantile Commerce Bank & Trust Co., 234 S.W. 2d 789
(Mo. 1950).
178. Schoen v. Lange, 238 S.W. 2d 902 (Mo. App. 1951).
179. Riley v. White, supra note 172.
180. Ewing v. Dubuque Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 237 S.W. 2d 498 (Mo. App.
1951).
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(3) As to Matters Involving Discretion of Court or Jury
Appellate courts will not reverse decisions of trial courts on matters
within the latter's discretion, unless that discretion has been abused. This
doctrine has been applied to rulings on the prejudicial effect of emotional
demonstrations by witnesses,181 to the credibility of witnesses,182 to the
weight of evidence,183 to the amount of damages awarded,8 4 and to the
reopening of a case for the presentation of additional testimony.18 This
doctrine also applies to appeals from judgments of the Industrial Commis-
sion in workmen's compensation cases. 86
j. Tests Applied in Reaching Judgment
(1) Most Favorable Test
In considering whether a submissible case has been made, the appellate
court looks upon the evidence, and all inferences which may be fairly and
reasonably drawn therefrom, in the light most favorable to the party in
whose favor the jury's verdict was given.' s  This test has also been applied
181. Gedville v. Mahacek, supra note 106; Clark v. McKeone, supra note 128.
182. Gardine v. Cottey, 230 S.W. 2d 731 (Mo. 1950); Kasten v. St. Louis Public
Service Co., supra note 109; Clemens v. Clemens, 238 S.W. 2d. 47 (Mo. App. 1951).
183. Widener v. St. Louis Public Service Co., supra note 109; Gardine v. Cottey,
supra note 182; Smithpeter v. Wabash R.R., supra note 162; Steckdaub v. Sparks,
231 S.W. 2d 160 (Mo. 1950); Nance v. Atchison, T. &. S. F. Ry., supra note 162;
Clark v. McKeone, supra note 128; Goodwin v. Winston, 230 S.W. 2d 793 (Mo.
App. 1950); Kasten v. St. Louis Public Service Co., supra note 109; Frye v. Baskin,
supra note 15; Sigmund v. Lowes, supra note 73; Fenimore v. Potashnick Local
Truck System, 239 S.W. 2d 362 (Mo. App. 1951).
184. Widener v. St. Louis Public Service Co., supra note 109; Smithpeter v.
Wabash R.R., supra note 162; Conner v. Neiswender, 232 S.W. 2d 469 (Mo. 1950);
Dye v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., supra note 104; Mitchell v. Pla-Mor, Inc.,
supra note 106; Steuemagel v. St. Louis Public Service Co., supra note 109; Cruce
v. Gulf, Mobile & Ohio R.R., 238 S.W. 2d 674 (Mo. 1951); Kasten v. St. Louis
Public Service Co., supra note 109; Cacioppo v. Kansas City Public Service Co.,
supra note 167; Smith v. St. Louis Public Service Co., 235 S.W. 2d 102 (Mo. App.
1951); Bray v. St. Louis-SanFrancisco Ry., supra note 100.
185. Narens v. St. Louis Public Service Co., 238 S.W. 2d 37 (Mo. App. 1951).
186. Thompson v. Railway Express Agency, 236 S.W. 2d 36 (Mo. App. 1951).
187. Burkland v. Starry, 234 S.W. 2d 608 (Mo. 1950). In accord: Smithpeter
v. Wabash R.R., supra note 162; Stone v. Farmington Aviation Corporation, 232
S.W. 2d 495 (Mo. 1950); Nance v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry., supra note 162; Silvey
v. Herndon, supra note 36; Brungs v. St. Louis Public Service Co., 235 S.W. 2d 81(Mo. App. 1950); Rauch v. Gas Service Co., 235 S.W. 2d 420 (Mo. App. 1950);
Lemonds v. Holmes, supra note 97; Johnson v. Thompson, supra note 166; Ilays v.
'Dell, 236 S.W. 2d 367 (Mo. App. 1951); Martini v. St. Louis Public Service "Co.,
237 S.W. 2d 213 (Mo. App. 1951); Simon v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n. of St. Louis, 237
S.W. 2d 244 (Mo. App. 1951); Murphy v. Kresge Co., 239 S.W. 2d 573 (Mo.
App. 1951).
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in determining whether a verdict has been excessive, 18 and whether a direct-
ed verdict 8 0 or an after-trial motion, similar to a motion for a judgment
notwithstanding the verdict, was properly granted. s0 However, this test
does not permit an appellate court to assume facts upon which the record
is silent nor to draw speculative inferences.' 91
(2) Regard for Trial Court's Attitude
An appellate court must give due regard to the attitude of the trial
judges who had the opportunity personally to observe what transpired at
the trial.'1 -
(3) Influence on Trial Court
In a trial before a court alone, the appellate court will not assume that
the trial court was influenced by incompetent evidence. 93
(4) Liberality of Appellate Court
When a motion for a new trial is sustained, an appellate court will be
more liberal in upholding such action than it might be in reversing a judg-
ment on the same ground on appeal, since an appellate court tends to follow
the judgment of the trial court as to the prejudicial effect of errors at a trial,
as that court has a better knowledge of what occurred at the trial than the
appellate court has.' 94
k. Judgment of Appellate Court
(1) Harmless Error
The appellate court will not reverse a judgment because of a harmless
error.
95
188. Osburn v. Kansas City Southern Ry., 230 S.W. 2d 856 (Mo. 1950); Smith
v. St. Louis Public Service Co., supra note 184; Cooley v. St. Louis Public Service
Co., supra note 45.
189. Dickinson v. Eden Theatre Co., 231 S.W. 2d 609 (Mo. 1950); Brawley v.
Harwell, 236 S.W. 2d 419 (Mo. App. 1951); Doran v. Kansas City, 237 S.W. 2d
907 (Mo. App. 1951).
190. Marshall v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co., 234 S.W. 2d 524 (Mo. 1950);
Hawkins v. Laughlin, 236 S.W. 2d 375 (Mo. App. 1951).
191. Osbourn v. Kansas City Southern Ry., supra note 188.
192. Smith v. St. Louis Public Service Co., supra note 184.
193. Ramos v. Ramos, 232 S.W. 2d 188 (Mo. App. 1950).
194. Hicks v. Shanabarger, supra note 98.
195. Hoock v. S. S. Kresge Co., 230 S.W. 2d 758 (Mo. 1950); Smithpeter v.
Wabash R.R. supra note 162; Davidson v. Haggard, 236 S.W. 2d 405 (Mo. App.
1950); De Voto v. St. Louis Public Service Co., 238 S.W. 2d 66 (Mo. App. 1951).
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(2) Direction of Judgment Though New Trial Granted by Trial Court
An appellate court has authority to direct the judgment that should
be entered, even though the trial court has ordered a new trial. For example,
after a case had been in the courts for some time where the plaintiff by a
motion to modify had requested a final disposition of the case, and where the
defendant had not contended in its brief that there was any ground, other
than an excessive verdict, which would sustain the granting of a new trial,
the appellate court passed on the issue of damages and gave directions for a
final disposition of the case. 198
(3) Reduction of Judgment
Even though an appellant in its original brief did not ask the appellate
court to order a remittitur in addition to the one ordered by the trial court,
where the appellant in that brief cited cases involving excessive verdicts in
which the supreme court had ordered remittiturs and in its reply brief
specifically asked that, if a new trial should be denied, the appellate court
should order a further remittitur, the court examined the question of wheth-
er the amount of the verdict, as reduced by the trial court, was still ex-
cessive.197
(4) Correction of Transcript
An inadvertent misstatement in the transcript of a record may be cor-
rected at the direction of the appellate court so as to show the correct date
on which a motion for a new trial was overruled and the correction will be
certified to the clerk of the trial court.198
(5) Remand
The question of whether a case shall be remanded for retrial only
arises where the judgment is to be reversed, and a judgment is only reversed
where the record reveals that error was committed at the trial. Hence, where
a trial is free from error in the only respect in which plaintiff suggests that
error was committed, the case will not be reversed and remanded. 19g
On the other hand, where the appellate court determined that the plain-
tiff was entitled to legal relief, but the record did not sustain the equitable
196. Steuernagel v. St. Louis Public Service Co., supra note 4.
197. Abernathy v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., 237 S.W. 2d 161 (Mo. 1951).
198. Starr v. Mitchell, supra note 82.
199. Bowzer v. Singer, 231 S.W. 2d 309 (Mo. App. 1950).
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claims upon which the trial court originally assumed jurisdiction, the upper
court decided that it could not grant legal relief and remanded the case
to the trial court for determination of the plaintiff's legal remedies.2 0 0
Where issues involved in the claim under the plaintiff's petition and
the defendant's counterclaim was so interrelated and interdependent that
trial of one necessarily involved the trial of the other, and where, on appeal,
the plaintiff's claim was required to be remanded for retrial, the defendant's
counterclaim was also required to be sent back for a new trial, though there
were no assignments of errors and no briefing by the defendant with respect
to the counterclaim. 20 1 Further, where the trial court in a personal injury
action held that the verdict of $9,500 was excessive and required that amount
be reduced by a remittitur to $6,000, and the judgment for the plaintiff was
reversed because of the giving of an erroneous instruction, the case was
ordered retried on all of its issues, including the issue of the proper amount
of damages. 20 2
TRANSFER
When a case is transferred to the supreme court from a court of ap-
peals the supreme court considers the case as if it had come to it upon an
original appeal.203
200. Welborn v. Rigdon, supra note 81.
201. Vogelgesang v. Waelder, 238 S.W. 2d 849 (Mo. App. 1951).
202. Kelly v. Lahey, 232 S.W. 2d 177 (Mo. App. 1950).
203. Marshall v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., supra note 190; In re Adoption of
Sypolt, 237 S.W. 2d 193 (Mo. 1951).
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